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To Our Readers

Now in the 20th year of our youth—something of a record for a "little" or radical magazine—we come to you, as every two years we must, with a request for help.

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FALL 1974

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

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Irving Howe

A Season for Democracy

It has been a pretty good season for democracy, the summer of 1974. Not quite the triumph some writers have suggested, but encouraging enough both in Europe and America.

EUROPE. The collapse of the Portuguese and Greek juntas, good news intrinsically, raises fascinating problems. In neither case does there seem to have been an internal resistance movement powerful enough to have overthrown the dictatorship. What apparently happened, both in Portugal and Greece, was the worsening of an internal crisis among the men in power and, still more, a recognition within the bourgeoisie, the larger ranks of officers, and segments of the middle class that the military cliques in power had reached a point of utter incapacity. In both countries, this had to do with foreign policy: the Portuguese empire and the Cyprus disaster. One would like to know whether the military cliques ruling Portugal and Greece came to a realization by themselves that they were incapable of governing a European country, or whether they were pressured/driven out of power by social forces that had previously supported them. Probably the answer is: both. It's the relationship between the two possibilities that seems intriguing.

Everyone understands that the restoration of democracy in both countries is still fragile. There is the problem of removing from positions of power repressive officers, especially in Greece. There is the larger problem that neither country has a sufficiently deep-rooted political life, with parties extending beyond mere cliques of operators and clients—except for Communist parties, whose mass support represents another and severe problem for the survival of democracy. Not by chance do Portugal and Greece lack strong liberal and/or social democratic movements offering viable democratic alternatives to the authoritarians of both extremes. And perhaps most urgent of all, both countries need extensive reforms in order to create the social conditions in which democracy can survive—though it may be that neither has the resources fully to carry them through. If the "European community" were what its advertisers claim it to be, it would now proceed to offer substantial help at both ends of the continent in order to strengthen the democratic base of Europe.

But of all this, more next time.

AMERICA. The resignation of Nixon is a good in itself. There comes a point when a government must leave the scene, not because, as Nixon said in his dishonest speech of resignation, it has lost its political "base" but because it no longer commands the elementary moral authority, which, short of terror, is the premise of government.

The change of guard in the White House has been hailed as evidence that "the system works." Well, yes—but not an unqualified yes.

The public exposure, though by no means complete as yet, took on a merciless character; the press had no choice but to pile up the evidence indicting Nixon and his cronies as liars and thugs; and in the televised hearings of the House Judiciary Committee there were some voices trying to think the problem through, clearly concerned with the preservation of democratic norms. (There is something ironic in the sight of a country congratulating itself that it has a few reflective men in its Congress, but let that pass . . . .) When all is said and

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done, and one remembers the blood that accompanies political successions in other countries, there *was* something impressive about the recent American events.

But if "the system works" in the sense that ways were found to expel a man from the presidency who, by elementary moral standards, should never have been there at all, that does not warrant the self-congratulation that followed his resignation. Difficult problems remain: How was it possible for so great an extralegal concentration of power to occur within and near the executive branch, from the White House to the CIA? Why did the Congress show itself to be so supine over the last period—so that the issue of Nixon's unsanctioned invasion of Cambodia seemed to require an evasion by the House Judiciary Committee on the ground that, if illegal, the invasion should have been challenged by the Congress immediately? What new procedures are to be built into the political system, so that the domination of big money can be—not removed, since that is impossible in a capitalist society—but at least held in check a little?

And perhaps most important: how was it possible, what failures in our society enabled a cheap-jack like Richard Nixon, whose past record was a matter of public knowledge, to gain the Republican nomination and then the presidency?

A "mere accident"? We doubt it. The narrowness of his victory over Humphrey in 1968 may support that judgment, but not the fact that he was able to run against Humphrey in the first place. The notion that advertising methods in political campaigns render democracy a fraud, a mere charade manipulated by slicksters, is one that we reject. But we certainly would not deny that this represents a serious deformation of democratic norms. Nixon was so clearly a *fabrication,* that even his removal is hardly—if you consider the powers he accumulated—sufficient reason for placebos that "the system works."

Yes, it works; but how well does it work?

The rhetoric at the moment I write these notes (it may have faded by the time you read them) is that we must now "heal the wounds." Not so fast! Questions remain to be probed, facts discovered, judgments considered. The whole story isn't out yet, and it ought to be. For once, let's stick with something in this country and not flit to the next "show," as if public life were equivalent to turning a TV dial. There ought to be some looking-back at political choices. Do George Meany and all the meanies still think it was right to be "neutral" in 1972? Haven't recent events done anything to shake their complacence? Will the array of intellectuals who supported Nixon as the candidate of "prudence" now contribute to the upkeep of the *New York Times* another ad offering retrospective thoughts? (A generous suggestion for heading such an ad: What Price Prudence Now?)

The wounds of Watergate and all it represents cannot be healed until properly treated. That means continued investigation, a prosecution, neither vengeful nor lax, and efforts to improve the political structure so that there is a richer democratic substance within our democratic (but insufficiently democratic) forms.

It also means that, since the Democrats cannot coast into the coming congressional elections by simply chanting "Watergate," concrete proposals must now be forthcoming for coping with the economic crisis. Gerry Ford may well be an honest man, but his policies remain those of the mindless right, chipping away at the edges of the welfare state and proposing that the burdens of inflation be borne mainly by the workers and the poor.

The liberal-left has advanced concrete proposals, some in the pages of this journal and others elsewhere. Now the time has come to formulate them more sharply and to dramatize them, so as to resume political debate and move us beyond, while not forgetting, the shame and miseries of the last few years. □

P.S. These lines were written before Pres. Ford pardoned ex-Pres. Nixon, a piece of flimflam that ought to sharpen skepticism as to how well "the system worked." It should also put an end to the sentimentalism about "the new Gerry," which swept the country for a few weeks. Honest he may be, but politically he remains the dull-spirited conservative hack he's always been. You don't develop a mind just because you change your address. □

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Maurice Goldbloom

The New Greece: Prelude to Freedom?

August 12, 1974

The overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship was front-page news throughout the Western world. But in Greece, as in Spain, it was almost the *only* front-page news for many days after it happened. Under the rigid press censorship Greek newspapers could not, of course, suggest that developments in Portugal were relevant for Greece. But it would have been superfluous to do so, since everyone got the point. The junta's journalistic spokesmen could not ignore it; they sought to ward off the evil omen by incanting assertions that "Greece is not Portugal" and "Those who would bring back the past should not take comfort in the events in Portugal; if events in Greece were to parallel those in Portugal, the return to parliamentarianism would take half a century."

Even the Greek junta's most sanguine enemies, however, did not expect it to go the way of Portugal quite as quickly as it did. The weaknesses of the Greek dictatorship were obvious enough. Under Papadopoulos it had the support of an estimated 8 percent of the population. His successors, in the first few days following his overthrow last November, were hailed ecstatically by the great majority of the population. But after that, when it became evident that they brought not liberation but a still more merciless tyranny, they had far less popular support than even Papadopoulos had enjoyed.

Again, the junta after Papadopoulos depended on the armed forces as it had under Papadopoulos. But the divisions within the armed forces, which had led to his replacement, continued in a more acute form under his successors. His overthrow had been accomplished by a temporary alliance of two major groups of officers who opposed him for opposite reasons. One, led by Dimitrios Ioannides, the notorious torturer who headed the Military Police, were the true believers of the 1967 coup. They opposed Papadopoulos because of the pervasive corruption of his regime and even more because of his relaxation of its original rigidity. To them, the student demonstrations, which reached their climax in the revolt of November 1973, were the result of his attempt to placate world public opinion and the Greek opposition by such measures as partial amnesties, a relaxation of press censorship, and promises of eventual elections. Within this faction, further subdivisions existed; notably, a group of younger officers took Colonel Muammar el Qadaffi of Libya as their model and hoped to institute a sort of military collectivism.

The other main group consisted of traditionalist officers, mostly royalist. They were especially strong in the Navy and Air Force, where the higher level of education and technological skill required had made it impossible for the junta to purge the officer corps as thoroughly as it would have liked. But they were also strong in the upper ranks of the regular Army. Many of them had gone along with the "Revolution" of April 21, 1967, because they assumed it was a traditionalist coup designed to prevent a sharp swing to the Left. But they objected to the subversion of military discipline that resulted when the colonels and majors who had carried out the coup gave orders to the generals. They were unhappy when the sort of repressive measures, which they had approved against Left and Center, were turned against the political leaders and newspapers of the traditional Right. They resented the abolition of the monarchy in favor of a "republic" in which power was concentrated in the hands of the self-elected President Papadopoulos. They were upset by the popular hostility to the armed forces that had developed as a result of their identification with the dictatorship. And many of them were angry and ashamed because of the role that had been imposed on the armed forces in the suppression of the student revolt.

There is some evidence suggesting that officers of this group had planned a coup to bring Karamanlis back last November, but that Ioannides had acted first, and that they had joined his coup so as to remain in a position to influence the course of events. Be that as it may, the overthrow of Papadopoulos left the two factions which had joined to accomplish it in a state of cold war with one another. (At the same time the Papadopoulos loyalists in the

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Army now constituted a separate oppositional tendency.) Ioannides controlled the Military Police and through it the Athens area and the central government; his men ran the ministries without regard to their nominal heads. The stronghold of the other group was the Third Army, with headquarters in Salonica. As the Ioannides group showed its inability to handle the affairs of the country, tensions between the two factions increased. One sign of this was that the traditionalist right-wing newspaper *Ellenikos Vorras* was able, under the protection of the Third Army, to print material that could not appear in Athens. And when a reader asked why this paper did not attack the Center Union leaders George Mavros and John Zigdis for trying to get other nations to cut off military aid to Greece, it replied that it only attacked those who were in a position to defend themselves. Such an answer would have been unthinkable for any Greek-language paper in Athens.

Besides its general unpopularity and the instability of its base in the armed forces, the Ioannides junta also found its position undermined by the catastrophic deterioration in the economic situation. Official figures showed an inflation rate of some 32 percent for the past year, but these were almost certainly manipulated; the real rate was closer to 50 percent and perhaps higher. The balance of trade for the first four months of 1974 showed a deficit of about $1 billion, twice the already astronomical figure for the previous year. At the same time the income from invisibles, which had in any case never been adequate to cover even half the trade gap, was beginning to drop. And interest payments on the billions of dollars the junta had borrowed at high rates in previous years added to the problem. New loans, even with a friend at Chase Manhattan, were almost impossible to get. Chase was willing, but could not round up a syndicate. And the sort of austerity program Greece might have to undertake could have precipitated the downfall of the regime.

IT WAS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES that Ioannides resorted to the classic stratagem of rulers beset by domestic problems with which they are unable to cope. He embarked on an adventure abroad, the Cyprus coup. If he could have carried it off and united Cyprus to Greece, the achievement might have temporarily united the armed forces, if not the nation, behind him. But it should have been clear from the beginning that the goals of the coup could not be obtained. Turkey had proved on previous occasions that it would fight rather than permit "Enosis," the union of Cyprus with Greece. And Turkey had almost three times the military strength of Greece, even without taking into account the demoralization of the Greek armed forces under the junta.

When Turkey invaded Cyprus in force, the game was up. A politically isolated Greece, condemned for its aggression against Cyprus by world public opinion and almost every capital except Washington, faced Turkish military power on a scale that made the position of the Greek forces on Cyprus untenable. The junta's adventure had left Greece the choice between a humiliating retreat and entering on an all-out war that would be predictably disastrous.

At this point, the traditionalist wing of the Army decided that it would neither put up with Ioannides any longer nor take on itself the responsibility for extricating Greece from the mess into which he had gotten it. General Davos, the commander of the Third Army, gave the government 24 hours to resign in favor of a political regime. Ioannides and his government yielded, President Gizikis called in a group of political leaders who advised him to ask former Premier Constantine Karamanlis to return from his exile in Paris and take over, and Gizikis acted on their advice.

It took only a couple of days for Karamanlis to organize a "transitional government of national unity." The cabinet ministers included a wide range of political views. Several, from the right-wing National Radical Union (ERE), had been members of previous Karamanlis governments. George Mavros, titular leader of the Center Union in Greece, became Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, with the unenviable job of negotiating an end to the Cyprus conflict. Two of the Greek representatives to the Socialist International, George Mylonas and Haralambos Protopapas, joined the cabinet as ministers of Transport and Industry respectively. So did George Mangakis, their fellow-member of the resistance organization Demo-

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cratic Defense. Xenophon Zolotas and John Pesmazoglou, who took the major economic portfolios of Coordination and Finance, had been governor and deputy governor of the Bank of Greece before 1967 and had resigned together shortly after the coup. Pesmazoglou had become the recognized leader of the intellectual resistance to the junta, and went to the Cabinet directly from exile in a small village.

THE END OF THE DICTATORSHIP and the immediate release of all political prisoners give ample cause for rejoicing. But Greece's road back to democracy is by no means assured: as Virgil pointed out, the way to Hell is much easier than the way back. Seven years of the junta have left an economy heavily burdened by debt and one-sided concession agreements with Greek and foreign firms, and a lost war to be liquidated. They have also left a 30,000-strong force of military police, deeply implicated in the worst of the junta's crimes, and large numbers of officers in all branches of the armed services who gained their commissions as a reward for their loyalty to the dictatorship. A similar situation exists in the Security Police and Gendarmerie. It is obvious that the mere promise of veteran plotters to abstain from politics in the future has little value. Even if they mean it today, they can be expected to have second thoughts when the present wave of popular enthusiasm gives way to resentment at the foreign policy retreats and economic sacrifices that the present situation demands.

If the government is to carry through the successful reestablishment of democratic institutions, and if those institutions are to be reasonably secure against another coup, a thoroughgoing purge of the armed forces and police is a matter of the highest priority. So far, the new government has taken action against the junta's key personnel in the civilian services, but it has made few similar moves in the armed forces and police.

The Military Police was reduced in numbers (though it still remains far more numerous than before 1967) and deprived of jurisdiction over civilians. Several of the leading torturers in the Military Police and the Security Police were transferred out of those services and, after half a month of suspense, Ioannides himself was given six months' leave from active service "at his own request." The Greek commander of the Cyprus National Guard was replaced, but the other officers who conducted the coup against Makarios were left in place and probably will be until a Cyprus settlement is reached. Even the reinstatement of officers dismissed by the junta has lagged; after some three weeks it was ordered for the Navy, but not for the other services.

Here, in the Cyprus situation, and in the catastrophic state of the economy, lie the major obstacles to the restoration of Greek democracy. □

Sanford Gottlieb

Scoop & Henry—the Arms Debate

> . . . One of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what, in the name of God, is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?

Henry Kissinger posed these questions at a press conference in Moscow at the end of the 1974 Summit meeting. The meeting failed to fulfill the commitment made a year earlier by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev that they would reach agreement in 1974 on a permanent treaty limiting offensive missiles.

It is very late to be pondering Dr. Kissinger's questions. After more than a generation of superpower competition in A-bombs, H-bombs, strategic bombers, missiles, antimissiles, and submarines, the nuclear arms race is spiraling upward to still more dizzying heights. Following the lead of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., more

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countries are joining and thinking of joining the nuclear club. Not a single weapon has been scrapped as a result of negotiations during the nuclear age. The world has entered a much more dangerous period, despite détente and the rhetorical "structures of peace" that are being fabricated all around us.

To understand what one does with "strategic superiority," we have to look at the military and political dimensions of the nuclear arms race.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pinpointed, in 1967, *the number of separate nuclear warheads* (H-bombs) as "the most meaningful and realistic measure of nuclear capability." The number of strategic warheads determines the number of separate major targets that can be destroyed. Since the U.S. has more smaller warheads, and the U.S.S.R. has fewer larger warheads, the Pentagon tends to magnify the Soviet threat by stressing a different measurement: megatonnage or "payload," the explosive power of these weapons of mass destruction. But there are few targets, whether cities or missiles, that require a blitz by a brute of 20 million tons of TNT equivalent, when an H-bomb of a "mere" 1 million tons can demolish them just as well.

Several months before Kennedy became president, his science adviser Jerome Wiesner wrote: "Studies made independently by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy have indicated that, even in the absence of agreements limiting force size and permitting inspection, 200 relatively secure missiles would provide an adequate nuclear deterrent" (*Daedalus*, Fall 1960). The figure of 200 missiles was undoubtedly chosen by the Army and the Navy because it corresponded to the number of major Soviet cities. Since one nuclear-tipped missile can destroy a city, the military planners calculated—with the awesome logic of the nuclear age—that the Russians would be deterred if threatened with the annihilation of their population centers.

Yet, in the first year of the Kennedy administration the American nuclear arsenal had already reached nine times the level of "adequate nuclear deterrent" recommended by the Army-Navy studies. The following comparison of strategic warheads since 1961 shows the steady upward thrust of the nuclear arms race:

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
1961	1,830	210
1968	4,200	1,200
1972 (SALT I)	5,900	2,200
1974	7,940	2,600
1977 (estimated)	9,800	3,950

These figures do not include the thousands of tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons deployed by both sides in Central Europe and by the U.S. in South Korea, nor the nuclear-tipped intermediate-range Soviet missiles trained on Western Europe.

AT PRESENT an American president could, if he wished, allocate 36 H-bombs to each of the U.S.S.R.'s 219 cities of 100,000 population or more. If he preferred applying the available overkill more equitably to both civilian and military targets, he could dispatch three H-bombs each to the 219 large cities and to 1,500 separate military objectives in the Soviet Union, and still have almost 14 times the "adequate nuclear deterrent" level left over. With a smaller surplus, the Soviets could similarly annihilate any combination of American targets.

A technologically superior U.S. has enjoyed strategic superiority since Hiroshima. But the arms race has persisted so long that even the runner-up has become muscle-bound with overkill, achieving in recent years a rough parity of destructiveness with the U.S. The Soviets' more numerous missiles with bigger payloads now compensate (at least in the view of those who believe this calculus still has some meaning) for the American advantage in numbers of H-bombs, an advantage maintained through a six-year lead in Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).

MIRVs are the focus of the currently expanding phase of the arms race. A MIRV is a missile resembling a space bus with up to 10 passengers. Each passenger is an H-bomb that can be guided to a separate destination with considerable accuracy. Because they can reach so many different targets, MIRVs have vastly escalated the destructive range of strategic weapons.

As if these developments weren't sufficient evidence of reciprocal madness, each side is still vigorously seeking better ways to heap incalculable destruction on the other. Once they perfect the technology, the Soviets will try to

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marry MIRVs to bigger missiles. The U.S. will build a new submarine (Trident) and a new strategic bomber (B-1) to carry additional MIRVs. The former will cost $13 billion, the latter $15 billion, according to highly conservative estimates. The U.S. military budget is expected to reach $130 billion within a few years. (Its total cost since fiscal 1946: $1.5 trillion.)

Unless this momentum is checked within the next few years, says Dr. Kissinger, "we will be living in a world which will be extraordinarily complex, in which opportunities for nuclear warfare exist that were unimaginable 15 years ago . . . ."

What forces made this world? First, mutual cold-war fears and suspicions generating an international game of "Can You Top This?" known to the experts as the "action-reaction cycle." These fears were fueled, on both sides, by exaggerated reports of the adversary's prowess. Major General Daniel Graham, a top man in the U.S. intelligence community, has admitted that military intelligence badly overestimated Soviet military threats, resulting in the fictitious "bomber gap" and "missile gap."

Moreover, as the cold war continued, vested interests became institutionalized within the American military-industrial complex. Factors as irrelevant to national security as personal careers, profits, and jobs generated—and continue to generate—massive pressure on Congress and the executive branch to keep producing more sophisticated weaponry. Similar pressures on Soviet decision-makers are undoubtedly exercised by the chiefs of their Strategic Rocket Forces and their Military-Industrial Commission. Finally, bomb-rattling and missile-making have been used by the political leaders of the superpowers for purposes of national prestige and machismo. In our own country, this has been most apparent in Kennedy's big missile buildup (and dispatch of advisers to Vietnam) in response to his bullying by Khrushchev in Vienna, and in Nixon's insistence on being "Number One" (in weapons, not health care).

Armaments policy is basically a political question resolved at least as much by internal power struggles as by international security considerations. This is reflected in arms control negotiations, where the infighting between different parts of the U.S. government often surpasses in ferocity the differences between American and Soviet delegates. Far less visible, Soviet infighting occasionally surfaces into public view. The Central Committee's decision to demote hardliner Pyotr Shelest three days before Nixon arrived in Moscow for summit talks in 1972 was clearly a victory for Brezhnev's pro-détente policies and a green light for SALT I, despite the U.S. mining of Haiphong harbor.

At the time of the disappointing 1974 Summit, Kissinger stood virtually alone in the Washington bureaucracy as an advocate of restraint. President Nixon was determined to appease the promilitary conservatives in Congress whose votes he courted to stave off impeachment and conviction. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were more interested in protecting their big weapons programs than in taking the risks of a compromise agreement.* And the Administration had already purged two years earlier, with Kissinger's acquiescence, most of its able pro-arms control officials. The purge was the price paid to pacify Senator Jackson and the Joint Chiefs, after the SALT I accord curbed defensive missiles (ABMs) and placed a temporary limit on offensive missiles. (It is one of the ironies of the Nixon administration that Henry Kissinger, former academic spokesman for "limited" nuclear war and skeptic about arms control, now advocates positions more advanced than anyone in official Washington.

APPEASEMENT, however, has not pacified Scoop Jackson. More aggressive and harder working than the others in the promilitary bloc of Congress, Jackson assumed the unofficial leadership of this group in 1972 and never let go. He fought against SALT I and helped intimidate the Administration into its current paralysis in negotiations. Jackson's phobia with regard to the Russians is buttressed by the true believer's faith in unlimited military power. He is impressed by the Chinese Communists, perhaps because they are the enemy of his enemy. During debate on Senator Mansfield's amendment

* Leslie Gelb of the *New York Times*, however, reported June 29 that Schlesinger had proposed a comprehensive agreement with the U.S.S.R., while Kissinger favored a limited accord. Schlesinger did not believe, according to Gelb, that a comprehensive agreement could be reached in Moscow; he thus maintained that the U.S. "should continue its research and development programs for new weapons to be used as bargaining chips for a wider accord later."

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to reduce the number of U.S. troops abroad, Jackson even suggested that we should not remove any troops from Europe because the Chinese want us to keep them there.

As a presidential hopeful, Jackson is smart enough to moderate his promilitary stance in public. He has advocated a reduction in missile forces, which sounds good to the unsuspecting. His proposal, however, would require the Soviets to cut more launchers than the Americans and would maintain the American lead in MIRVs. By championing the cause of Soviet Jews, Jackson has also managed to maneuver himself into position as the Administration's intermediary with the Soviet Union on the paired issues of Jewish emigration and Soviet-American trade.

Jackson's power flows from a political and a congressional base. Politically, he is backed by defense firms, conservative labor unionists, Democratic party officials, and part of the Jewish community. In Congress, he can count on the ideological agreement of the promilitary clique, which, in the 93rd Congress, represents about 40 percent of each House. Despite a moderately liberal domestic record, Jackson has strained relations with Senate liberals because of his personal vindictiveness during legislative combat.

Jackson's goals, like those of his civilian and military allies in the Pentagon, are shaped by his fears. The basic fear of the military-minded is the specter of a Soviet first strike against American land-based weapons. Jackson and the Pentagon point to the current Soviet arms momentum as capable of producing in coming years a force of large, powerful MIRVs that could overwhelm the Minuteman missiles. The Senator and his allies respond to this challenge by pressing on the one hand for military counters to the Russians, and on the other hand for negotiating positions that would get the Russians to surrender their recently acquired advantages.

These fears ignore several realities: (1) Soviet leaders, on the short end of "strategic superiority" for so many years, also have long had legitimate cause to fear an American first strike; (2) escalation in weapons breeds escalation in counterweapons; (3) even if Soviet leaders were so insane as to attack U.S. land-based missiles—and succeeded in destroying all of them—a single Poseidon submarine could destroy 160 major targets in the U.S.S.R.

As McGeorge Bundy wrote in 1969,

> In the real world of real political leaders—whether here or in the Soviet Union—a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.

One part of Senator Jackson's proposals, contained in a speech of December 4, 1973, points toward a solution. The superpowers must *reduce* their nuclear arsenals. A stable strategic balance is unlikely to be reached as the arms race moves upward and aggravates the fears of surprise attack. Given the destructiveness of the superpowers' arsenals, a confidence-building parity can only emerge as the armaments levels go down. Given the asymmetry in these two arsenals, the task would be difficult even with good will on both sides. The least difficult approach would be to phase out the land-based missiles, about whose vulnerability the military strategists worry so much, then reduce the number of bombers and submarines, all the while balancing such factors as warheads and payload.

IN SHORT, the road away from the precipice is real disarmament, based on common interest in avoiding war, halting the spread of nuclear weapons, and lifting the economic burdens of modern military establishments. One of the most important by-products of real disarmament between the superpowers would be a decrease in the current incentives to smaller countries to "go nuclear."

The record of the Big Two in this respect has not been encouraging. Mrs. Alva Myrdal, who served until recently as Sweden's representative to U.N. disarmament talks, observes:

> The so-called "disarmament agreements" that we have obtained are either non-armament agreements or mere cosmetic devices. They have been used to stall for time, and to make people believe that somthing is being achieved . . . . We are pessimistic about achieving any real disarmament because we must blame the two superpowers who . . . have gone on not only piling up more arms but also improving the weapons they have. [*War/Peace Report,* June 1974]

Several key ingredients are needed to overcome the domestic obstacles to a policy of dis-

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armament. The first is a president who is fully committed to the proces, and that is highly improbable until January 1977, at the earliest. Even a powerful secretary of state cannot be expected to move the military-industrial-congressional bureaucracy by himself without the full support of the president. There is even reason to wonder how far Kissinger, recent convert to the cause of arms control, would be prepared to press for the bolder measures that are required.

Another ingredient is a much larger, more tenacious constituency of citizens working on behalf of disarmament. Again, this is unlikely at least until the country is able to focus on problems other than antidotes to Watergate.

But what is the alternative? After all, "strategic supremacy" cannot be employed. It can only be paid for. □

Bernard Rosenberg

Scoop & Chou — Love at First Sight

On July 9, 1974, Senator Henry M. Jackson, known affectionately but until then unaccountably as Scoop, finally justified his sobriquet. Scoop-watchers realized then that their man might be more than the deadwood of which most presidential timber is made. If you could believe your eyes, George Meany's favorite candidate had so far strayed from his predictable pattern as to have made sensational news. The *New York Times* tucked it away on page 12. Another piece of media mischief. But dogged readers caught the headline: *Closer China Ties Urged By Jackson*. Closer *China* ties? Urged by *Jackson?* Heaven knows, there was reason to be skeptical. This might be sabotage by lib-lab typesetters, if not by David Binder, the correspondent under whose by-line the story appeared. The thing was hardly credible. As well believe: *J. Paul Getty Bites the Running Dogs of Capitalism.*

But true it was. You see, Scoop's been on the go. In fact, he's running. Our Senator from Boeing and Washington, in his 63rd year, made it all the way to China, formerly Red China, now a colorless land, indeed the *People's Republic* as Scoop handsomely recognized it to be in another historic first on July 28. This time he tidied up his view in a signed Op-Ed article for the same paper of national record. We have been informed twice over now that America's most intransigent anti-Communist spent six consecutive days in the Peasants' Paradise. And not idly either. He had 15 hours of conversation with two perspicacious functionaries, the hitherto neglected Deputies, Teng Hsiao-ping and Chiao Kuan-hua, as well as the ailing Premier himself. They got on swimmingly. Scoop discovered that "there are many areas in which American interests parallel those of the Chinese." An unexceptional judgment. Nor would it have been half so easily arrived at without a junket around the world.

And more. "He indicated his agreement with the Chinese perception that the nature of Soviet policy is 'expansionist and unreliable,' and directed in part at the encirclement of China." The epithets are neither novel nor inappropriate. But how clever of the Chinese to notice that Soviet policy is as expansionist as their own. If Scoop doubts this perception let him ask the Dalai Lama or Indira Gandhi or his good friend, President Thieu. Has the American Superhawk forgotten so soon why it was "necessary" to spend an eternity in Indochina? Must we remind him that the U.S. saw no other way to prevent "a billion Chinese" from toppling all our dominoes?

What about "unreliable"? Russia, yes; China, no. Well, the People's Republic vowed that it would keep supplies flowing to North Vietnam. Peking has not reneged on that pledge—which it honors to this day. And, fair's fair, so does the U.S.S.R. So, for that matter, do we in South Vietnam. A pretty good record of reliability all around. Ah, but Mao's is best, for, quoth the Senator, "The Chinese have not broken their word with us." No sir, nor with the Arab terrorists.

Who can fault them for exploding H bombs in the air (did they promise not to?) or for

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suppressing freedom? Not having given us their word, they are perfectly situated never to break it.

Anyhow, China is busy combating that "part" of Soviet policy (for any other power it would be a full-time job) directed at its encirclement. Now many of us tried as children to dig our way to China. Take it easy, Scoop. Our offspring will get there with spades before Russia completes its little encirclement.

Meanwhile, business prospects look fine: It should be easy to grant good trading terms to China, the Senator said, because the problem of Chinese desiring to leave to join families is not large. He said he knew of only 80 Chinese in this predicament, although "there will be a lot more." How many more, Scoop? 80,000? 80 million? Mao has declared China could spare at least that many in a nuclear holocaust. Is this an area where American interests parallel those of the Chinese? Tell us, Mr. Prospective President, before you appoint Paul Sweezy to your shadow cabinet. □

On the Death of an Old Militant

Messali Hadj, father of the Algerian nationalist movement and one-time charismatic leader of the Algerian people—in Algeria itself, but particularly among those Algerians who had gone to work in France during the colonialist days—died in France on June 3, 1974, at the age of 76. His death, virtually ignored in the French press and totally ignored in the world press, ought not to pass unnoticed. Messali Hadj was a striking figure, a *Zaïm*, to employ the Arabic term. He stood for something independent Algeria has yet to find—a socialist Algeria within a democratic framework—and this, in fact, was his program for the entire Maghreb of North Africa.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of Messali's movement was its popular foundation, the fact that most of its members and supporters came from the Algerian poor, working-class nomads who had drifted over to France to work in the bottom layer of French industry. Messali himself had worked for years in the Renault plant and never lost touch with Algerian proletarians. Although he lost out in the bitter internal struggle that split the nationalist movement, he never ceased to represent its democratic and socialist spirit as opposed to the Muslim nationalism represented by his opponents. While this is not the place to evaluate that long struggle between the two wings of Algerian and North African nationalism, a comment on Messali written by Jean Lacouture (*Le Monde*, June 5, 1974) is appropriate:

> From time to time, Messali Hadj would receive journalists. On the day after independence, for example, or after the putsch (by Boumedienne) of 1965, commenting upon the political events affecting his country with finesse and a certain serenity. Forty years of struggles, of involuntary nomadism, of different prisons had passed over him like thousands of years of wind on an abrupt mountain peak. He was eroded, pounded upon, but also appeased. The inspired actor, the exalted prophet of a proletarian Islam had taken upon himself the inspired gesture, the engaging smile and the calm voice of a pontiff on vacation.
>
> To be sure, he had kept his hermit's beard, his lathe-turner's dervish head of hair topped by an imposing *tarbouch*, and wore the noble caftan of an "alem" of a Koranic university. A strange silhouette, more Balkanic than Maghrebian, more orthodox in appearance than Musulman. One would have said that of a Karl Marx withdrawn to Mount Athos.
>
> But what struck one perhaps most forcefully in this old leader of exiled masses was a kind of malicious good nature, an ironic detachment, that of a man who had seen much, and retained above all whatever it was that strengthened his convictions and his faith, indestructible and almost naive, in his star. So many storms, so many tests, and so much violence inflicted and suffered were summed up in this episcopal smile.

A reluctant Algerian government finally permitted the burial of Messali to take place in the city of Oran, Algeria, near his birthplace. Despite efforts to keep his burial secret, word got about and many thousands of people escorted his body to the burial grounds where an emotional ceremony took place. S. P. □

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John Herling

Change & Conflict in the AFL-CIO

A Washington Letter on Recent Developments

As George Meany grows heavy and sprightlier with years, it is strange to observe that in the summer of 1974 open talk about a successor seems to have abated. This may be because of the irrefutable fact that "he is the only president we have." Inside the AFL-CIO it seems almost sacrilegious to talk of succession—I write this on the eve of the AFL-CIO Executive Council's August meeting and of Meany's 80th birthday—but the thought persists. This avoidance of political reality would not be the prevailing situation if the AFL-CIO, like many trade unions, had a compulsory retirement age of 65 or 70. The old AFL did not require its president to step down at a certain age, nor did the CIO. Meany's predecessor, William Green, died in office shortly before he was 80, and Philip Murray at the age of 66. Both died in November 1952. Meany, then secretary-treasurer, was chosen president by the AFL Executive Council and elected by convention the following year.

Today when the unmentionable—if not unthinkable—topic of succession comes up, it is projected, not by a bold spirit in the AFL-CIO Executive Council, but by an irreverent outsider. When a reporter puts the question directly to Meany, there is quick intake of breath by the union listener. Here was one such exchange:

> Q.: Is it a wise thing to stay in office so long? Many presidents of your affiliated unions are in their 70s and beyond.
>
> MEANY (*poised, rather than testy, as if prepared for a snotty questioner*): The question of retirement, I think, is something you can't do by simple arithmetic. We have areas where there is compulsory retirement and I have seen people retire at the very top of their ability. It's a question of what you want to do and what you're able to do. Now what I've been doing, I've been doing for 50 years. I contend that I do have experience. I don't know how much knowledge I've acquired from the experience. I feel as long as I can do the job, I'm going to try to do it. I've got my eyes open. If I see that I can't do the job, if I feel that the people who head up all these unions that are part of the AFL–CIO feel that I can't do the job, I'll just say goodbye and go on my way.

Questioned about the kind of credentials and qualities a union leader of the future should have, his reply rested largely on platitudes. "I think," said Meany, "he's got to have the basic approach and the basic philosophy that whatever is good for this great country of ours must be good for the trade union movement, and not the other way around."

Having saluted the flag, Meany is not the kind of man who would put the succession up for grabs. Although he is often given to impulsive judgments—and even commitments—from which he is loath to withdraw, he would like to be around to arrange the succession.

He enjoys playing the role of political boss as well as of AFL–CIO president, and the two are not mutually exclusive. He admires the man who can prepare the way for his own successor: with great zest he tells the story of how the late Mike Quill, president of the Transport Workers (whom he did not always admire), "got it ready" for his successor Matthew Guinan. He got it ready by making certain changes in the constitution and by elim-

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inating potential rivals. This was done, not so much by a laying on of hands, but as a public assignment of duties, and letting the word get out.

TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, this is now happening inside the AFL–CIO. If Meany should decide to retire, the man most likely to succeed him would be Lane Kirkland, 52, who has been secretary-treasurer since 1969, and before that, Meany's executive assistant.

Kirkland's elevation was a break with precedent. Such a post is usually filled by a high elected officer of an affiliated union. Kirkland's career in the AFL–CIO and, for a while, in the Operating Engineers, was that of a staff man. He had never been an elected officer of the union in which he holds a membership card, the Masters, Mates and Pilots (recently merged into the International Longshoremen's Association).

There was a rumble of discontent among Council members, but not loud enough to overcome reluctance to tangle with Meany's choice. Since the action was taken suddenly, nobody was prepared for an alternative. Several Executive Council members insisted that Kirkland was not to be considered automatically the next president of the AFL–CIO. Especially vehement in taking this position was Joseph Beirne, then president of the Communications Workers of America, who was at one time considered a likely successor to Meany. But even before Beirne had bucked Meany in the 1972 national presidential election—when he took the initiative in organizing the Labor For McGovern Committee—the CWA president had fallen out of favor with Meany. Beirne's role as an opposition leader has come to an abrupt end. A few months ago he was stricken by cancer, which hastened his retirement from the CWA presidency, though he remained on the AFL–CIO Executive Council.

In the past six years, Kirkland has played the political game astutely. He has become a shrewd appraiser of the strengths and weaknesses of fellow members in the Executive Council. He has first-hand knowledge of jurisdictional problems, and his close proximity to Meany affords a strategic position to secure his intercession.

Through this administrative post, Kirkland has also built up a strong following among AFL–CIO headquarters staff whose advancement he has expedited. But in building backing for himself, Kirkland was also providing Meany with the kind of staff support for which he is increasingly grateful as he paces himself more carefully with the onset of years.

ASIDE FROM SUCCESSION, the subject that absorbs a great deal of Meany's time and energy is the care and feeding of the presidential ambitions of Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson of Washington. Aside from the undeniable fact that Scoop Jackson has voted in the Senate almost invariably with organized labor, he and Meany have held identical positions on the Vietnam War and entertain the same fears of the new elements activated into the Democratic party, and the same determination to resist the blandishments of détente with the Soviet Union.

Months before the 1972 Democratic convention, Meany had let it be known that, although a long shot, Jackson was his preference. The failure of the AFL–CIO to adjust itself to the restructuring of the Democratic party and AFL–CIO misjudgment in measuring its influence only embittered the feeling against Senator McGovern, who won the nomination despite the opposition of COPE—the AFL–CIO's Committee on Political Education. In fact, the AFL–CIO headquarters provided a staff man as speech-writer for Jackson during the primary campaign; the same person compiled a 50-page "white paper," called by some a "dirty white paper," which so distorted McGovern's record that it was distributed by Nixon's CRP organization. One would never have guessed from this weird document that the Democratic nominee had achieved over the years a 93 percent average on the legislative scoreboard of the AFL–CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE). The same staff man wrote the speech delivered at the convention by Steelworkers President I. W. Abel, ostensibly nominating Scoop Jackson but actually attacking not only McGovern but the coalition of forces that brought about his nomination.

In the minds of some, this preoccupation with Jackson was considered a blocking action against McGovern, not necessarily a permanent commitment. But in the last two years, the Washington Senator has been a featured speaker

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at many union conventions and was showered with attention by organizations intimately connected with AFL–CIO headquarters staff. Without this orchestration, Senator Jackson would not have reached his present plateau of national attention. At the same time, Jackson—with 22 years of seniority in the Senate—has effectively exploited issues that have caught and deserved to receive public attention.

Believing that "détente" was phony, Jackson insisted that the price of any concessions we make to the Soviet Union should be conditioned upon agreement that the Soviet regime permit Jews to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. The trauma of the Yom Kippur War—Jackson's effusive identification with Jewish interests—brought him an emotional political response. Tied to that, moreover, the investigation by his Senate committee on the energy crisis and the Arab Oil embargo gave him a strong play. All of this reinforced Meany's belief in Jackson's presidential possibilities. At the same time, however, Meany insisted on the fiction that he has no concern in the shaping of Democratic party policy or the Party's choice of candidates. He falls back into this posture of feigned indifference, especially when things don't go as he wishes inside the Democratic party, or if he believes AFL–CIO influence not sufficiently recognized along the way.

While Jackson is Meany's favored horse, at this point, he must feel a little miffed that Scoop took off on a trip to China to play the game of détente there. It was considered unlikely that Jackson would have gone off to China without checking with Meany. But no, said Meany, "he didn't clear it with me." Still, this apparent inconsistency in the Senator's global view must have required some painful adjustment on Meany's part. Mao Tse-tung doesn't stand any higher in Meany's estimation than Brezhnev.

ALTHOUGH MEANY ENJOYS stomping the national and international stage, his arena of first concern is that of internal arrangements in the AFL–CIO. You can't be sure how aware he is of all the maneuverings around him, but there is no doubt that he makes every effort to keep in touch.

For example, he was considerably surprised, if not shaken, late last year when he encountered stormy resistance to his effort to name Shanker, then vice-president of the American Federation of Teachers, to fill a vacancy on the Executive Council. The naming of a teacher to the Executive Council was long overdue. But Meany was not about to allow David Selden, the AFT president, to be chosen. Selden had opposed Meany's hawk position on Vietnam and, even more unpardonable, supported McGovern in 1972.

When vacancies on the AFL–CIO Council occur, they are seldom filled by convention vote, as called for in the constitution. Since the merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955, vacancies have been filled by vote of the Council and subsequently acquiesced to by a compliant convention.

Under normal circumstances, Meany's choice of Shanker would have ridden through without open argument. For months, the way had been greased for Shanker. After a bitter internal struggle in the AFT, Shanker had succeeded in a strategy to win the support of the AFT executive board as the AFT's nominee for AFL–CIO Executive Council. Considerable pressure for such a move had been generated by AFL–CIO headquarters, where it was made clear that Meany insisted on Shanker rather than Selden. It was assumed that the Executive Council would bow to Meany's wishes.

But a strong and determined opposition to Shanker developed under the leadership of Seafarers Union President Paul Hall. The latter made the point that by naming Shanker over Selden, Meany was intervening in the internal affairs of an affiliated union. This, he said, was an unfortunate break with past practice. During the extended argument, Meany saw his own turf unexpectedly roughed up. While Meany had the votes to push through the Shanker nomination, this was the first time that open dissent had broken out on such an issue. Although some of the opposition was rooted in the certainty that Meany was visiting his personal displeasure on Selden for his openly expressed opposition to Meany on Vietnam and the spurious AFL–CIO 1972 presidential campaign "neutrality," others opposed Shanker for what they regarded as a violation of a procedural principle. Certainly Hall, who agreed with Meany's position on Vietnam and who had endorsed Nixon's re-

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election, could not be accused of running in ideological harness with Selden. Other Council members held that only presidents of affiliated unions should be chosen for the Executive Council. Currently there is only one exception to this "presidential" pattern on the Executive Council—the veteran and highly respected Joseph Keenan, secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.

Shanker was approved by a vote of 16–8. Opposing him were Hall, CWA President Joseph Beirne, State, County President Jerry Wurf, head of the International Union of Electrical Workers Paul Jennings, Machinists President Floyd (Red) Smith, C. L. Dennis, of the Railway and Airline Clerks, Rubber Workers President Peter Bommarito, and Al Grospiron, president of Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers. Frederick O'Neal, president of the Associated Actors and Artists, abstained.

This commingling of diverse personalities indicated that on certain matters affecting the internal government of the AFL–CIO, acquiescence to Meany's wishes by members of the Executive Council is no longer automatic. Whether this could be a forerunner of Council opposition on other more sensitive decisions, such as the succession to the presidency, one can only guess. It took all of the pressure of Meany, alive and kicking, to overcome the resistant forces. When the slate was subsequently offered *en bloc* to the convention, no opposition voice was heard on the floor.

With his additional muscle as a member of the AFL–CIO Executive Council, Shanker called a special meeting of the AFT executive board and demanded Selden's resignation as president forthwith. Selden refused to oblige and announced his intention to stand for reelection, despite his almost certain defeat at the AFT convention in August.

PERHAPS THE MOST fiercely fought struggle inside the AFL–CIO is the conflict between Shanker and Jerry Wurf, president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Not only have the two men differed sharply on political issues—again, Vietnam and the 1972 campaign—but the battle has been carried on in the field of organization.

Indeed, the positions taken by Shanker in opposition to Wurf have given him high standing at AFL–CIO headquarters. For one thing, Wurf does not limit his discussion of labor issues and his disagreements with official AFL–CIO policy to union forums. When he put forward a proposal for a study of the reorganization of the AFL–CIO, he was attacked by Shanker on the floor of the last convention. The proposal was, of course, rejected.

In and outside union meetings, Wurf warns,

> We can stand pat as a movement that represents a declining percentage of the workforce, and watch our influence over national direction seep away. Or we can make ourselves more relevant to the needs of workers in a postindustrial society, and become an even more substantial voice in the shaping of the future than in the past. If labor is weakened, society is more likely to close out the poor and the powerless whom labor seeks to represent.

This has led Wurf to advocate a drastic reorganization of the American labor movement. Instead of more than 110 AFL–CIO affiliates, many competing with each other or with groups outside the AFL–CIO, he urges the merger and consolidation of the unions to no more than 25 or 30. By eliminating the duplication of effort, he believes there is greater likelihood of increasing the percentage of organized workers. Out of more than 80 million in the workforce, not many more than 21.5 million belong to a union or employee association that performs union functions.

The hostility between Wurf and Shanker resulted, in good part, from Wurf's success in fashioning cooperative legislative and political ties with the National Education Association —an all-teacher organization with 1.4 million unaffiliated members—into the Coalition of American Public Employees (CAPE). When establishing this relationship more than a year ago, Wurf moved cautiously. He conferred with Meany, who saw advantages in the legislative and political field and informally approved the coalition. Wurf was thus able to block any later claim that this was a kind of "dual unionism." The AFSCME and NEA were brought together by the common problems both faced during Phase I of President Nixon's wage control. They were joined by the National Treasury Employees Union, which is, like the NEA, independent of the AFL–CIO. For a while the AFL–CIO Fire Fighters were in

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CAPE, but although they withdrew as a national union, their various state associations continue in state coalitions. Altogether, there are a dozen state CAPEs.

While Wurf leads his organization into formal and informal alliances with organizations both in and outside the AFL–CIO, he finds his organization seriously harassed by AFL–CIO unions. Raids and jurisdictional disputes are nothing new in the labor movement, but this sort of jungle warfare has supposedly been curbed under Article XX of the Constitution. An important body of labor jurisprudence has been built up inside the AFL–CIO on the foundation of this article. Legally, unions with established collective-bargaining relations are protected from raids.

Perhaps the most serious confrontation took place between the Shanker-led United Federation of Teachers in New York City and AFSCME's District 37, headed by Victor Gotbaum. The struggle there revolved around Shanker's attempt to raid 10,000 teachers' aides already represented by AFSCME. Gotbaum and Wurf hauled Shanker to "court," under Article XX, and David Cole, the permanent impartial umpire, not only found against Shanker but was upheld by the Appeals Committee of the Executive Council. Cole's language in the Shanker case was cutting. This setback for Shanker was especially noteworthy because it diminished his prestige, as he appeared for the first time before such a tribunal since his election to the AFL–CIO Executive Council.

The success of CAPE has triggered the move to organize an AFL–CIO Public Employees Department, to include federal, state, and local employees who are now members of unions such as the Service Employees Union, the Laborers, the CWA, and Operating Engineers—the latter having a mixed membership of workers in the private as well as the public sector.

Reluctant because of his misgivings as to the motives of some union leaders in pushing for such a department, Wurf said he would give it a try, but if it doesn't prove productive his union's relationship with such a new department would be minimal. Sometimes the question pops up: "Is AFL–CIO affiliation necessary?" While Wurf says he has "concerns" about the AFL–CIO, he believes that AFSCME should continue its affiliation. Lacking such affiliation, a union could be open to raids, without redress. This would seem to be his present response to those who argue against paying per capita dues on 750,000 AFSCME members to the AFL–CIO.

Moving to higher ground, Wurf invokes the spirit of Eugene Victor Debs who, in his day, was critical of the American Federation of Labor under the presidency of Samuel Gompers:

> I am the friend, not the enemy of the American Federation of Labor. I would conserve, not destroy it. I am opposed, not to the organization of its members, but to those who are restraining its evolution and preventing it from fulfilling its true mission.

IN THE MEANTIME, both the AFL–CIO's president and from time to time many international union presidents would like to see the United Auto Workers back in the AFL–CIO. For UAW President Leonard Woodcock, the idea of reaffiliation, six years after the late Walter P. Reuther led the UAW out of the AFL–CIO, has become increasingly attractive. He holds strongly to the opinion that there ought to be a single, national trade union center in which his union would play an influential role.

The advantages for the AFL–CIO are clear. Such reunification would add more than $1.5 million a year in per capita payments to the AFL–CIO treasury. UAW would be the largest union in the AFL–CIO. More significantly, proponents of such a coming together are convinced that it would increase the magnetic pull of organized labor in the political, legislative, and economic areas.

Friendly pressures to win the UAW back are generated by unions inside the Federation who regard the UAW as strong reinforcement of the liberal wing inside the AFL–CIO. Should the UAW return to the AFL–CIO, there is little doubt that in addition to Wurf, Floyd (Red) Smith and his associates in the Machinists Union (with which the UAW already pursues joint activities) and the International Union of Electrical Workers, headed by Paul Jennings, would regard the UAW as a natural ally. So might other unions—such as the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, with its new leadership; the Textile Workers Union headed by Sol Stetin; the Graphic Arts International Union of which Kenneth Brown is president; Al Grospiron of

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the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers; Dan Conway, president of the Bakery and Confectionery Workers.

Part of the unspoken motivation in the drive to get the UAW back with the AFL–CIO has been the belief that the UAW's presence there may influence the selection of a next AFL–CIO president. The realistic Meany understands this clearly, but he is willing to take his chances. His confidence in his own ability to shape Federation decisions, especially on the Executive Council level, remains unimpaired.

But UAW reaffiliation is still in the distance. For months before its convention last June, the feeling grew that a decision to reaffiliate was at hand. But it became clear that the opposition to a return could not be ignored. Privately, Meany was assuring certain people that only financial considerations deterred the UAW from coming back; but that was both an oversimplification of the problem and a belittling of UAW motives. Foremost among the opponents to reaffiliation on the UAW executive board were Irving Bluestone, UAW vice-president, who is head of the General Motors Department, and Emil Mazey, UAW's secretary-treasurer. At the middle and local level of leadership there was also a considerable reluctance to merge UAW's political and legislative identity—Community Action Programs known as CAP—with the AFL–CIO state and local councils. Under a new reorganization plan, the restriction by the national AFL–CIO may become more stringent. Above all, inside the UAW there is considerable belief that there are principled differences on policy, organization, and attitude, which led to the rupture with Meany in 1968 and still remain.

As a result, a proposal for reaffiliation was not even brought to the floor of the UAW June convention. Woodcock told the delegates it would be unwise, because of strong differences of opinion and the shortness of time for adequate discussion, to call for any kind of definitive action from the convention. "We give you the commitment," he said, "that if it should ever be proposed that there should be reaffiliation with the AFL–CIO, then that action will be finally sanctioned and approved only by action of a convention of the international union." Since the next regular convention will not be held until 1977, the subject of rejoining the AFL–CIO, if revived soon, may have to be brought before a special convention.

So far, the American trade union movement remains a pluralistic labor universe, with areas of tension and collision within and without the AFL–CIO. At the same time, there have developed areas of innovation and stimulus.

PERHAPS THE MOST ZESTFUL DEVELOPMENT in the labor movement came upon the scene with the formation of two groups: the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), launched about two years ago, and the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW), which held a founding convention last March in Chicago.*

In its first constitutional convention in Detroit, the CBTU with 1,200 delegates from 42 unions, in and outside the AFL–CIO, created last May a structure, with national and regional officers, to do a job its founders believed was not being done by the labor movement. After months of preparation, the CBTU was ready to make its presence felt. Its spokesmen—particularly William Lucy, AFSCME's secretary-treasurer, who was elected CBTU president—warned organized labor of the "overall dissatisfaction of black workers" with their "limited role and involvement in the shaping and implementation of union policy at local and national levels." Top priority must be given, they say, to "organizing the unorganized of all American labor. With less than 25 percent of the labor force organized, this means the exclusion of millions of blacks and other minorities as well as whites."

Out of the ranks of the trade union movement has come CLUW. After months of planning, 3,200 women—white, black, Chicano, Puerto Rican and American Indian—founded

* For a fuller account of the founding convention of CLUW, see "Workers (Female) Arise!" by Patricia Cayo Sexton, DISSENT, Summer 1974.

In Forthcoming Issues:

ON VIRTUE
by Czeslaw Milosz

GEORGES SOREL: JANSENIST MARXISM
by Leszek Kolakowski

INFLATION & THE WELFARE STATE
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an organization that seems on its way to making an important imprint on the character and spirit of the trade union movement.

"We have a message for George Meany. We have a message for Leonard Woodcock. We have a message for Frank Fitzsimmons. You can tell them we didn't come to Chicago to swap recipes." These were the exultant words addressed to the convention by Myra Wolfgang of Detroit, a vice-president of the Hotel & Restaurant Workers, one of the few women to have attained that eminence in an international union.

Woodcock, actually, did send the convention a good luck telegram and a pledge of support. None, however, came from Meany and Fitzsimmons, who seldom act impulsively in such matters. Through unionization, CLUW says, it will not only seek to correct discrimination against women, but "educate and inspire our union brothers to help give affirmative action in the workplace." There are 4 million union women but "30 million unorganized sisters." CLUW's intention to move for more "active participation in the political and legislative processes of our unions" surely has sounded an alert in many union headquarters.

After considerable uncertainty as to how to handle these new developments, the top AFL–CIO leadership decided to roll with the punch. At a news conference, Meany was asked what role did he see for CBTU and CLUW in the labor movement? Where did he think they were headed?

MEANY: Well, I think they have a role in the AFL–CIO. I think they have it within the constituent unions of the AFL–CIO. They certainly have the same rights as any other member and I don't know of any union that has any machinery, any rules that bar the advancement of these people.

Now, as far as women are concerned, my experience has been that we have some very, very capable women in these organizations but they only go up to a certain level—to membership on an executive board or head of a district organization—they don't seem to have any desire to go further. Now we have [unions] where the vast majority of the membership are women and still the vast majority of officers are men. That is not due to any policy of the AFL–CIO and in a good many cases not due to any policy of the unions themselves.

Q: Do you think if a vacancy occurs on the AFL–CIO Executive Council—and one has—a woman might be chosen?

MEANY: I don't know, John, and I haven't given it any thought. I certainly wouldn't have any objection. □

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Michael Harrington

A Collective Sadness

Sometimes, Emile Durkheim once remarked, a society develops a collective sadness.

That is obviously the case with America today. The Harris poll, showing a pervasive uneasiness in this country, only confirms what all of us instinctively know. An optimistic and confident nation whose Great Seal proclaims it a New Order of the Ages seems to have lost its nerve. And some of the causes of this mood are painfully apparent. After the elections of 1964 and 1972, the overwhelming majority of the American people who had named Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon as their president were forced, almost against their will, to turn upon the man for whom they had voted. Those of us who have always thought of Nixon as a devious, dishonest man sometimes forget the shattering psychological consequences when more than half of the people who voted for him in 1972 want to turn him out of the White House. Implicit in that change is the admission: I was gulled and tricked by a scoundrel who may be, in his own immortal words, a crook as well.

But then Johnson and Nixon are only the names we give to two of the most wrenching and disillusioning experiences in the nation's history: our first truly unpopular war and our greatest political scandal. Add to this some five years of spectacular economic mismanagement carried out by an Administration whose constant prophecies of imminent great success became a horrible joke, like the light at the end of the tunnel in Vietnam that was always being glimpsed during the Johnson years. These people, George Meany remarked, would have said that the Titanic stopped to take on ice. And to make their misery abject, the nation of plenty had to wait in line at the gas pumps last winter and, though most of them are not aware of it, still face massive dislocations because of the outflow of an extra $60 billion from the industrial West to the oil-producing nations.

All of these factors are at work in our collective sadness, but I will not linger over any of them. In an analysis that makes no pretense at being complete, I want to treat three other (but related) aspects of the curren malaise. First, there is a cultural crisis that represents the explosion of epochal contradictions within the daily life of just a few years; then there is the impact of what Joan Robinson calls The Second Crisis of Economic Theory; finally, there are new possibilities of political disintegration.

I do not think it personal ethnocentrism if I take the crisis of American Catholicism as the point of departure for an impression of a culture crisis that affects the entire society. Two generations ago, American Catholics were almost all workers and they are still a major element in the labor movement. Today, they are also to be found in a new middle class (with a good number of the Irish in the vanguard) and in newly conscious "ethnic" groups (Italians, Poles, other South and East Europeans). Their

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experience is unique in that the religious dimensions of the cultural crisis are dramatically present in their case; but they are also typical in that their disenchantment is to be found, in other forms, throughout the working class and sectors of the middle class. Archie Bunker, who sings of the days when there was no welfare state, men were men and Glenn Miller played, is their cousin even though that thought would startle his anti-Catholic prejudices.

For the Catholics, the center of their lives was a belief in God and country. Now both are in doubt and the question arises, by what values does one live?

The religious crisis is characteristic of the sloppiness of history. The death of God was clearly announced more than a century ago and Marxists (and atheistic humanists of every persuasion) predicted the imminent demise of that most Medieval of institutions, the Roman Church. But it did not pass away, especially in America. Here the working class did not defect, as it did in France and Italy, for there was not a nobility, or even a Catholic bourgeoisie of any consequence, on whose behalf the prelates could betray, and repell, the faithful. Here there was a society in which, as Tocqueville understood long ago, religion was an important means of group identity. American Catholicism was democratic in practice and ultramontane in theory; it failed to produce a single heresy of any consequence. Hierarchical and meritocratic, this Church was a center of established truth—of a morality, a world view, a way of life—for tens of millions of citizens, particularly for urban white workers.

And then it seemed that the crisis, which had so perversely delayed its arrival for more than a century, erupted into a decade. Priests and nuns left their vocations—and married and had children—and there was a catastrophic fall in new recruits to the religious life. There was folk music on the altar and new doctrines were preached from the pulpit. And just as the stern old pastors had said before the deluge broke, but not for the reasons they gave, once the morale of the Church went there was no stopping the forces of militant secularism. A Supreme Court appointed by a pietistic Protestant president effectively legalized abortion on demand; pornography came out of the stag parties and into the movie houses; young couples publicly lived in sin together, and starlets had babies out of wedlock; women's liberation and gay liberation challenged the holiest of verities about family structure and sexuality; and on and on. The very ethical fiber of the country seemed rent and torn.

Suddenly masses of rank-and-file Americans, the Catholics most obviously, saw the religious foundations of their personal code begin to crumble. *They did not know what to believe any longer.* At the least, they were not sure. And at more or less the same time, the second pillar of their daily faith—that America is the greatest nation on the face of the earth—began to quake.

The immediate cause was, of course, Vietnam. Those old enough to remember World War II know how extraordinary the events of the '60s were. For in the '40s, the war was genuinely popular. There was a kind of siege comraderie throughout the society. People picked up hitchhikers in uniform and sometimes took them to their homes; the trains and buses were jammed to bursting with millions of men and women who faced constant uncertainty and the possibility of youthful death: yet the spirit was good. We are, Joe Lewis said in one of the popular aphorisms of the time, on God's side.

And then Vietnam. Young people publicly admitted that they were trying to avoid the draft; some fled to Canada, others deserted. An antiwar movement that was absolutely right on the basic issue sometimes delighted in the most infantile contempt for symbols, like the flag, which other Americans took as holy. Gradually, even the hawks were forced to the conclusion that the war was insane. More often than not they did so out of disillusioned militancy rather than

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dovishness—if we didn't have the guts to nuke Hanoi or Peking, we had no business letting American soldiers die for Saigon. But that still meant admitting that the United States had lost a war. The myths of our invincibility and righteousness shattered.

I think that all this was experienced most acutely by Catholics because their religious crisis was more extreme than that of other faiths. But I suspect that the factors I have defined here as elements of a particularly Catholic sadness are to be found, in one way or another, among millions of other religionists in this society. People can't believe in either their God or their country the way they used to; people just don't know what to believe in at all.

By far and large, the crisis of God and country took place in the '60s within a prospering economy. The Kennedy-Johnson years witnessed the longest, uninterrupted peacetime boom in American history. So if people were puzzled in the presence of new cultural forces, they could always fall back on that most fundamental of American convictions: next year's living standard will be better than this year's. Then along came a bewildering combination of recession-inflation. Joan Robinson described it in a brilliant address to the American Economic Association a few years back as The Second Crisis of Economic Theory. She was comparing this shock to the First Crisis, the Great Depression of the 1930s. In her opinion it was a fundamental event comparable to the Depression, one that challenged the basic assumptions of the society. She was right.

Two themes abstracted from her intricate argument are particularly relevant to this sketch of America's collective sadness. Within the Keynesian framework, Robinson writes,

> It was sufficiently obvious that if continuous near-full employment was maintained without any change in traditional institutions and attitudes in industrial relations, there would be an irresistable pressure to inflation. I think that in the United States this element in Keynes was somehow swept under the carpet.

And then, later in her essay, she notes that

> experience of inflation has destroyed the conventions governing the acceptance of existing distribution. Everyone can see that his relative earnings depend on the bargaining power of the group that he belongs to. The professors become quite nervous when they are discussing the earnings of the garbage collectors. Now it is clear that the income from property is not the reward of waiting but the reward of employing a good stockbroker. On top of this a sudden freeze comes down. [Mrs. Robinson's paper was presented the year after the Nixon economic freeze of August, 1971.] If it is successful it is to keep everyone in the position where he happened to be when the scramble for relative gains was brought to a halt and it will perpetuate the division of income between work and property that happened to exist when it set in.
>
> But it does not seem likely that it will be as successful as all that. Rather it will add a political element to the distribution of bargaining power. Perhaps this is going to create a crisis in the so-called free-enterprise economy.

Now we know, of course, that Joan Robinsons' prediction was accurate. Nixon lifted the controls, which had come under increasing attack from both labor and business; we are back to a scramble for relative earnings based on bargaining power. In the Robinson analysis, that is a structural tendency of Keynesian economics. It is also, I believe, a source of the collective sadness in our society, for it is often destructive of solidarity, particularly among the great mass of people.

Indeed, this trend sets in motion a process that, with acknowledgment to Daniel Bell, might be called "situs conflict." In the political bargaining going on under the conditions Joan Robinson describes, where a person works becomes extremely important. During the height of the energy crisis in the winter of 1974, for instance, the workers

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and the owners of the airlines industry felt a common stake in getting fuel for their department of the economy; the truckers made their claims; so did mass transit. In each case, there was a vertical integration of management and the employees in a de facto struggle with the other blocs of management and employees. In a kind of industrial feudalism, men and women become attached to their jobs and function politically, not so much as members of a class, but as partisans of an industry in alliance with all of its members, from the chairman of the board to the janitor.

Then there are more traditional, but now exacerbated, struggles for money that set workers against workers. Policemen in New York fight to get more than firemen. Public employee wage demands seem to be raised, not against the "boss," but against the taxpayers, i.e., in considerable measure against other workers. (The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, one of the most progressive unions in the country, has rightly tried to deal with this problem by linking wage demands to increasing the quality of public service.) The building trades' attempt to keep pace with inflation—and it must always be remembered that the high hourly rates in this sector are necessary because of the seasonal character of the work and the chronic unemployment that results—are seen as an act of hostility toward prospective new homeowners.

Perhaps one of the most significant signs of the time in this area is the switch in policy taking place in the American Federation of Teachers. Under Albert Shanker, its new president, the union is moving away from its earlier social democratic style toward a much narrower, situs-oriented approach that has so long characterized the most conservative forces in the labor movement. As Shanker said during his election campaign for the union's presidency, "I favor building the AFT on *teacher issues—issues which will appeal to all teachers regardless of their political views*—and avoiding politically divisive issues" (emphasis in original). In terms of an old but still quite functional distinction, Shanker here puts the interest of the trade over that of the class. I do not single him out on this count simply because of my disagreements with him on other issues; this kind of thinking will, I suspect, become frequent in the coming period. (Although I must add that the UAW's rejection of a protectionist policy for the auto industry at its convention last June is an encouraging example of the opposite, and to me infinitely preferable, policy.)

All of this has a saddening—and frustrating—effect for a number of reasons. People feel themselves on a tread mill. The auto workers' strike of 1970, for instance, was a bitter struggle to make up for the losses inflation had already caused and to anticipate, and head off, those that might come. The militancy in the public sector is a special case in point: for here workers have had to fight to make up for the generations of second-class economic citizenship that had been forced upon them. Moreover, there is no clearly defined enemy as there was in the Great Depression. Indeed, one explanation of why American workers in recent years have been so moderate in their wage demands is that they have bought the argument that big increases will only generate higher prices, which will take their new buying power back from them before they have had the chance to use it.

But finally, the most perplexing thing about this situation is that, if one accepts the present distribution of economic and political power as given (and therefore legitimate), then there is no solution to these problems. Forty years ago, the New Deal created a welfare state, which may, or may not, have been accompanied by a very modest redistribution of income. Since then, practically everyone (including the Council of Economic Advisers in their Report this

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year) agrees, there has been no significant change in the distribution of wealth. The top 20 percent of the American people own 76 percent of the society; the bottom 20 percent have two-tenths of 1 percent. Thus the new political power, which the workers and other groups acquired during the '30s, has not been able to affect the relative shares in the economy. It may have staved off a trend toward immiseration, as John Strachey and others have argued, and if that is the case, it is a real accomplishment. But it is also limited.

As long as there were relatively steady increments in the absolute standard of living, most people did not bother about the "abstraction" of fairer shares. But now that we have experienced stagnation, and periods of decline in real buying power (the AFL–CIO estimates that the effective demand of American workers went down by 3 percent in 1973), the distribution issue is posed again. If everyone contributes equally to the fight against, or suffers equally from, inflation, that will perpetuate our intolerable division of wealth. It will also make millions of people feel as if they are riding an endless merry-go-round.

The conservatives are preparing to fight for the status quo, of course. They are arguing that profits are essential to new investment and increased production and must therefore be encouraged; but that wage increases and social spending will augment demand before profits have accomplished their contribution to the common good.

What is obviously required is an offensive by the labor movement aimed, not simply at bettering the position of this or that segment of the working people, but at *changing the rules of the game* so that there can be some kind of rational solution to the inflationary challenge. And indeed most unions have political policies that move in this direction. The problem is that, for a complex of reasons which cannot be analyzed here, the most powerful drive within the labor movement is still that of each group of workers trying their best to fend for themselves in an impossible situation. Let us hope that will change as the full import of the new situation becomes apparent to the union leaders and members.

Right now, however, the dominant mood is one of scrambling to make the best of a bad lot. This corrodes what solidarity does exist; it privatizes social struggles and it makes people sad. It also creates the basis for a similar disintegration in our political life. Here, too, the centrifugal forces seem to predominate, and there are even those, like Dean Burnham, who foresee the end of the American party system.

The reasons for this view are clear enough. Independents now constitute the second largest voting bloc, behind the Democrats but ahead of the Republicans. Then in the 1972 presidential election, nonvoters were a higher percentage than at any time since 1948. The result is that the established model of American political behavior is breaking down—and perhaps the party system with it. According to that model, most elections confirm, or only temporarily deviate from, a basic alignment that lasts for a long period of time (the Republicans from the 1890s to the 1930s; the Democrats from the 1930s to the 1960s). Realigning elections, in which a new majority coalition came into being, were seen as relatively rare occurrences.

But how, on that basis, explain the extraordinarily erratic patterns of recent times? Within a mere eight years, the voters gave landslide mandates to the candidates of different parties—and within a few years of having made that choice, they turned by an overwhelming margin on the man they had picked. In the established model, voting habits—and therefore the party system—were normally consistent and fixed. Now, suddenly, they don't seem to be so at all.

Are the centrifugal tendencies in American politics so great that there is no coherent majority coalition possible and that we will

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therefore zig and zag into the unforeseeable future? Yes, it is possible. At any given moment these days, as I suggested in *Toward a Democratic Left,* two radically different scenarios seem plausible. In one, the various elements with a stake in social change —the unions, the college-educated constituency, the minorities and so on—unite in spite of their differences; in the other, they fight one another, each placing a particular interest over those of coalition. Clearly something like that happened in 1968 when many in the Kennedy-McCarthy movement failed to rally to Humphrey and in 1972 when George Meany and his associates turned their back on McGovern.

If the politics of disintegration do indeed prevail, then the prospects is for an increase in the collective sadness of American life. We will find ourselves in the unprecedented position of suffering a cultural crisis that shakes the confidence of millions in the values by which they have lived while at the same time confronting a new academic challenge, one that is perhaps more profound, and certainly more elusive, than that of the Great Depression. And all of this under political circumstances where the majority coalition with a democratic Left program, which is so desperately needed, may be impossible.

Clearly, I do not take these things as inevitable. Clearly, my analysis motivates me to action, not despair, to fighting for a "centripedal" strategy that will bring into being that new coalition. But it is important to understand how difficult the task is and to perceive the new anxieties and frustrations that have contributed to our collective sadness. □

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Robert Lekachman

Mill, Malthus, and Growth Without End

Last December at the meetings of the American Economic Association, there was a major address by MIT's generally admired theorist of economic growth, Robert M. Solow. He chose for his title, "The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics," and began with this quotation:

> Contemplation of the world's disappearing supplies of minerals, forests, and other exhaustible assets has led to demands for regulation of their exploitation. The feeling that these products are now too cheap for the good of future generations, that they are being selfishly exploited at too rapid a rate, and that in consequence of their excessive cheapness they are being produced and consumed wastefully has given rise to the conservation movement.

Solow's intent was playful, for as he immediately revealed, "The author of those sentences is not Dennis Meadows and associates, not Ralph Nader and associates, not the president of the Sierra Club; it is a very eminent economic theorist . . . Harold Hotelling," who confided these fears to fellow economists way back in 1931. From this instance of doom averted and scarcity denied, Solow inferred the encouraging conclusion that "The world has been exhausting its exhaustible resources since the first caveman chipped a flint, and I imagine the process will go on for a long, long time."

After this preliminary skirmish with the catastrophists, Solow treated his auditors to an elegant analysis of the manner in which market forces in the future as in the past can be expected to evoke new resources, improve the technology of their extraction, and impose salutary cost constraints upon individuals and enterprises purchasing resources in either raw or processed form. Solow's nearly unqualified message was one of confidence in the capacity of societies organized on market principles to grow indefinitely into the future at the 3–4 percent annual per capita rates, which describe the economic history of the West since the Industrial Revolution.

If this conventional economic wisdom contains the root of the matter, then the current flood of gloomy social prophecy—of which Robert Heilbroner's eloquent *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* is this year's best example, as Dennis Meadows' *Limits of Growth* was last year's—symbolizes no more than a recurrent fashion. A long time ago Malthus predicted doom because of too many people. A century ago Jevons feared that exhaustion of its coal deposits would halt England's progress. But here we are richer than ever.

Sound economics explains why pessimists err and optimists are wise. Pay heed to the market. Energy prices will drop for predictable reasons: the OPEC cartel, like cartels before it, will disintegrate as the interests of its members come into sharper and sharper conflict (already Iran and Saudi

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Arabia have semipublicly quarreled over crude oil prices); new deposits of conventional energy will be located because higher prices encourage exploration; alternative energy sources will be exploited by entrepreneurs for the usual profit-maximizing reasons; new technologies will become economically important for the same reasons; and energy-thrifty activities, appliances, autos, and residential patterns will displace their energy-wasteful alternatives. Little in the way of government action is necessary, for given half a chance, competitive markets will perform their routine miracles of allocation of existing resources and evocation of new ones. So it has been for two centuries at least. So it shall be.

I mention only parenthetically the embarrassing limitations which monopoly imposes upon market efficiency, certainly in petroleum extraction and marketing, as well as in autos, steel, and a long list of manufacturing industries. I assume that true believers in the efficacy of competitive behavior will do their bit to revivify the antitrust statutes and fragment concentrated industries. That economists tend, one suspects for their own convenience, drastically to underestimate the impact of monopoly is a story for another occasion.

What concerns me here is the continuing confidence of mainstream American economists and their colleagues in Japan and Western Europe that growth can and will continue at its usual pace. The implications of that conviction are momentous. One relates to the analysis of contemporary inflation. Most Keynesians accept continuous but slight inflation as on balance socially beneficial. Persistent 2–3 percent annual increases in the consumer price index tilt the odds in favor of debtors, entrepreneurs, and innovators at the expense of less active elements in the community such as creditors and rentiers. It was Keynes himself who set the tone by looking forward wistfully to the "euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of capital. Interest today rewards no genuine sacrifice, any more than does the rent of land."

Dynamic capitalist societies flourish when businesses take shrewd gambles in the hope of great gain. When they calculate the odds correctly, inflation affords them the opportunity to sell their inventories at prices higher than those at which the merchandise was acquired. Inflation makes it easier to borrow and enlarges prospective capital gain as well as profit.

Businessmen are not the only winners. Since moderate inflation stimulates economic activity and reduces unemployment, well-organized unions can successfully bargain for wage gains in excess of the inflation rate. It follows that so long as output per worker grows faster than the cost of living, typical white- and blue-collar operatives can reasonably anticipate long-run improvements in their real income, which average the 3–4 percent secular improvement in per capita productivity. In 33 years a steady 3 percent annual increase in real wages ensures that real wages double those in force at the beginning of the period, even if an individual never becomes a foreman or supervisor.

AS THIS ACCOUNT RUNS, the coincidence of steady growth and persistent inflation since the end of World War II is the necessary and benign consequence of the power of organized business and union groups to extract somewhat larger profits and wages than, at current prices, a given economy is capable of generating. Conventionally, the American Federal Reserve and the central banks of other nations validate the claims by printing enough new money and generating sufficient credit to pay into corporate treasuries and workers' hands the amounts targeted by corporate managers or embodied in union contracts.

Inflation is realistically unavoidable because depression has become a socially unacceptable technique for the treatment of

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rising prices. In the United States the Employment Act of 1946, emasculated though it was by congressional conservatives, nevertheless signaled political recognition of new public responsibility for the maintenance of high levels of employment and production, come what might. Although in the last generation American employment performance leaves much to be desired, particularly by comparison with Western Europe and Japan, the contrast between pre- and post-World War II experience is striking. In the worst month of the worst post-World War II recession, unemployment was less than 8 percent. By somber contrast, on the eve of World War II, after nearly seven years of the New Deal, unemployment persisted at 12–14 percent levels.

These days wages, once flexible in both directions, are now flexible only upward. There have been times, most recently in 1969 and 1970, when wages actually advanced more rapidly during spells of mild contraction than in time of rapid expansion. Profits also tend to resist erosion, whatever the economic weather. During the 1973–74 recession profits increased more rapidly than they did in 1971 and 1972, and both were years of general business expansion.

THUS FAR I have written of slow inflation. What about the double-digit pace at which prices are now marching upward? Optimistic Keynesians argue that a combination of bad luck, poor national leadership, international politics, and coincidence explain the present price explosion. Bad luck has abounded. The Peruvian anchovies, now back in their usual haunts, swam mysteriously away, caused shortages of cattle feed, compelled substitution of soybeans, drove up soybean prices, and elevated American meat prices. In 1972 simultaneous Russian, Chinese, and Indian crop failures generated explosive demand for American food. Dollar devaluation, in addition, for a time turned American food into a world bargain. As luck would have it, business boomed simultaneously in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, a coincidence of business cycle peaks which accentuated demand pressure upon all manner of finished goods and raw materials.

Administration blunders compounded misfortune. The list is familiar. Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz retained acreage limitations long after worldwide crop shortages dictated reversal of American policy. White House pursuit of détente as well as sheer incompetence allowed Russian trade negotiators quietly to purchase far more wheat at far lower prices than the Nixon administration realized or perhaps wished to realize until the damage had been done. Neglect of international commercial relationships necessitated three dollar devaluations, which predictably enlarged foreign demand for American products and contributed to domestic inflationary pressure. At exactly the wrong moment, the Administration in January 1973 dismantled its relatively effective (though inequitable) Phase II wage-price controls and moved to an ambiguous Phase III which was generally interpreted by the business community as a license to elevate prices and profits as high as the market would bear.

The near quadrupling of petroleum prices by the OPEC cartel reinforced these inflationary tendencies. And as the most cheerful will concede, in the short run no relief is in sight. For some time to come the multinational oil companies will continue to enjoy record windfall profits. Real transfers of wealth will continue to be made not only between oil consuming and oil producing nations but between average American motorists and Exxon, Mobil, and Texaco stockholders, a generally more affluent collection of men and women.

According to the optimists, however, these are transitional events. For the reasons earlier noted, energy prices will subside. Plentiful American and Russian harvests, for instance, are far more likely to revive apprehensions about the reappearance of crop surpluses than to demonstrate Malthusian theo-

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rems about faster growth in mouths to be fed than in food to feed them. And the new Ford administration may have learned enough from its predecessor's experience to avoid repetition of the most egregious blunders.

The watchword then is, Keep Cool. Economic growth, less alarming inflation, and renewed improvement in living standards will soon resume, *if* we don't panic and, following the lead of Dr. Arthur F. Burns, take such drastic anti-inflationary action as to cause a genuine deep recession.

II

Are the economists, our contemporary Dr. Panglosses, right? Is the specter of scarcity as distant as ever? I don't think that they are. If the world is Malthusian, we are likely to be better guided by Malthus and Mill than by Robert Solow.

Malthus would be at home in the 1970s. With the help of Robert Heilbroner [1] and Emile Benoit,[2] the situation can be readily summarized. With now approximately 4 billion, world population is increasing about 80 million annually, 13 million in India alone. At present rates of increase the globe's population by the end of the present century will be between 6 and 7 billion. The bulk of this growth is occurring not in the richer industrialized nations but in the poverty-stricken continents of Asia, South America, and Africa. As Heilbroner puts it,

> Southeast Asia . . . is growing at a rate that will double its numbers in less than 30 years; the African continent as a whole every 27 years; Latin America every 24 years. Thus, whereas we can expect that the industrialized areas of the world will have to support roughly 1.4 to 1.7 billion people a century hence, the underdeveloped world, which today totals around 2.5 billion, will have to support something like 40 billion by that date if it continues to double its numbers approximately every quarter-century.[3]

The Malthusian "solution," which Heilbroner judges to be probable, features famine, disease,[4] and other calamities. Or, as Malthus phrased the prospect, in a passage that led Thomas Carlyle to call political economy the dismal science,

> Famine seems to be the last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction; and they often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence and plague, advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should success be still incomplete; gigantic, inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow, levels the population with the food of the world.

Effective limitation of population is essential to human survival. The routine marvels of science and technology by themselves do not suffice. For with all the ingenuity and imagination that science may muster, raw

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[1] *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* (New York: Norton, 1974).

[2] "What Future Spaceship Earth?" *Social Policy*, November–December 1973, pp. 17–21.

[3] In his *First Essay on Population* (1798), Malthus formulated the problem like this:

> Taking the population of the world at any number, a thousand millions, for instance, the human species would increase in the ratio of—1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, &c. and subsistence as —1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, &c. In two centuries and a quarter, the population would be to the means of subsistence as 512 to 10: in three centuries as 4096 to 13, and in two thousand years the difference would be almost incalculable. . . .

Although food output has increased rather faster than Malthus anticipated, Latin-American and African population growth rates are frighteningly close to his speculations.

[4] In June 1973 an Indian smallpox epidemic has killed tens of thousands in the province of Bihar. A precursor of things to come?

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materials of some kind are essential, but as Benoit observes

> The presently estimated usable reserves of most of the world's irreplaceable raw materials will be exhausted in 50 to 100 years if the present growth of demand continues.[5] Even if new discoveries succeed in quintupling usable reserves and social discipline novel to the American experience allows us to reclaim and recycle 75 per cent of the irreplaceable resources now discarded, the additions would accommodate our rising rates of consumption for only a pitifully brief additional period—one that would be measured in decades rather than centuries.

Moreover, hope for a technological "fix" is much less well-founded than economists and other optimists seem to believe. Generally speaking, alternatives to petroleum all entail either threats to safety (as in nuclear power plants), enormous pollution problems (as in strip-mining and oil shale extraction), vast water requirements, threats to marine life and protein supplies from the ocean, enormous capital expenditures, or some combination of these costs and hazards. If, by some succession of miracles, the scientific community invents solutions to each of these difficulties, there is still no reason to count on the technology improving at requisite speed. Benoit reminds his readers that

> It is now a quarter of a century since the basic technology of nuclear power has been understood, yet nuclear plants still account for only a small fraction of world energy production, the breeder reactor is still in the development stage, and serious unresolved safety and pollution problems impede rapid expansion of the program.

THE PROSPECTS for adequate food are even more discouraging. Despite a "green revolution" in wheat and rice cultivation, aggregate food supplies in recent years have increased only at about the same pace as population, leaving no margin for improvement in standards of nutrition and no cushion against localized famines, like the one in progress caused by a five-year sub-Saharan drought or the catastrophe looming in that new nuclear power, India. As a protypical technological fix, the green revolution relied heavily on petrochemical fertilizers, chemical insecticides, forest clearing to extend cultivated land, and tilling of new land in regions of marginal rainfall. Unfortunately, just as though Emerson's law of compensation were malignly at work, artificial fertilizers tend to diminish the natural fertility of the earth. Insecticides frequently enter into food chains and imperil human health and life, encourage the breeding of poison-resistant strains of crop pests, and occasionally destroy the natural enemies of plant vandals. Attempts to clear forest and cultivate marginal land appear to increase soil erosion and lower water tables. Fishing, which has enjoyed its own technological revolution, is threatened by pollution as well as depletion of fish stock caused by the greed of the fishermen.

Even if we don't all starve, men and women may perish from the adverse effects of the pollution of their water, atmosphere, and immediate environment. Benoit cites a Japanese expert to the effect that in his country "where illnesses attributed to pollution number in the hundreds of thousands . . . half the population will be dead in twenty years if economic growth continues at present rates."

In sum, Robert Solow's optimism is close to fatuous at a time of demographic, raw material, food, and environmental threats to which the deified market, worshiped by every respectable economist, seems the most trivial of responses. The world that Malthus predicted and feared is our world. As Benoit aptly comments, "The fact that someone once cried 'wolf' does not prove that a wolf may not finally arrive. . . . Every extinct species and civilization was a success story for a while—often for a long while!"

[5] American energy consumption has been steadily growing at 4.8 annual rates. Nor is the situation less ominous in other advanced communities.

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III

What next? Should the middle-aged rejoice because they are likely to disappear before the steaks, lobsters, and vintage wines vanish from the tables of all but Greek billionaries? Should the living, to revise Herman Kahn, envy those who sooner then they themselves will be dead? Is it necessary, as the only viable alternative to such despair, to resign ourselves, as Robert Heilbroner appears to do, to the necessity of authoritarian governments, which alone, so his argument runs, can control resource use and regulate human reproduction in the interests of the survival of the species? In such a context it is sobering to note the almost casual comment of a Russian scientific humanist like Andrei D. Sakharov that "The scientific and democratic regulation of the world economy and all social life, *including the dynamics of population* [emphasis added], is not, I am profoundly convinced, a utopia but a very real necessity." But Sakharov, whose values approximate those of the editors and readers of DISSENT, does not pause to explain just how one "democratically" regulates human reproduction.

At worst, zero or negative rates of growth imply a Hobbesian universe, a specter that animated the British economist Rudolf Klein's June essay in the *New York Times Magazine*. Once growth stops,

> Immediately the competition for resources becomes a zero-sum game. One man's prize is another man's loss. If the blacks want to improve their share of desirable goods, it can only be at the expense of the whites. If the over-65's are to be given higher pensions, or improved medical services, it can only be at the expense of the working population or of the young.
>
> [Klein fears that] It would seem only too likely that the haves would man the barricades to defend their share of resources, against the have-nots. The politics of compromise would be replaced by the politics of revolution, because the have-nots would be forced to challenge the whole basis of society, and its distribution of wealth and power.

Such contests of each against all are likely to end in the extermination of some of the antagonists, the exhaustion of the remainder, and the emergence of the sort of authoritarian monarchs or governments that Hobbes postulated in his version of the social contract and Heilbroner describes as the likeliest of future political developments.

In the absence of that universal solvent, genuine and continuous economic growth, it is hard to deny the plausibility of the dreadful futures variously envisaged by Heilbroner, Klein, and other pessimists. The wars among nations over resources, the clashes within nations over income and wealth redistribution, and the games of nuclear blackmail that Heilbroner foresees, may indeed be the only responses to scarcity that "human nature," national egotism, and group hostility are capable of engendering once the realization becomes general that the economic pie cannot be indefinitely enlarged, that, in Malthus's words, there really are "unhappy persons who, in the great lottery of life, have drawn a blank." If so, magazines like DISSENT and essays like this one will be among the minor casualties in the regimented societies just over the horizon. It is unlikely in the extreme that the controllers of the printed word in this world to come would allot even recycled paper to their professional critics. Possibly no one ought to weep for a species so prone to aggression, cruelty, deception, and misuse of its own intellectual and esthetic powers. Why trouble about the fate of societies that prefer to evade rather than pursue the ethical goals of compassion, justice, and brotherhood, which spiritual leaders and secular prophets have vainly promoted over the millennia?

Still, hope, like despair, is a human tendency. Even terminal cancer victims dream of spontaneous remissions and new therapies. In this spirit, I shall briefly speculate about a somewhat different and less depressing re-

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ponse to the ending of the Era of Growth and the inauguration of the Era of Redistribution. There are plastic as well as stable elements in human behavior, just as there are instances of institutional improvement as well as rather more cases of institutional deterioration.

FOR REASONS that will become speedily evident, I shall term what follows a Millian alternative. The first edition of John Stuart Mill's *Principles of Political Economy* was published in that year of failed revolution, 1848, the last during Mill's own lifetime in 1871. During the intervening generation, Mill's detestation of the moral and esthetic impact of English and American capitalism steadily deepened, partly as his *Autobiography* disclosed, because of the influence of his wife, Harriet Taylor. The chapters on socialism took an increasingly kindly view of the ethical desirability if not the economic practicality of the versions of Utopian socialism promulgated by Fourier and Owen. Powerful chapters entitled "Of the Stationary State" and "On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes" grappled ever more devotedly with the definition of a state of society superior to Victorian capitalism.

Mill's intellectual strategy embraced the stationary, zero-growth state as a huge opportunity for personal development, not at all as a menace to humankind. In one place Mill phrased this vision of a better future in this way:

> It must always have been seen, more or less distinctly, by political economists, that the increase of wealth is not boundless: that at the end of what they term the progressive state lies the stationary state, that all progress in wealth is but postponement of this, and that each step in advance is an approach to it. We have not been led to recognise that this ultimate goal is at all times near enough to be fully in view; that we are always on the verge of it, and that if we have not reached it long ago, it is because the goal itself flies before us. The richest and most prosperous countries would very soon attain the stationary state, if no further improvements were made in the productive arts, and if there were a suspension of the overflow of capital from those countries into the uncultivated or ill-cultivated regions of the earth.

The diagnosis embodied in this forecast was premised upon increasing population and diminishing returns from the cultivation of less and less fertile land, as well as overcultivation of higher quality farms.[6] As a result, both the pace of real growth and the rate of return upon capital declined. For orthodox contemporaries of Mill, who defined prosperity after the fashion of James R. McCulloch not as a "large production and a good distribution of wealth but a rapid increase of it" stimulated by "high profits," such a condition was unmitigated disaster, much as it appears today to writers like Rudolf Klein.

Perceiving much that was wrong with Victorian capitalism as remediable in a stationary state, Mill reached a precisely opposite evaluation:

> I cannot . . . regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our present condition. I confess that I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of industrial progress . . . the best state for human nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back, by the efforts of others to push themselves forward.

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[6] In the trade jargon, cultivation at both the extensive and the intensive margin infallibly yields smaller and smaller additional outputs per additional unit of labor and capital.

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English capitalism was bad enough; the American version was plain dreadful, an object lesson of what happens to a society that pursues wealth above all other goals:

> The northern and middle states of America are a specimen of this state of civilization in very favourable circumstances; having, apparently, got rid of all social injustices and inequalities that affect persons of Caucasian race and of the male sex, while the proportion of population to capital and land is such as to ensure abundance to every able-bodied member of the community who does not forfeit it by misconduct. They have the six points of Chartism, and they have no poverty; and all that these advantages do for them is that the life of the whole of one sex is devoted to dollar-hunting, and of the other to breeding dollar-hunters.

Mill's prescription for a better society emphasized what now are called quality-of-life issues. Here a central dilemma was how to reconcile his admiration of competition as guarantor of free choice and economic efficiency, and his dislike of societies organized on the model of rat races. Very much like Karl Marx in his own time and our own analysts of worker alienation, Mill worried about the deficiencies of factories as social institutions. It was not only, in Mill's bitter judgment, that "hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being"; it was also and far more important, the circumstance that at the center of the factory operative's daily routine was a cancer. The relationship between worker and employer was diseased by the mutual suspicions of both parties. Employers coldly insisted upon the last possible ounce of effort from their employees, treating them as particularly refractory machines. For their part, the employees retaliated by conscientious malingering. The contest demeaned both groups. Reading Mill, one finds it easy to grasp his premonition of such recent episodes as the Lordstown strike, which centered on just such an effort by the General Motors Assembly Division to extract extra labor and just such a sabotaging reprisal by the human targets of its policy.

What, then, should be done simultaneously to preserve competition's benefits and dissipate its dehumanizing side effects? It seemed to Mill that a transformation of industrial relations was essential so that the interests and emotions of workers and owners might coincide instead of conflict. Profit-sharing was a promising technique. Examining numerous 19th-century French and English experiments, Mill concluded that under profit-sharing laborers worked harder, enlarged their incomes, and even raised the profits of capital. Moreover, because workers took into their own hands factory discipline and punished malingerers, the quality of workmanship tended steadily to rise.

Yet, even though profit-sharing improved normal industrial relations, Mill judged the form transitional. His ideal solution was syndicalist. Workers ought by peaceful purchase to acquire factories, run them in their own interest, and compete with other enterprises similarly managed. Although Mill's account of the internal governance of worker-owned factories was less than precise, his expectations of benefit were high: "The relation of masters and workpeople will be gradually superseded by partnership, in one of two forms; in some cases, associations of the labourers with the capitalists; in others, and perhaps finally in all, associations of labourers among themselves."

For Mill as for such spiritual descendants as William Morris, R. H. Tawney, and J. K. Galbraith, the relevant measure of social achievement was moral rather than material. Syndicalist solutions preserved the formal value of competition; but as Mill aged and witnessed ever more of market capitalism's corrupting effect on inlividual character, he became increasingly eager to soften the rigors of competition between persons, increasingly partisan to diminished inequality of income and wealth, more feminist than ever in his insistence upon the emancipation of women

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as a precondition to general progress, more inclined in 1871 than even in 1848 to judge English society harshly, and more confident than ever that only freedom of expression and parliamentary government promoted truth and enlightenment.

IV

Obviously there is no occasion for rejoicing that Mill more than a century ago sketched an agenda for industrial societies that in 1974 is not only incompletely resolved but in significant respects barely started upon. Today as in Victorian England population limitation is absolutely essential to human survival at least in any manner that one might prefer to survive. It is fair to say that contemporary scientific advances have actually accentuated Malthusian dangers. Notoriously uneven in its impact, science and technology have been better at draining marshes, controlling malaria, reducing infant mortality, eliminating epidemic disease, and purifying water supplies than in sweetening the routine of daily life, raising the level of public education, comprehending the roots of crime and mental disorder, moderating the hostile and aggressive impulses of individuals, groups, and nations, and generally promoting the altruistic, cooperative side of "human nature."

Population limitation is not an end, but a precondition of a society friendly to the best of human aspirations and potentialities. For us as for Mill such a society requires a decrease in the gap between rich and poor, managers and workers, educated and less educated, black and white, male and female. The human condition is now more desperate than in 1871, in good part because of the warlike uses of science. Inequality between rich and poor nations is now embittered by the demonstration efforts upon the poor of the life-styles of the affluent. Nuclear blackmail is a real possibility, for a community as poor as India can explode nuclear devices. The relatively puny military weaponry of the 19th century made genocide at worst a localized affair.

As I read our contemporary catastrophists, I find it hard not to nod my head in agreement. On the record, poor nations have preferred war to painful efforts at solution of their internal problems. Rich nations have erratically, at best, recognized a community of interest with less fortunate neighbors. Rich men have reluctantly surrendered their tithes to improve the condition of men and women of their own nationality and citizenship, let alone those lesser beings whose color, religion, ethnic origin, or geographical location enforce even smaller claims to succor.

Hunger, nuclear war, and authoritarian social control may lie just over the horizon. I have far less than complete confidence that we shall take the enlightened route signposted by Mill. We may and very possibly will fail to limit population, transform the character of work, transfer resources within rich societies and between rich societies and poor ones, and learn to prefer cooperation to competition. No divine principle insures human survival. In the absence of changes such as these, the human prospect would be truly dismal. □

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Dennis H. Wrong

Watergate: Symptom of What Sickness?

By now Watergate stands not merely for the illegal and unethical acts of a President and his men but for the intensifying response of Congress, party leaders, and the public. The crisis has illuminated so many areas of American government and politics that it is difficult to stand back and assess its larger meaning.

Is it as momentous as its domination of our consciousness for 18 months makes it seem? Does it reveal anything about American politics and society that we didn't know in the large before? Will it produce any lasting changes in our political system? Does it point to an incipient totalitarianism in advanced capitalist societies that will reassert itself after the ritual cleansing gestures have been completed? Or does it show that the political system in the end "works," suggesting a possible renascence of democracy?

Obviously, Watergate is in the first instance a constitutional crisis. We have all been provided with a refresher course in the Constitution and the structure of American government, which both reflects and encourages the American predilection for reducing political conflicts to questions of legal and constitutional procedure. Yet there is also the opposite tendency on the Left to treat forms of government as mere superstructures, often manifest in efforts to define Watergate as evidence of a "crisis of legitimation," allegedly plaguing "late capitalist" societies. It is worth emphasizing therefore that it is the basic design of the American government plus the *de jure* and *de facto* accretions creating what Arthur Schlesinger calls "The Imperial Presidency" that have compelled us to "wallow in Watergate" these many months. Under a parliamentary system—even the Canadian, which combines British institutions with looser, North American-style political parties—Nixon would have soon been forced to resign, his caretaker successor would have called a general election within days after the evidence of illegal acts by Nixon's chief aides (let alone by himself) had become public. There would have been no equivalent of the long Ervin Committee hearings, no appointment of a Special Prosecutor, no discovery of the White House taping system, no reexamination of presidential tax returns, no revelatory transcripts—in short, no interminable scrutiny of the government's dirtiest secrets casting a garish light on American institutions.

Two contrasting explanations of the scandals might be called the "big money" theory and the "power" theory. Early in the Ervin hearings, a columnist quoted the advice of one of those "wise and experienced" but unnamed Washington "observers" to "keep your eye on the trail of the long green" if you want to unravel the mysteries of Watergate. Indeed, the massive purchase of favors by ITT and the milk producers, the sale of ambassadorships, the raising of millions of dollars by illegal means from corporations for Nixon's reelection campaign, the apparent "skimming" of these funds for gifts to Nixon's relatives and personal friends, Nixon's own chiseling on his tax returns and use of public funds for private purposes, Agnew's disgrace and fall for petty financial

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derelictions unrelated to Watergate—all of these are forms of "capitalist corruption," of what C. Wright Mills called "the higher immorality," examples of which are scarcely unknown in the record of previous administrations. Their scale and accumulation, and the extent of involvement at the very peak of government, are what make Watergate unprecedented. The *New York Times* has observed editorially that the case of ITT or of the milk producers alone is equal to the Teapot Dome scandal of the '20s—a period politically not unlike the present. I have heard radicals, predictably attracted by the notion of endemic "capitalist corruption," argue that the Nixon administration, as the publicly visible "government," is being made the scapegoat for the sins of the corporations who were the real agents of corruption.

At this point the limitations of the "big money" theory become glaringly obvious. No doubt ITT, Vesco, and others sought to buy favors from the Administration, but one gains the distinct impression that Nixon's campaign fund-raisers bullied many corporate officers into reluctantly making illegal contributions rather than the other way around. Recently it was revealed that, in addition to the well-publicized "enemies list," Maurice Stans compiled a "shit list" (his term) of corporations who had refused to contribute, or had done so less than lavishly, to the Committee to Reelect the President. The major corporations surely preferred Nixon's reelection to a Muskie or a Kennedy victory, but it is hard to believe that the prospect of the latter frightened them to the point of donating large amounts of money in violation of the law. (Some of the money was used to increase the likelihood of McGovern's nomination—which might well have frightened them—by undermining the other candidates after it had been given or extorted.) However, the corporations undoubtedly remembered President Kennedy's instant mobilization of the powers of the government against steel companies that had broken price guidelines in 1962; if they failed to remember, they were certainly not so subtly reminded by Nixon's men.

This brings us to the "power" theory—or theories. Early in the Ervin hearings it became a cliché to attribute Watergate to the itch for power rather than to the pecuniary greed at the root of most past American political scandals. A series of personable young men paraded before the Committee and confessed to perjury, destroying documents, and planning "dirty tricks" in the interest of Nixon's reelection. These activities bore little resemblance to past electoral frauds, which have usually involved ballot-tampering in one-party dominated cities or counties far from Washington. The initially shocking feature of Watergate was the attempted subversion of the electoral process by an incumbent administration that used "black" intelligence methods to try to influence candidate selection in the opposition party. That CRP may have partially succeeded in discrediting Muskie, and the fact that its preferred "weak" candidate won the Democratic nomination and lost by a landslide in the election gave its hidden activities an even more ominous look. One recalled the rumor circulated a few years before by New Leftists that Nixon planned to cancel the 1972 elections. Actually, Hubert Humphrey had a lot more to do than CRP with defeating Muskie and ensuring McGovern's nomination, for his candidacy split the "traditional" democratic vote in several important primaries that would otherwise have gone to Muskie.

The effort to create a shadow government, a secret "state within a state," is the most totalitarian feature of the Nixon administration's secret maneuvers. One can discern a pattern in the eventually rejected Huston plan, the creation of the "plumbers," the wiretapping not only of journalistic critics but of officials in the Administration itself and even on the White House staff, the efforts to appoint Nixon loyalists to strategic positions in other government agencies—especially those like the IRS with power to

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punish opponents, and even the lengths to which the isolation of the reelection campaign organization from the Republican party was carried. Other presidents, of course, have had their "kitchen cabinets" and White House "cronies," have created new government agencies under their personal control to bypass existing ones (FDR was a master at this), and have fiercely played the game of secret bureaucratic in-fighting. But the impulse both to duplicate offices and to "colonize" the government bureaucracy with men from the White House "cadres" was unprecedentedly strong in the Nixon administration. Moreover, there was a special obsession with the official foreign and domestic intelligence services, themselves often accused by liberals of operating as "invisible governments," which have elsewhere served as the major instruments of dictatorial rule or as objects of special mistrust, inducing the dictator to create his own conspiratorial substitutes for them. These "structural" indications of a totalitarian potential in the Nixon administration—in conjunction with Nixon's remark in the transcripts that he had not yet used the full powers of the FBI and the Justice Department in his first four years but that "things are going to change now"—give plausibility to the claim that the exposure of Watergate "seriously derailed . . . the fascist timetable," in the words of Irving Louis Horowitz.

When one turns to "subjective" rather than "structural" tendencies, a legitimizing counterideology to support these actions was readily available. The first Nixon administration showed little concern with civil liberties in moving against radical activists and attempted (with ambiguous success) to exploit their unpopularity with the "silent majority" in the 1970 congressional elections. Agnew's speeches linked the declining New Left to liberals and intellectuals in the media and the universities. As the 1972 election approached, efforts were made to discover ties between the opposition party and the radical Left, and, if necessary, to create the appearance of such ties, using rumor, forgery, and provocation to this end. That the campuses and ghettos were quiet, the New Left virtually dead, and the peace movement deprived of its onetime momentum by changes in the draft and the "winding down" of the war in Vietnam actually enhanced the usefulness of radicalism as an issue. Claims of vast conspiratorial goings-on could be made without having to confront the real and therefore limited disturbances made by flesh-and-blood activists. Whether the Nazis set the Reichstag fire in order to blame it on the Communists, or the Communists actually set it, or, as recent research indicates, it was the act of an individual madman that a court later judged it to be was of little consequence in view of the readiness of the Nazis to make ideological use of it as a pretext for suspending constitutional liberties. A more relevant example is the exploitation by Senator Joseph McCarthy of the theme of far-reaching Communist conspiracy in the early '50s when American Communism was already finished as a political force of any magnitude.

Watergate stands in the same relationship to the New Left excesses of the late '60s as the McCarthyism of the early '50s stood in relation to the exposures of past Communist infiltration and espionage a few years before. There is also a striking similarity in the way in which the supralegal fervor of the far Left provided the Right with a pretext for using the actual or alleged methods of its declared enemy to violate civil liberties and the law. In the late '60s some of us warned that the growing taste of "Movement" radicals for violent confrontations would encourage similar tactics on the part of the Right, but we were scarcely so prescient—or so fearful—as to imagine that this response would come from the White House itself!

There is an obvious congruence between the use of the alleged radical threat and Nixon's political beginnings as an anti-Communist crusader in the early years of the Cold War. Nor is it as paradoxical as it ap-

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pears that he should play on fears of domestic radicalism while making maximum use of his role as a peacemaker with the Communist powers abroad. Stalin's purges of "bourgeois" elements at home coincided with his turn toward the Popular Front policy abroad; Hitler's pact with Stalin did not lead to any abatement of his suppression of the Left in Germany. A notable trait of McCarthy and his followers and imitators was their lack of interest in and even antagonism toward, often reflecting isolationist roots, American foreign policy efforts to "contain" the Soviet Union. They were far more inclined to give primacy to "rooting out" Communist sympathizers at home. The "Radical Right" of the '50s even saw the fight against domestic Communists as an alternative to a sustained anti-Communist foreign policy requiring alliances, foreign aid, big defense budgets, U.N. participation, and limited wars as in Korea. Nixon's role in the Republican party and the Eisenhower administration was, in part, to build a bridge between the domestic Red hunters and the more respectable, conservative internationalists committed to the Cold War abroad. Today, with détente the order of the day, he is able to pose as the peacemaker abroad and as the scourge of a domestic radicalism, conveniently no longer tied to Soviet interests at home.

Of the Watergate conspirators themselves, Hunt and McCord were old CIA men experienced in anti-Communist intelligence activities; Liddy was an eccentric right-wing ideologue; the Cuban burglars were persuaded that the break-in served the cause of the anti-Castro opposition. The loyalties and commitments of these lower-level operatives were no doubt cynically manipulated by the higher-ups at CRP and the White House. One might add the "smartass shrewds" to the "crazy braves" and "phoney toughs" whom the late Stewart Alsop saw as uniting to bring about Watergate. Such a blend of PR manipulativeness, posturing rhetoric, and genuine fanaticism has often been a feature of fascist-type movements.

Somehow, though, the "mix" doesn't seem to be quite the right one to support the view that Watergate was a step toward "fascism." There were too few "crazy braves" at the top (Liddy was Alsop's main example) and too many "phoney toughs" and "smartass shrewds" ready to collapse under pressure and plea-bargain. Now that we have the transcripts of Nixon's conversations with his aides, it is even harder than before to believe in a demoniacal fascist interpretation of Wategate. The transcripts do not remind one of Hitler's tabletalk. No broad and misty ideological goals, no impassioned determination to rid the nation of a proscribed enemy reveal themselves in these colloquies. They never rise above the level of sleazy scheming, petty machinations to fiddle with and evade the law, and preoccupation with the traits of individual personalities. The overall picture is one of low cunning, nervous defensiveness, occasional flashes of a largely personalized venom, and a delusive ad-man's faith in "image projection."

As I wrote above, there was a discernible "pattern" in the various secret activities of the White House *apparat*. If this pattern suggests a drift toward fascist authoritarianism, the drift was nonetheless largely unconscious, made up of ad hoc improvisations reflecting no grand design—rather like the absent-minded empire-building of Britain in the late 19th century. The Huston plan, the plumbers, the illegal wiretapping, as well as the use of the "national security blanket" for purposes of concealment appear to have been responses to immediate problems posed by leaks embarrassing to the Administration, vindictiveness toward particular enemies like Ellsberg or Jack Anderson, and impatience with the independence and bureaucratic caution of the heads of the FBI and the CIA. These activities are perfect projections of Nixon's mistrust of others, his almost paranoid hatred of the media and political opponents, and his noto-

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rious preference for being a "loner"; but they do not seem to have been moves toward the implementation of any larger project.

The casual, accidental way in which people were recruited to the White House cadres is also striking: old college chums and frat brothers from USC, UCLA, and Brown; New York cops who happened to have guarded the President on ceremonial visits to that city; retired CIA men; unsuccessful politicians seeking government jobs; affluent Southern California lawyers with past business connections to the President; young protégés of Cabinet officers. They hardly add up to a hand-picked, disciplined, dedicated corps of men capable of a fascist coup.

Consider the following "scenario," as John Dean or John Ehrlichman might have put it. As the Watergate "cover-up" begins to unravel in the spring of 1973, Nixon addresses the nation:

> *Yes, we did most of those things we are now accused of doing by ignorant and small-minded men, and I take full responsibility for them. We did them to save America from a far-reaching radical conspiracy. The easy thing would have been to have limited our efforts to conventional, constitutionally acceptable methods. But, as that great jurist the late Justice Jackson, a Democrat, once observed, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact." This conspiracy had enlisted large numbers of young people in its ranks during the late '60s as a result of the misguided permissiveness and even encouragement of their elders in the media, the universities, and some segments of the Democratic party who should have stood for morality, patriotism, and strict observance of the law—the qualities that have made America great.*
>
> *Do not think the recent calm that has reigned on our campuses, in our inner cities, and our prisons means that radicalism has been defeated. Rather, the overwhelming mandate my Administration received a few months ago from the American people, and the peace with honor it has since achieved in Vietnam, have forced the Movement to go underground and to adopt even more destructive tactics than those it employed openly a few years ago. The radical conspiracy was, we now know definitely from secret intelligence sources, responsible nearly a decade ago for the assassination of a Democratic president and of his brother five years later. We have unmistakable proof that similar actions and even more deadly ventures were, and still are, under consideration.*
>
> *I hold here in my hand a communication sent to the FBI by the Weatherman Underground from which I quote. . . . I also have here a manifesto from another terrorist group in California calling itself the Symbionese Liberation Army which reads as follows. . . .**
>
> *I want to make one thing perfectly clear: the responsible leaders of the great world Communist powers, Brezhnev and Mao, whom I visited last year in Moscow and Peking, have in no way supported or encouraged these evil designs. CIA agents have discovered, however, that lesser Communist states and revolutionary movements abroad have provided significant financial and political aid to their allies in the United States. I refer to the governments of Cuba, Albania, North Korea, and Chile, and to the so-called Palestinian Liberation movement.*
>
> *My solemn responsibility to ensure the survival of this nation in peace and freedom as the hope of all the world left me with no alternative but to resort to drastic methods in fighting this radical conspiracy and exposing its dupes in high places. God bless America and God bless each and every one of you.*

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* My imagined reference to the Symbionese Liberation Army is, of course, an anachronism, for no one in early 1973 knew about such an organization. In the past year the SLA has provided the only other domestic news event to compete with Watergate. In their different ways and thoroughly unequal importance, both Watergate and the SLA are the detritus of the late '60s, the offal left behind as the frontlash and backlash of the tide of war and protest recede.

I have long been struck, incidentally, by the failure of the Right to exploit the fact that the assassins of both Kennedys were men of radical Left associations and commitments, one a former defector to the Soviet Union and a Castro supporter, the other a Palestinian nationalist. Contrast this failure with the wide hearing won by leftist theories of a right-wing plot behind President Kennedy's murder—even a commercial movie was produced, dramatizing one version.

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Only the last sentence was actually uttered by Richard Nixon in his speech of April 30, 1974. Can we be certain that if Nixon had made such a speech he would not have gotten away with it? Little of the full Watergate story had come to light in early 1973, and his approval rating in public-opinion polls still stood at over 60 percent. The fact that we cannot be sure that a speech like the one I have imagined would not have saved him and defused the scandal is a measure of the terrifying significance of Watergate. But there is also the fact that he did *not* make the speech, nor is there any evidence that he or any of his advisers possessed the boldness, nerve, and imagination even to consider doing so. This was no Hitler or Mussolini, not even a Joe McCarthy or Huey Long, nor a de Gaulle confronted with the Paris "Days of May" of 1968. Happily for all of us, Nixon's responses were the low scheming, the trivial PR engineering of appearances, and the general ineptitude and unrealism that have marked his defense against Watergate from the beginning and by now have clearly doomed him.

The secret and illegal harassment of political opponents compels us to consider Watergate in light of the "deadly parallel" with fascism and totalitarianism. But what might have happened if Watergate had not been exposed (and we assume—plausibly, as I have argued—that American democracy would have survived Nixon's term in office)? After Nixon's reelection it was widely believed that, unable to run for office again and with his eyes on posterity, he would lead the country in a moderate and statesmanlike manner, burying old enmities and playing peacemaker at home, as he had done with apparent success with the Communist powers abroad. In the few months between the election and the beginning of the Watergate revelations, it became quite evident that Nixon had chosen differently: there was the Christmas bombing of Hanoi, the demand for letters of resignation from all of his top officials, the dropping or demotion of the few mildly liberal officeholders he had appointed and the failure of rumored appointments of others to materialize, the rapid dismantling of OEO, and most of all the open defiance of Congress by the impoundment of funds, vetoes and threats to veto, and the thinly concealed contempt shown toward congressional committees by top members of the Nixon administration. Fortified by the size of his electoral mandate and the awareness that he would not be running for office again, instead of the expected mellowing there seemed to be a falling away of previous restraints.

The effort to concentrate unprecedented power in the White House was not solely to gratify Nixon's personal appetites but also aimed at the implementation of far-reaching conservative policies. Nixon's deep-rooted conservative and anti-welfare state beliefs came to the fore after the 1972 election, beliefs that even some liberals who had long loathed him for his opportunism and synthetic public personality had come to doubt he genuinely held. Nixon was about to become the first activist conservative president. As an electoral base he sought to cultivate Kevin Phillips's projected new Republican majority uniting the South, the Western "Sun Belt" states, and those white, ethnic blue-collar workers who were responsive to George Wallace's appeals. It is doubtful, even without Watergate, that the Nixon administration's incompetent management of the economy would not have frustrated these hopes of a conservative counterrevolution if indeed they had any substance in the first place. But Nixon was clearly prepared to alter the structure and direction of federal welfare policies that had not been seriously challenged, let alone by the White House, since the New Deal.

I recall hearing Robert Lekachman argue, just as the Watergate scandal was beginning to break, that Nixon's revenue-sharing with cities and states, his dismantling of sections of the federal welfare state bureaucracy, and other pending economic policies would, if

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carried out over the next four years, make it very difficult for a future liberal Democratic president to undo their consequences and recover the lost powers of the federal government to shape nationwide social policies. In late 1972 and early 1973 some of Nixon's supporters responded to criticism from conservatives and Republican members of Congress of his flouting of Congress and his aggrandizement of the presidency with the argument that he was doing all this precisely in order to reduce once and for all the powers of the entrenched federal bureaucracy in Washington. A mood of *après moi le déluge* seemed to prevail.

Watergate ended all this. A policy of concentrating power in the executive in order to deconcentrate it for future presidents suggests that we were saved by Watergate from something less than a fascist coup designed to establish an authoritarian statist regime. But what Nixon aimed at, and might well have come close to achieving, amounted nevertheless to a major break in what I have called the rhythm of democratic politics (see DISSENT, Winter 1974).

The election and reelection of Nixon, and of course the Watergate activities themselves, were part of the reaction against a decade of reform and protest from the Left. Nixon's first Administration had both capitalized on the reaction and succeeded in partially appeasing the protest by ending large-scale American involvement in Southeast Asia, changing the draft laws, promoting détente with Russia and China, and even proposing a few domestic liberal initiatives (which ultimately came to nothing), such as the Family Assistance Plan. Emboldened by the landslide victory handed him as a result of McGovern's candidacy, Nixon was ready to move even further than his predecessors toward a Gaullist, plebiscitarian definition of the presidency, which would permit him to use its powers for conservative rather than liberal domestic goals. Occurring in a period of mild reaction and loss of initiative by the Left, Watergate has now aroused fear and revulsion against the excesses of the Right and has at last discredited the incantatory use of national security and executive privilege as shields for presidential authority free from congressional and public scrutiny. Eighteen months of continuing exposure to an almost endless series of crimes and abuses has also revealed the hollowness of the more extravagant New Left sloganizing of recent years—the equation of America with Nazi Germany, seeing the hand of the CIA or the FBI in every unpleasant happening at home or abroad, imputing "repressive" aims to all our institutions. The ugly reality of Watergate is sufficient to rob such hyperbolic, self-indulgent claims of any authority.

Watergate and Vietnam may prove to be the end of an era in American politics that began with Pearl Harbor: the end of the imperial presidency, of the invocation of the external enemy to silence debate, of the shameless and costly merchandising of political candidates, of the taste for exaggerated ideological rhetoric on the part of both Left and Right. Yet these effects may not fully manifest themselves at once: we are still in a conservative period. Gerald Ford may well become the Eisenhower of the late '70s, presiding over a pacified country weary of politics. Or the Democrats, with the presidency within their grasp in 1976, are likely to be tempted to run a bland and vacuous campaign, no matter whom they nominate, expecting to be swept into office by revulsion against the Nixon administration. The most urgent immediate task of the democratic Left is to maintain the pressure for reforms of those practices that made Watergate possible: campaign-spending laws, the activities of government intelligence agencies, the accountability of the executive to Congress and the public. The broader challenge, with the prospect of a more active Congress becoming a major legacy of Watergate, is to advance concrete proposals addressed to the injustices of American society and to avoid the attitudinizing and inflated rhetoric that so often in the past decade served as a substitute for such proposals. □

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William H. Chafe

Feminism in the 1970s

If there is unprecedented concern with sex roles today, it is in large part because of the revival of feminism. The women's liberation movement has launched a drive for social change that promises to alter some of the fundamental values by which we live. Although feminism is not new to America, the present movement is distinctive in at least three ways: it is grounded in and moving in the same direction as underlying social trends; it has an organizational base that is diverse and decentralized; it seeks objectives that strike at some of the root causes of sex inequality.

The chief advantage of the present feminist movement lies in the extent to which its goals and programs speak to the realities of today's society.

In the past, the demands of women's rights organizations were far removed from the immediate concerns of most women. The Declaration issued at Seneca Falls in 1848 called for equal economic and educational opportunity, an end to the double standard of morality, the right to vote, and an end to the notion that women occupied a "sphere" different from that of men. A bold document anticipating future feminist platforms, the Declaration bore, however, little relationship to the world in which most women found themselves at the time—nonurban, full of large families, and increasingly suffused with Victorian morality. Feminist objectives seemed so far outside the realm of most people's daily experience, and women as well as men dismissed the feminists as a lunatic fringe.

The 20th-century suffrage movement also lacked contact with the realities of the day. Although suffrage supporters believed they were struggling for full equality, social conditions were not ripe for the achievement of their goals. Gaining the right to vote was primarily a symbolic victory. Having the ballot did not materially alter the division of labor or authority between men and women. A substantial minority of women did not vote (it was inconsistent with "woman's place") and those who did almost always chose the same candidates as their husbands or fathers.

Nor did the suffrage victory mean greater emancipation for women in the economy. The proportion of women who held jobs changed hardly at all from 1910 to 1940 and there were few, if any, advances in working conditions. Although suffrage leaders expected many women college graduates to enter careers and carry on the struggle, the new generation failed to respond. For most women, marriage still seemed the primary definition of female "success," and the prospects for combining marriage and a career were dim at best. Most Americans believed that wives who worked were calling into question their husband's ability to be a good provider (the *key* masculine role). Furthermore, a two-career family required modifications in the traditional roles of husbands and wives, which had little precedent and less public support. With few role models to emulate and a substantial degree of public opposition, only a small minority of women struck out in pursuit of careers.

The one area where "emancipation" did take hold—that of sex—also proved a major point of contention among women's rights advocates. Throughout the first three decades of the 20th century, a "sexual revolution" was in progress. For women born after

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1900, rates of premarital and extramarital intercourse were approximately double those for women born before 1900. The new morality was symbolized on a popular level by the emergence of the flapper with her short skirt, rolled hose, and risqué language. But the change went deeper than fads of dress and manners. A new awareness of contraceptive devices, an increased recognition of female sexuality, and growing disapproval of the double standard all signified a dramatic expansion of sexual freedom.

Yet most feminists were repelled by the "revolution in manners and morals." To women's rights advocates, the flapper seemed frivolous. There were crusades to be won, political battles to be fought, careers to be opened up. The issue of sex—especially when flaunted and sensationalized—appeared insignificant, even counterproductive when compared with the fight for equal treatment in politics, the job market, and the home. A woman might have affairs, smoke, and swear without improving the status of women. The latter were the issues that meant most to the older generation of suffragists.

Thus 20th-century suffragists, like their 19th-century counterparts, were somewhat out of touch with the underlying forces at work in their society. They overestimated the importance of the ballot and underestimated the extent to which inequality was rooted in the socialization process. They showed little sympathy for those women who were speaking for liberation in their personal lives. But if women's rights advocates were not sufficiently in tune with their environment, the larger problem was the environment itself. In both the 19th and 20th centuries, social conditions were not conducive to the development of a large feminist constituency. The problem of inequality was imbedded in the day-to-day routines of men and women, and until those began to alter, there was little chance of a popular base for feminism.

What makes the current feminist drive different from those in the past is that this one *is* in touch with prevailing social trends. Ideological protest and underlying social changes reinforce each other. Over the past three decades, significant shifts have occurred in the makeup of the labor force, the type of activities men and women engage in, the size of the average family, and the values of the culture. None of these changes has produced equality, but they have helped prepare a foundation on which a strong movement for equality could be built. Feminist ideas are still far in advance of what most Americans are willing to accept. But because of the changes that have taken place, feminists now have a substantial audience, they are speaking to concerns that are important for most women, and they are getting results.

II

One of the best examples of the interplay of social trends and the revival of feminism is the dramatic change in women's employment over the last 35 years. In 1940 approximately 25 percent of all women over 16 were in the labor force. Thirty years later, that figure had nearly doubled. More important, the characteristics of the female labor force changed drastically. In the years before World War II, female employment was dominated by young and single women. Except in families living on the edge of poverty, it was almost unheard of for wives or mothers of young children to hold jobs. The labor crisis of World War II permanently reversed that pattern. Nearly 7 million women went to work during the war, the vast majority married and over 30. When the war ended, the working wife became an institution as families learned the value of an extra pay check and women discovered the enjoyment of a role outside the home. By 1970, 51 percent of all mothers with children aged 6–17 were employed, and it was just as likely for a middle-class woman to hold a job as for a working-class woman.

This shift in the labor force disrupted the status quo of traditional sex roles. Conventional ideas on woman's "place" might still

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prevail, but the reality of woman's "place" had been destroyed. The facts of female employment flew in the face of social stereotypes. Sociological studies showed that holding a job gave women a greater sense of independence, more power in the home, and increased confidence in dealing with the outside world. A new set of life experiences provided the basis for the development of new attitudes toward woman's "place."

As a result, feminist programs for the first time spoke directly to the daily experience of millions of women. Female workers might not consider themselves feminists; indeed, they might shun association with the abstract cause of women's rights. But the same workers knew in their gut that they did not receive equal pay with men. They knew that most of the higher paid jobs carried a "male only" tag. And they saw that a large number of their coworkers experienced difficulty because there were no adequate day-care facilitis or after-school centers. Discontented homemakers had a similar sense of recognition. There was thus a common ground on which feminist activists and their potential constituency could stand. And that common ground provided the starting point from which women could move toward greater consciousness of their grievances.

Long-term demographic shifts provide another example of the way social trends and feminist ideology have reinforced each other. After the "baby boom" of the late '40s and early '50s, there ensued a prolonged decline in the birth rate, which by the late '60s resulted in the lowest birth rate since the Great Depression. Demographers disagreed about the reasons for the downturn, some citing the development of oral contraceptives, others economic and social instability. But all agreed there would be a new baby boom in the early 1970s when the children born 20 years earlier began to reproduce. Only, it happens that they were wrong. The birth rate reached an all-time low in 1972 and 1973, reaching the level required for Zero Population Growth.

Many forces contributed to this decline of the birth rate, but the interaction of female employment with changing attitudes toward women's roles seems to have been a key. Throughout the '60s, women married later, delayed the birth of their first child, and bore their last child at an earlier age. Whether as cause or effect, this trend coincided with many women finding occupations away from the home. Having a job and extra money tended to emphasize the advantages of a small family and the freedom to pursue individual interests. These values, in turn, were reinforced in the late '60s by the ideology of feminism and the population control movement. Two Gallup Polls highlighted the shift in values. The 1967 survey showed that 34 percent of women in the prime childbearing years anticipated having four or more children. By 1971, in contrast, the figure had dropped to 15 percent.

The issue of sexuality represents another illustration of the close "fit" between contemporary feminism and dominant social trends. A strong theme of women's liberation is the importance of women knowing their own bodies and having the freedom to use them as they see fit. This emphasis parallels what many observers see as a second sexual revolution, characterized by greater openness toward a diversity of sexual experiences and a decline in guilt over premarital sex encounters. Although women's liberation advocates warn that under the guise of sexual freedom women can be victimized anew, the movement's support for abortion, homosexual rights, and free body expression place it in close relationship to new cultural attitudes toward sexuality.

A dynamic relation now exists between "objective" changes in the society and feminist efforts to shape those trends. What the results will be we do not know, but for the first time in history, the feminist message speaks to the realities of contemporary society, and the audience for that messagee is now in a position to hear it.

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III

The organization and structure of the movement is also significantly different from that in the past. When women's rights advocates were on the margin of society, their organizational base was narrow. Supporters of feminism were homogeneous, the organizations they formed national in scope. By contrast, the contemporary movement almost defies categorization. Some observers have described women's liberation as a "guerrilla movement," because it exists in every kitchen or bedroom where women's minds are changing. In any case, the current movement is both diverse and decentralized. Its strength is more likely to be found in local communities than in national hierarchies.

Through most of the 19th century, feminism drew its support from a scattering of educated upper and upper-middle-class women who became angry at the absence of opportunities to use their abilities. Although occasional working-class women or black heroines like Sojourner Truth became identified with feminism, the movement generally represented radical and alienated members of the elite. Toward the beginning of the 20th century, the movement softened its rhetoric and broadened its base, becoming linked with Progressivism. But it remained overwhelmingly native-white and middle-class. Suffrage organizations shared the anti-black and anti-immigrant prejudices of their age, passing resolutions that disparaged both groups. Like the Progressives generally, the suffragists represented a homogeneous middle-class constituency.

The same charge of being narrow, elitist and middle-class has been leveled at the women's liberation movement. Feminism is often associated with "liberal" towns, university centers, affluent suburbs, the cosmopolitan cities. Many supporters of the movement *do* come out of the best universities and from prosperous families. Others supposedly are discontented wives, bored by suburban bridge parties. According to some critics, these women are indulging in the luxury of fashionable protest, inventing the false issue of sex discrimination because they have never experienced the real problems of hunger, poverty, and race.

While it is true that most supporters of women's liberation are middle-class, the charge of elitism seems less true of today's movement than of earlier ones.

First, supporters of the movement are highly conscious of the issues of class and race. Rather than remain aloof from other dissident groups, feminists are likely to support organizations such as the United Farm Workers and to work in alliance with other groups seeking social change.

Second, most of the demands of today's movement promise to help the poor more than the rich or middle-class. Well-off women can afford to send their children to nursery school or hire help. It is working-class women who will benefit most from universal day care, equal pay, an end to job discrimination, and available inexpensive abortions and birth control assistance.

Third, there is growing evidence to contradict the popular image of the contemporary movement as white and middle-class. Black women play a prominent role in national feminist groups; individuals like Shirley Chisholm and Eleanor Holmes Norton work for civil rights for blacks *and* women; recently, the National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO) held its first convention with over 400 delegates who asserted the special interests of black women. Obviously, white and black women have different priorities and concerns. But to polarize the two or deny the possibility of coalition across racial lines seems increasingly less justified.

Working-class women have also developed their own identification with the concerns of the woman's movement. The Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW) met a few months ago in Chicago,* and the re-

* See Patricia Cayo Sexton, "Workers (Female) Arise!" in DISSENT, *Summer* 1974.

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sults astounded even the most optimistic organizers. Earlier in the 20th century, the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) sought to achieve objectives sounding similar, but the WTUL was essentially a middle-class organization that spent most of its energy trying to persuade middle-class citizens to support social legislation. CLUW, in contrast, grows out of the working-class and excludes nonunion members. Furthermore, a recent poll by Social Research Inc. showed substantial support for feminist goals (though not feminist tactics) among working-class women. Thus it appears that women from different social and economic backgrounds are responding to feminist ideas.

As a direct corollary, the movement operates through a decentralized structure. When feminism had a narrower constituency, activity tended to focus on a national or state level. A few devoted activists would work out of a regional or national headquarters, and seek to persuade legislators of the virtue of their cause. Even when the popular base of the movement broadened in the early 20th century, the structure remained hierarchical.

Much of today's movement, in contrast, is almost without an overarching structure. Despite the existence of such organizations as NOW, the movement functions primarily through small, informal groups on a local level. The energy of the movement comes from the bottom, not the top. Events or issues that are national in scope (such as the Equal Rights Amendment) are not ignored, but the day-to-day direction of the movement derives from local conditions close to the lives of the women most involved. As long as people in a given place share a common desire for change, the movement is largely self-sustaining. It does not depend on national leadership. Indeed, many women's liberationists believe deeply that "leaders" are unnecessary, that women can make decisions collectively, and that concepts of hierarchy and command are products of a male culture, hence to be avoided.

This is not to say that feminists do not have a keen sense of participation in a national movement. A profound feeling of community unites the diverse women working in disparate local settings. It is a feeling, ultimately, of sisterhood—of sharing a common struggle and a common discovery. And for a movement without centralized structures, an enormous amount of informal communication takes place.

Not surprisingly, the absence of conventional leadership structures has been a source of controversy. Some observers have criticized the movement for its lack of focus, implying that a disciplined national organization could mobilize a concerted following and get immediate results. Others, such as Joe Freeman, have warned about a potential "tyranny of structurelessness," claiming that the deliberate rejection of structure can create situations where a few women with staying power will dominate the movement because of the absence of regularized procedures to guarantee fairness and order.

Although ideally one might wish to combine the energy of local grass-roots efforts with the discipline of a national organization, such a synthesis appears unlikely—even contradictory—given the internal dynamics of women's liberation. The vitality of the present movement lies in the proliferation of small organizations, each growing out of the experience of different groups of women. It is at least possible—if not likely—that such local initiative and diversity would be difficult to sustain in a hierarchical organization with established policies and strict procedures.

In addition, the pattern of decentralization and diversity ensures that the current movement will not rise or fall on the basis of one organization's decisions. When attention is riveted on a single national group, too much depends on the caprice of personality and the right juxtaposition of events and issues. Thus a movement can be judged dead or alive on the basis of a vote in Congress or a series of public relations maneuvers.

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On the other hand, a movement rooted in a thousand local situations and organized around a hundred separate issues is far less vulnerable to symbolic defeats. Reflecting the life of each participant, it is imbedded in the social process.

IV

The third quality distinguishing the current movement from its predecessors is the range and depth of its objectives. Through most of the 19th and 20th centuries, feminist organizations have tended to focus on single issues. If only the suffrage were won, or an Equal Rights Amendment passed, the problem of sex inequality would begin to disappear! The contemporary movement seems both more realistic and more visionary. Most supporters of women's liberation recognize that there is no single answer to inequality and sex role stereotyping. They see the problem as pervasive. Hence, they encourage a multifaceted approach that gives each group maximum leeway to attack the manifestation of inequality concerning it the most.

The past tendency to concentrate on a single issue grew largely out of the political and social environment in which the movement found itself. The Seneca Falls feminists grasped the depth of the problem and sought to address the many specific areas where women were denied their freedom. But their approach was too radical, too far-reaching. Association of feminism with free love, divorce, and competition for careers aroused almost universal hostility. In this political atmosphere it made sense to select one issue symbolizing the larger questions. Suffrage was such an issue, and women's rights advocates used it brilliantly as an instrument for creating broader support. The problem was that the symbolic issue gradually became identified *in toto* with the larger problem. As a result, feminists and anti-feminists alike came to expect too much from the 19th Amendment.

In a similar way, the National Women's party (NWP) concentrated on the belief that an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) would be a panacea. Beginning in 1923, the NWP devoted its entire energies to the fight for an ERA. The issue was important, and incorporation of the ERA into the Constitution would have provided a crucial lever for seeking change in women's status wherever questions of law were involved. But in the process, the NWP, already a small elitist organization, alienated most working women (the ERA prior to 1941 would have meant invalidation of protective legislation for working women, such as minimum wage laws), spent an excessive amount of energy battling other women's organizations, and tended to ignore the extent to which the roots of sex inequality were beyond the reach of any constitutional amendment.

Current activists seem acutely aware of such pitfalls. They campaign for ratification of the ERA, they demonstrate for repeal of abortion laws, and they organize women's political caucuses. But they also know that success in any of these ventures only means that there will be a new problem to work on. They seem to have learned from the history of their own movement as well as from the experience of the civil rights movement, out of which so many younger women organizers came. In 1963 and 1964, many participants in the civil rights struggle also believed that passage of a civil rights act would bring instant equality. But after such legislation was passed, they saw that racism did not stop and that having the right to buy a steak at the Holiday Inn did not give one the money to do so. Women's liberationists who received their baptism in movement politics in 1963 and '64 took that lesson (among others) to heart and spread it wherever they went. As a result, most of today's feminists recognize that the problem of inequality is like a box within a box within a box. There is no single answer, and no reason to be disillusioned over the failure of any one reform.

On the other hand, awareness that the problem is multi-dimensional has not, in the case of most feminists, produced numb-

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ing resignation or cynicism. Rather, it seems to have freed women to work on the area or issue which concerns them most. Thus the movement is characterized by tolerance of diversity in activism, which partially grows out of the decentralized structure of the movement, and partially also from a realization that the problem is so large that everything is important.

V

As in the history of all social movements, of course, there are numerous barriers to success. The most serious obstacle today is the extent to which the movement seems to threaten the sense of identity each of us has received from our common culture. One of the first things we are taught as children is a set of personality traits labeled "masculine" and "feminine." Our sex roles define who we are, what bearing we adopt toward people, which responsibilities we assume in the household, what emotions we display, how much and what kind of power we exercise, which jobs we will hold, and how we relate to our bodies. To deviate from this network of attributes has historically been a cause for shame.

Now, an acute, radical attack on the whole syndrome has emerged from a movement of women. They are not women who easily can be classified as a lunatic fringe, because a great many of them are hard-working, respectable citizens by anyone's standards. And their theme is that the culture has denied females their right to be human, first by insisting that they be "feminine" and then by defining "feminine" in such a way that women are deprived of the freedom to shape their own lives. The same culture, it is charged, has denied males the right to be fully human, because it has ruled "out of bounds" the idea of fatherhood as a full-time vocation, denied men the chance to be homemakers, and established as "inappropriate" for men the expression of vulnerability, gentleness, or dependence.

To correct these flaws, supporters of the current woman's movement seek to dismantle, or radically alter, some of the fundamental institutions of the culture. If marriage is to remain a viable institution, feminists say, perhaps a contract is in order, specifying the responsibilities of each partner. Women and men should be equally free to pursue careers, care for children, travel, select social companions, follow avocations.

Needless to say, both the indictment and the proposed solutions profoundly threaten millions of people who have been brought up to believe that existing norms of behavior are morally sacrosanct. Women who have spent a lifetime devoting themselves to the roles of homemaker and helpmate frequently take the feminist charge that women have been enslaved as a direct attack. Such women do not believe that they have been duped by their husbands or the culture. They are not stupid—they enjoy the nurturant and supportive roles of wife and mother, they believe that the family should operate with a sexual division of labor, and they deeply resent the implication that their lives have been wasted. From their point of view, the feminist movement is guilty of arrogance and contempt toward the majority of women.

Somewhat similarly, many men believe that the woman's movement is conducting an insidious campaign to undermine their strength, deny their authority, destroy their self-image. Such men see an effort to take away their role as breadwinner and to sabotage their leadership in the home. Instead of helping women, these men say that feminists seem intent on wrecking the family, turning wife against husband, and transforming men into dishwashers and baby-sitters. Nothing reinforces this view more than the popular image of consciousness-raising sessions where women reputedly tell each other intimate details about their marriages, families, and experiences with men. To many men, therefore, the movement is a symbol of anarchic and amoral forces, seeking to untie all the knots, loosen all the bonds that give life its stability.

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Both of these positions are deeply rooted in the culture. With the possible exception of the issue of race, it is difficult to imagine an issue that goes more to the foundation of personal as well as social identity. At best, pain and anguish accompany discussion of sex roles and power relationhips between men and women. These questions expose our vulnerability and insecurity. At worst, raising the issue produces bitter hostility and outright rejection. Thus the greatest obstacle the movement must overcome is the commitment of millions of people to the institutions, values, and personal self-images associated with traditional sex roles. And the more the movement succeeds in generating awareness of the issue, the greater the obstacle becomes.

The second major obstacle faced by the movement is that of internal dissension. Despite the advantages of a decentralized structure, disagreement over tactics and goals persist. As with most social movements, the divisions tend to focus on methods of achieving common goals. Some feminists believe that only the total abolition of the nuclear family will bring freedom to women. Others accept the family but seek to change its structure. Similar divisions exist on other questions, such as whether men should play any role in the movement. Most common, perhaps, is the argument over style or political tactics. Should movement supporters denounce the status quo in uncompromising terms and demand immediate thoroughgoing change? Or should they moderate their rhetoric and attempt to move one step at a time, even at the risk of sacrificing principle?

In addressing this problem, supporters of the movement seem to have adopted two complementary approaches. First, women's liberationists decided not to exclude anyone from the movement for reasons of political unorthodoxy or social unpopularity. The issue surfaced quickly when feminists had to face the question of whether to endorse the struggle of female homosexuals. Although some feminists were concerned that identification with lesbianism would destroy the movement's credibility with the public, a larger number—representing all political and social viewpoints—appeared to accept the cause of lesbian rights as their own and to affirm the unity of all women who experience discrimination on the basis of sex. Movement followers have declared that they will stand together on their own terms, and not be divided by the terms of the larger society.

The second approach—growing out of the first—is to espouse the conviction that conflict can be resolved in a spirit of love and conciliation. Despite disagreements that appear to the outside observer as irreconcilable, members of the movement repeatedly try to place their allegiance to the common goal higher than their views. This effort is based on the conviction that the male world has failed to achieve conciliation, that men would rather fight than admit error, and that women have a better and more humane way of solving problems. In theory at least, the movement pursues the Quaker ideal of reconciliation rather than conflict.

There are risks. It does not require a public opinion poll to recognize that many potential recruits are alienated when some feminists defend the right to lesbianism, or that other latent sympathizers are angered when some feminists denigrate the nuclear family or equate all men with a capitalist, war-mongering conspiracy. Nor is it difficult to imagine the impact on most Americans when the media sensationalizes the actions of the most radical feminists and portrays these as representative of the entire movement. (Here, incidentally, is one area where an accepted national voice of the movement might help discourage distortion.)

There is also some danger that the norm of conciliation will be used as a justification for imposing a narrow and partisan point of view. It is not inconceivable that in some situations, the stronger, the more persistent, and the more power-hungry will use the ideal of sisterhood to drive across a point of view, and that those who act most con-

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sistently on the philosophy of conciliation will end up regularly on the losing side.

Finally, the division over tactics poses a constant threat of open conflict. There is a world of difference between denouncing the contented homemaker as a deluded Sambo, and reaching out to make contact with women in the home. And a tremendous chasm separates those who view men as congenitally oppressive and those who see males as victims too. In face of such conflicts, there is the continuing potential that the movement will become polarized as it was for nearly five decades after 1920, and that energies needed for positive action will be diverted into sectarian feuding.

VI

Despite these problems, what remains most impressive is the degree of change that appears to be taking place. The vast majority of American women may still disavow any overt association with feminism ("I'm no women's libber," "they're too radical for my taste"), but the same women now support many substantive programs of the movement. As late as 1962, a Gallup Poll showed that a majority of female respondents did not believe American women were discriminated against. Ten years later, the figures were reversed.

The commitment to equality is seen most clearly on college campuses. Women students in growing numbers are declaring their intention to enter professions, postpone marriage until embarked on a career, and establish families on an egalitarian basis. The trend appears also among older women.

The nature of the change is difficult to specify. But at its roots, it seems to be a change of consciousness, a new awareness about women and their relationship to men. It surfaces in strange as well as familiar ways —in the comments of a middle-aged woman who says in a routine phone conversation, "I'll have to check with my husband," and then feels called upon to add: "We're a traditional couple." Or in the remark of a young woman—not an avowed feminist—who was bothered that the epilogue to *American Graffiti* ignored the women in the movie: "Why did they just tell us what happened to the boys ten years later? What about the girls?" Or finally, in the edged comment of a 40-year-old mother: "I need to be recycled, only no one wants to give me a chance. I gave away my career 15 years ago when I dropped out of graduate school to stay home with the kids."

There is no way to quantify this consciousness, or to state with precision what it may mean. One can only voice the impression that it is there—growing, spreading, taking root. It can be exhilarating, as when a whole new set of life possibilities opens up. Or it can be devastating, as when you are caught, or catch yourself, in an act or statement that springs from a lifelong routine, and suddenly appears transparently sexist. Needless to say, social revolutions do not develop solely from the emergence of new perceptions and ideas. But heightened awareness is a prerequisite for social change, and it seems likely that as consciousness of sex-role stereotyping and discrimination mounts, it will cast other social relationships in a new light and spur a rethinking process about one's entire life.

Only part of the change now taking place, of course, can be attributed to the woman's movement. Much of it grows out of long-standing trends in the economy, demographic patterns, and changes in cultural values. It is important to emphasize how relatively small the woman's movement is compared to the entire female population. If a majority of women identify with some feminist ideas, only a tiny minority view themselves as part of the movement. Conceivably, many of the women involved in changing their own lives would have done so regardless of the movement, and as a natural by-product of the underlying changes in the society and economy.

Yet the movement seems, on balance, decisive to the heightened consciousness of

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today's generation. Behavioral change, prompted by impersonal social forces, can go only so far. We live by our values as well as our actions, and a change of values almost always requires an ideological catalyst. The woman's movement has provided such a catalyst to American society in the last decade, exposing our assumptions about ourselves, our power, our self-images, our needs.

Where the new feminism and its goals will end remains difficult to predict. As with any movement, there are numerous pitfalls. At present, there seems to be a healthy tension between a cutting edge of militant radicals and those in the movement who favor a more gradual, accommodating stance. The loss or submergence of either of these perspectives could deprive the movement of its capacity to speak prophetically in a voice that people can hear.

Perhaps more important is the need to come to grips with some of the potential consequences of the movement. There needs to be a greater awareness on everyone's part of the pain and anxiety that change in sex roles can cause. The personal anguish is as likely to occur among women as men. It is part of the process, and sensitivity toward it may enhance the prospect that the end will be constructive and happy rather than destructive and bitter. It might also be helpful to acknowledge more openly the need of most people for structure and stability in their lives. Growing out of the counterculture, there is a feeling in some circles that freedom entails the absence of group norms and regulations. In some cases, that might be true. But for our own freedom and fulfillment, most of us need a set of relationships with others that we are committed to and can depend on. The structure may not be the nuclear family, but it is likely to be some "family" in the generic sense of a group coming to live together on the basis of mutual obligations and responsibilities.

Overall, though, the movement for women's liberation seems to be in the vanguard of one of the most important, potentially beneficial social changes in our history. Looked at from the perspective of unsettled marriages, shaky cultural norms, and difficult personal adjustments, the losses may appear great. But the gains are greater when seen from the perspective of enhanced personal freedom and social well-being. At a minimum, success for the movement will mean significant progress toward eliminating economic exploitation of women.

The deeper benefits are perhaps more subtle. If a society with sex equality existed, men and women might each spend the same amount of time with children. Fathers could develop their nurturant role, learn to cook, develop a greater capacity for sharing feelings of sorrow, vulnerability, or dependency. Women, in turn, could choose their own career, fulfill their assertive as well as passive instincts, define for themselves the balance of time spent inside or outside the living unit. Children, most of all, might grow up with the sense of being able to become what they most want to be.

Perhaps most important, men and women might learn to view each other as individuals, separate and independent of each other, each with the right to self-determination and fulfillment. If people developed the capacity to understand their own complexity and the diversity of their own needs; if they acquired the ability to communicate honestly to each other the nature of those needs; and if they were able to work out arrangements by which, living together, they could respect and encourage each other's development, then the potential for human fulfillment and community would be almost limitless.

The values espoused by today's feminist movement hold out the prospect of something better. Perhaps the vision of autonomy in a world without invidious sex stereotypes cannot be achieved. Certainly the risks are substantial. But historically, the chances for success seem greater than at any time in the past. And socially, the goal seems well worth the effort. □

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Jack Clark

The Democrats: Feuds & Factions

Can a Compromise Be Struck Between Meany and the Reformers?

> "Right now, they have a great big Band-Aid holding them together—Watergate. When it gets ripped off, watch out."—ANNE ARMSTRONG, *then White House counselor, speaking about the Democrats, July 16, 1974.*

The jockeying for the 1976 Democratic presidential nomination has already begun, while the fights that divided the party in 1968 and again in 1972 still smoulder. Henry Jackson's prime supporters in and around the AFL–CIO's Committee on Political Education and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority are smoldering the hardest about such things as the retention of most of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines for delegate selection. The Jackson partisans have been vociferous in their dislike of those guidelines and have opened battle to get rid of them immediately after the 1972 election. Their first move was to dump McGovern's Democratic National Chairwoman Jean Westwood and replace her with Robert Strauss, a conservative Texan. In more recent months, CDM and COPE spokesmen have denounced Strauss for selling them out on the delegate selection guidelines. There is, though, very little indication that COPE or CDM will object to very much in the present guidelines. Their real animus is directed against the "kooks and crazies" (COPE Director Al Barkan's phrase) who proposed the guidelines and favored McGovern. But in 1974 and probably again in 1976, COPE will allocate money and personnel to reelect some of those "kooks and crazies" to Congress.

If that sounds confusing, hold on. The "kooks and crazies" or, as they prefer to call themselves, reformers, aren't fond of Barkan and his hard-line friends either. Barkan and friends followed the "neutrality" line in 1972. Except for some of them who didn't —like Bill DuChessi, one of Barkan's more outspoken defenders, who cochaired New York Labor for McGovern, and Mike Johnston of the Pennsylvania AFL–CIO, a Barkan choice for the Democratic National Committee, who risked his job by actively backing McGovern. Another reform complaint against the Barkan hard-liners is that their candidate, Jackson, has been "soft" on George Wallace—even though Wallace's aides on national Democratic party bodies have voted with the reformers rather than with the regulars.

If the reformers sometimes define the conflict in misleading terms, Barkan and his allies do so habitually. The "kooks and crazies" (the term Barkan constantly uses to describe almost everyone who supported McGovern) are reputed to be a small corps of university- and media-based elitists representing no one in the Democratic electorate. These "New Politics" elitists are also alleged to be the direct descendants of the most destructive New Left tendencies of the '60s and to pursue as their chief political goal the destruction of the labor movement's po-

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litical clout. Included in this "New Politics" faction are such noted "upper-class crazies" as Leonard Woodcock, the officers of the Communications Workers, the Machinists, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the Graphic Arts International Union, and Barbara Mikulski, the Baltimore city councillor whose political base is in that city's blue-collar ethnic neighborhoods and who headed the Commission on Delegate Selection.

To sort all this out, we must backtrack to the 1964 Atlantic City convention, where the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party challenged the all-white Mississippi delegation. In the wake of that challenge—and the compromise settlement—the 1964 convention adopted a resolution barring discrimination in delegate selection. New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes headed the Special Equal Rights Committee to enforce the guidelines. In 1968, as a continuation of the work begun in 1964 and in response to the upheavals and insurgencies of the Kennedy and McCarthy candidacies, the antiwar platform resolution, and the charges that the convention was run undemocratically, the convention went further. A commission to study delegate-selection rules was mandated. After the convention, Party Chairman Fred Harris, in consultation with Hubert Humphrey, appointed the commission and named George McGovern its chairman.

The commission found a lack of any system in delegate selection. Some states had primaries; others had closed caucuses of party leaders; still others had state conventions to select delegates to the national convention. Some of the states chose delegates two years before the convention. In very few states did the presidential preference of the voters have anything to do with the delegates' preferences. Some states forced delegates to vote against their own preferences for the presidential nomination.

THE MCGOVERN Commission surveyed all this and came up with recommendations emphasizing that the delegate selection process had to be:

- open—no more caucuses, no more straight appointment of delegates;
- timely—delegates had to be chosen the same year they would serve;
- responsive to the will of the voters—the delegates' presidential preferences had to reflect the presidential preferences of the voters, preferably in the same proportion. (Ironically, a compromise on this very point, which regulars wanted and reformers didn't, insured the nomination for McGovern. The reformers wanted to do away with the "winner-take-all" primaries in which 51 percent of the vote carried 100 percent of the state delegation. California party leaders, afraid that such a move would diminish the importance of their state's primary, prevailed on the commission to let them keep the "winner-take-all" primary.)

All these reforms, of course, affected the demographic (though not the political) composition of the '72 convention. But most controversial, at least in retrospect, were the "affirmative-action" provisions, which outlawed quotas and then called on the states to send delegations reflecting "in proportion to their presence in the population" women, youth, and racial minorities. Before the 1972 convention, the AFL–CIO was reportedly cool to these guidelines; particularly those on affirmative action. But there was no preconvention effort to scuttle any of the reform guidelines. Not much effort would have been needed to do so. Steelworkers President I. W. Abel had a vote on the McGovern Commission, though he never attended meetings. If he had voted against the affirmative-action language, it would have been defeated. Instead, Al Barkan boasted at regional COPE meetings that the labor movement had a lot of women, a lot of minority-group members, a lot of young people, and that COPE would go out, get people involved in all the liberal campaigns,

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and create a large labor delegation at the '72 convention. (His predictions were accurate, for the labor delegation to the Miami convention was the largest ever.) These were the same COPE meetings in which Barkan assured his activists that labor would mobilize to elect even George McGovern over Richard Nixon.

The story of Democratic divisiveness from the '72 convention through the November election is all too well known. Charging that the labor movement had been excluded, insulted, and ignored in Miami, Meany decreed neutrality. The politically active unions, except the Steelworkers, went outside COPE to set up Labor for McGovern units. After the election, Barkan delivered enough votes to elect Robert Strauss Democratic national chairman. And the fight was on.

The hard-line anti-McGovernites were, from all appearances, set to duplicate the strategy, as they had perceived it, of the "New Politics" forces after the 1968 election. Veterans of the McCarthy, Kennedy, and McGovern campaigns had formed the New Democratic Coalition dedicated to the politics of peace and new priorities. Now the Jackson partisans, with some help from COPE and Democrats for Nixon and propelled ideologically by some Social Democrats, formed the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in 1972. CDM declared itself dedicated to traditional (i.e., cold-war) liberalism and political alignments. Just as NDC activists became involved in the internal workings of the Democratic party, in commissions, on the Democratic National Committee, so CDM operatives moved into that kind of activity. In the 1968–72 party bodies, reformers presented charges that women, blacks, and racial minorities had been excluded from party decision-making bodies. After the '72 election, CDM charged a different kind of exclusion against representatives of the majority of—to use Scammon and Wattenberg's phrase—unyoung and unblack Democrats.

In May 1973, CDM issued a detailed report on the delegate selection procedures used in the '72 primaries. On the whole, unlike most CDM statements until then, the report was balanced, reasonable, almost conciliatory. The authors praised the work of the McGovern-Fraser Commission and agreed that many of the reforms were needed. On some issues, they disagreed with the Commission, and on two guidelines in particular they recommended change: the affirmative-action language and the proportion of delegates chosen by the state committee and/or automatically seated *ex officio*. CDM wanted to avoid the possibility of affirmative-action language being used to impose quotas in the future. Their solution was to drop the language entirely, or to broaden it to call for affirmative action for all Democrats. Arguing for *ex officio* delegates or delegates chosen by the state committee, the CDM report reasoned that public officials, elected in high turnout elections, were more representative of Democratic voters than delegates chosen in low-turnout primaries.

The reformers opposed both recommendations. *Ex officio* delegates might be broadly representative, but, given the Muskie experience, there was little reason to believe that elected officials represented their constituents' views on presidential preference. The strongest resistance came on affirmative action. Women in the NDC, in Americans for Democratic Action, and in the women's caucus of the Democratic National Committee decried attempts to backpedal on affirmative action. The Democratic Black Caucus also rose to defend this provision. Interestingly, quite a few trade unionists sided with reformers on guidelines.

The Labor for McGovern activists had worked with the reformers in 1972, and many of them openly resented Meany's indifference to the outcome of the election. Later, when COPE and CDM called for more labor representation on party bodies,

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they defined most of the McGovern backers in the labor movement as "New Politics people." Barkan sought, unsuccessfully, to prevent the appointments of UAW Vice-President Olga Madar, Communications Workers President Joe Beirne, and Machinists President Floyd Smith to the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee.

After a summer of taking testimony from party activists in cities across the country, the Mikulski Commission met in September of 1973 to draft revised guidelines on delegate selection. The reformers were ready to compromise up to a point. With those compromises, a reform-moderate alliance had the votes on most issues. But, in a closed labor caucus, a surprise came. Barkan's staffers announced that the affirmative-action language was alright, most of the reform proposals were alright, and compromise was possible. Proreformers in the labor caucus were delighted and hopeful. Then came the fireworks. Barkan pushed Strauss to double the size of the Delegate Selection Commission by appointing "more representative" members. Strauss, unwilling to take the reformers on, didn't move on that proposal, and it died. Then Barkan shifted to fighting against a drafting committee that was to be appointed by Mikulski from the Commission membership. The drafting, Barkan argued, should be done by the entire Commission. He lost on that one, too, but only after a long, bitter fight ending in a legal ruling that the Commission's work was reviewable by the full DNC. The drafting committee that emerged demonstrated a willingness on the reformers' part to compromise. Of those selected, one committee member had favored George Wallace for president in 1972; five Humphrey; five Muskie; three McGovern; and one Jackson.

A month later, the drafting committee presented its report, and the full Commission unanimously adopted new guidelines on October 27, 1973. COPE supporters voted for the guidelines while reserving an option to vote against them when the issue came before the DNC. Reformers threatened to take the party to court if the DNC overruled the work of the Commission, which was mandated by the 1972 convention.

Still, the vote was unanimous, and the substance of the new guidelines offered a hopeful compromise. The affirmative-action language was changed. Delegations no longer had to reflect women, youth, and minorities "in proportion to their presence in the population." Instead, affirmative action was demanded to "encourage participation in all party affairs" for these previously underrepresented groups. State parties were required to draw up and fund affirmative-action plans, subject to review by the national party. The new rules allowed state committees (provided that the committees met certain requisites) to choose 25 percent of a state's delegation—just the percentage CDM had demanded. To avoid repeats of the 1972 convention fights, the "winner-take-all" primaries were abolished, and proportional representation down to the precinct level was established.

Finally, in February 1974, the Democratic National Committee, after a week of behind-the-scenes maneuvering, adopted the new rules in slightly modified form. Before the vote, Strauss had pushed for some major changes, mostly in areas dealing with the proportional representation rules and the scope, authority, and membership of the Compliance Review Commission. After failing to get support from major elected officials, Strauss took his case to the DNC Executive Committee. A compromise there gave Strauss his way on the size of the Compliance Review Commission and on proportional representation starting when a candidate got 15 percent rather than 10 percent of the vote. The DNC accepted that, but the affirmative-action language caused a new uproar. Some state chairmen didn't like the "in all party affairs" phrase, and CDM-COPE agreed. The new approach was that affirmative action in delegate selection was fine, but

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not in "all party affairs." Mikulski insisted that the reforms were a series of compromises, and to unravel one might unravel the whole package. People in the party ranging from Mikulski and McGovern to Mayor Daley to George Wallace liked the whole package, and the effort to unravel it failed.

That should have been the end of the controversy. Compromises had been made all around; the most explosive issues had been finessed; the new delegate selection rules were reasonably noncontroversial, and the body charged with enforcing the rules, the Compliance Review Commission, was carefully balanced politically and demographically. Now the Democrats could go on to issues surrounding the new party charter and the charter conference, party positions on public policy issues, etc.

But the rancor of the delegate selection fight lingered after the fight was settled. One of Barkan's friends and allies complained, "Mikulski was the one that counted, and we got screwed." Barkan himself told Midwest governors that Strauss was his worst political mistake. Then, communication stopped. Barkan wouldn't talk to Strauss, and he blocked the Democratic Chairman's efforts to reach Meany. While a number of unions contributed money and volunteers to the June Democratic telethon, COPE was conspicuous by its absence. When Strauss offered Meany lieutenant Lane Kirkland, Meany speechwriter Tom Kahn, and Meany ally Bayard Rustin positions on the Democratic task force on domestic policy, all three refused.

Of course, issues other than delegate selection enter into the fray between the Democrats and COPE. The upcoming party charter conference will be another sore point. The reformers want to make the mid-term conference a party institution to deal with policy and issues. AFL–CIOers contend that such conferences could be embarrassing, if the Democrats hold the White House. Another source of friction is what Barkan sees as excessive independence of DNC staff.

All the issues that divide the CDM-COPE hard-liners from the rest of the DNC, indeed from the rest of the party, have to do with the entrance of new types of activists into the party. These new activists are the people motivated by the civil rights or antiwar movements, the student upsurge, the women's movement, or by the upheavals of the 1960s and early '70s. Most became active in the McCarthy, Kennedy, or McGovern campaigns and remained active on the state or local level. These issue-orientated Democrats became, in many localities, the new regulars.

This is illustrated by the results of the delegate selection for the mid-term conference. In state after state, the local and national press reported a "turn to the Right" by the Democrats as the "regulars" defeated insurgent slates. But the "regulars" in these states were the people who had run the local McGovern campaign and gone on to party office. Or they were McCarthy volunteers who were now on the state committee. Or they were liberal office-holders. The "insurgents," in many instances, were Wallace enthusiasts or Barkan operatives. But the sense that the "regulars" were re-assuming control became so pervasive that CDM Director Penn Kemble told the *Washington Post*:

> Because a person is a party official, he is not necessarily regular on the ideological issues. That might have been true earlier, but since 1972 so many McGovern people have achieved party office, you cannot regard them as ideologically regular.

Just what "ideologically regular" means in a nonideological party is unclear; but what Kemble—and Barkan—want is not. Barkan himself put it succinctly, "We didn't need all these women and youth to nominate Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy." And the May 1973 CDM report on delegate selection goes into more detail. Not only should there be *ex officio* delegates and delegates chosen by the state committees, but the rest

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of the delegate slots should go to established leaders—party officials, party fund-raisers, labor and community leaders. Enough of this "New Left nonsense" about participation, let's get on with building an institutionally based, institutionally representative Democratic party. One of the CDM's patron saints, Albert Shanker, has gone so far as to propose the rejuvenation of the old Democratic party urban machines.

There lies the goal for CDM, Barkan, and COPE. Restore the good old days, with the good "old-boy" network and with convention delegates we can deal with. There, also, lies the failure of CDM and COPE. They're fighting to restore a leadership that no longer wants to lead the national Democratic party. The old machines are hanging on with difficulty in the cities they still run, and, as ever, the local offices are far more important to them than the national ticket. The national party leaders of the Kennedy-Johnson years, the John Baileys and Larry O'Briens, have learned to deal with the new issue-oriented Democrats and are hardly eager to lead a battle against them. The last of the pragmatic hopes for restoring the old party, Robert Strauss, has looked around and seen that the new activists are too numerous, too hard-working, too important to the party's fortunes to be downgraded. So Barkan and his shrinking circle of allies battle alone on internal structural party issues; occasionally a few state chairmen will join them on this or that vote but not enough to carry the vote. One NDC activist summed up the irony: "It turned out that George Meany is more ideological and more concerned with the 'style' issues than any of us ever were."

The internal party skirmishes are interesting and instructive, but what they're really about is party leadership, leadership that is not determined by commission decisions and is rarely established by DNC votes. Those things affect it, of course, but leadership in the Democratic party is determined by elections, by the selection of a presidential nominee, ultimately by the election of a Democratic administration.

The Barkan people are hoping that no matter how many setbacks they suffer in the internal wrangling, their tendency will emerge victorious in the party with the election of Scoop Jackson as president. Once again, it is fascinating to watch the hard-liners' imitation of the "New Politics" strategy. Just as the McGovern campaign was launched with no real hope of success in 1968, so was Henry Jackson's bid for the nomination in 1972. Between '68 and '72, McGovern staked out his chief issue, Vietnam, and his base constituency, the antiwar Democrats. So Jackson began his campaign early, identifying his issues as a too-easy détente and an insufficient military readiness, and shaping his base constituency around those concerns and his support for Soviet dissidents and for Israel.

Jackson has been fortunate that these and other issues have been breaking in his favor. As a vocal supporter of Israel, he gained attention when war broke out in the Middle East. No other politician has gained as much from the interest in the plight of Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and other dissidents and minorities in the Soviet Union. Then came the energy crisis, a topic on which Jackson was well prepared.

All of this has earned him a sometimes grudging respect among the very "New Politics" constituency his own supporters seek to drive away. When Jackson's name comes up, one sometimes hears something to the effect, "Well, he's not my first choice, but I could certainly support him if he got the nomination." A variant of the respectful theme praises Jackson's diligent and competent work on issues. Ironically, this is happening when Jackson's most ardent partisans (with some assists from the Senator's staff) are sealing themselves off from any dialogue with the rest of the party.

The other two candidates for the '76 nomination who have received any attention at all are Senator Kennedy and Governor

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George Wallace. Of Senator Kennedy's intentions much has been guessed and little is known. He mobilized to get his people elected in the Massachusetts delegate selection for the interim conference, and that kind of activity in state politics is unprecedented for a Kennedy. He is also been taking a lot of speaking engagements, and his sudden rightward shift on national health insurance smacks of ambition. But even with the new rules, which will make a first ballot nomination difficult, a lot of party activists guess that Kennedy can have the nomination if he wants it.

On Wallace, much has been said and most of it is silly. A few years ago, we celebrated the emergence of the "new" Nixon; now we suffer through the merchandising of a "new" George Wallace. Statements from black mayors who rely on his largesse to keep their cities running are cited as indications of his new, liberal attitudes on race. National party figures parade through Alabama praising his courage. The always pragmatic Robert Strauss has carefully worked to keep him in the Democratic fold between elections, and Jackson has offered him the vice-presidency.

All that is aimed at the famous "Wallace constituency," 13 percent of the electorate in 1968. If only we're nice to him, the Democratic reasoning seems to run, then maybe he'll deliver us his votes. But there is no "Wallace constituency" without Wallace. If the right-wing candidate John Schmitz did not demonstrate that in 1972, George Wallace himself offered us proof in 1974.

Early in the year, Wallace announced that he would mobilize in every state to elect delegates to the mid-term conference. Mickey Griffin, an aide to the Governor, was assigned to the job. There was a brief flurry of publicity, some speculation that the mid-term conference would be absolutely dominated by Wallace's followers, some solemn headshaking by the young graybeards around the Coalition for a Democratic Majority ("see was 'participatory democracy' has wrought"). Now, in mid-summer, with almost one-half of the delegates chosen, the Wallace upsurge is nowhere to be found. One reformer has cockily predicted that the New York NDC delegation will outnumber the national Wallace delegation. If Wallaceite efforts to take the country by storm have failed to create enthusiasm far from home, Wallace's personal efforts to capture the Alabama party has been a disaster from his point of view. Long-time Wallace nemesis and national party loyalist Robert Vance (who backed Southern moderate Terry Sanford for the '72 nomination) easily beat back the effort to gain a Wallace majority and a Wallace chairman for the state party. Wallace personally lobbied members of the state committee after the primary election (in which a Wallace slate had run for state committee). When it was over, Vance had retained the chairmanship by a 66–51 vote.

Wallace himself still has tremendous personal appeal. Since January 1, he has raised $750,000, mostly from small contributions. Kevin Phillips has speculated that, given such resources, Wallace will choose the third party route. If he does, that will probably hurt the Republicans more than the Democrats. If he doesn't, it will be very difficult for him to "deliver" his votes to any Democratic ticket, including a ticket he's on as vice-president. Alan Baron, the director of the Democratic planning group and perhaps the closest student of the party's internal wrangling, divides the Wallace constituency into three parts. There is the hard right-wing constituency—the Birchers, Minutemen, and other assorted extremists who voted for Wallace and Schmitz. There is a very sizable group of Dixiecrats in transition—old-line Southern Democrats who are having increasing difficulty identifying with the national Democratic party; in 1972, they voted for Nixon. Finally, there are the northern blue-collar and lower-middle-class voters who back Wallace on such "social" issues as busing.

It is necessary to note that many of these Wallace voters will cast a "protest" vote for

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Wallace, as in the Michigan primary, but will not support him in the general election. True, most of them voted for Nixon in 1972, but Hubert Humphrey won their support in 1968. He didn't win it by going to Birmingham and praising Wallace's courage, or by offering Wallace the vice-presidency. Those votes went to Humphrey because Humphrey himself and George Meany and Walter Reuther led a campaign to take Wallace's record onto the shop floor and to expose him as the demagogue he still is.

No matter what Wallace does in '76 to win "his" voters, to challenge the Republicans, the Democrats will need to develop some Democratic stands or at least approaches on foreign policy, energy, inflation, and unemployment. Certainly to govern after a '76 victory, the Democrats will need some advance thinking on those problems. After the Stevenson defeat in 1956, Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler put together a series of task forces on specific issues and the Democratic Advisory Council. The controversial thinking of the Advisory Council sometimes irritated the Lyndon Johnson-Sam Rayburn congressional leadership, but it also developed some of the progress Kennedy campaigned on in 1960 and some of the ideas his Administration implemented—such as Medicare, civil rights legislation, the new economics of Walter Heller, the disarmament theories of Paul Nitze. Strauss, behaving more cautiously, has set up a similar Advisory Council, though this one is limited to elected officials. More recently, he and Advisory Council Chairman Arthur Krim have moved to set up task forces for discussion on foreign and domestic policy. Outside the official party structure, a diverse discussion group, calling itself the Democratic Forum, has been sponsoring discussions on some difficult issues.

Such discussion is not only needed for elections, it is needed to heal some of the wounds of the last six years. The Vietnam war, as a domestic political issue, is over. The reformers recognize that and show an openness toward new issues and alignments. They have been willing to compromise on such internal issues as delegate-selection guidelines. Senator Jackson, who at times has shown open contempt for the reformers, is taken seriously by a great number of them. Former hawks, trade union leaders Joe Beirne and Floyd Smith, are close allies of the reformers on the national party bodies. The New Democratic Coalition is asking its candidates for the interim conference to focus not only on issues of war and peace, but also on the economy, the energy crisis, inflation, and unemployment. Americans for Democratic Action devoted its most recent convention to the problems of achieving equality throughout the society, and the speakers' roster included Jerry Wurf, Geno Barone of the National Center on Urban Ethnic Affairs, and Richard Scammon, co-author of *The Real Majority*.

On the issues now before the Democrats—except for defense and foreign policy—there is real hope for reestablishing a party consensus capable of holding through the 1976 election. "New Politics" activists, concerned with limited job opportunities for women, blacks, youth, and the hardest-hatted Meany partisan can, or should, be able to agree on a full-employment program. Reform club presidents and building trades workers alike are beset by double-digit inflation. To develop a party consensus on these issues will require the Democrats to come up with some answers. For that to happen, discussion is, of course, a prerequisite, and for discussion to occur, Barkan and his friends will have to end their pointless boycott of party task forces and their war of silence against Strauss. All of that seems remote right now, and perhaps counselor Armstrong is correct that only the big Band-Aid of Watergate, which now has been ripped off, could hold the Democrats together.

But we shouldn't be overly pessimistic; after all, Al Barkan is helping to finance George McGovern's reelection campaign. □

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Daniel Yankelovich

A Crisis of Moral Legitimacy?

Among the many contrasts between the 1960s and the 1970s, perhaps the most politically fateful has been a massive shift in attitudes toward our national institutions—the presidency, Congress, the courts, business, the military, the unions, the media, and the universities. In the 1960s, a majority of Americans placed almost unqualified confidence in these institutions. By the 1970s, for the majority that confidence had dissipated. In its place has sprung up a cynical, quasi-sophisticated public view of political and business leaders as dominated by a selfishness so widespread and corrupt as to pit our central institutions against their own constituencies.

The decade of the 1960s witnessed its own attack upon American institutions, some of it unsurpassed in harshness and depth. But that criticism came from minorities—blacks, students, social critics, etc. The average citizen, although increasingly unsure of the wisdom of such government policies as those in Vietnam, nonetheless reacted vehemently against the critics. As late as in the 1972 campaign, 75 percent of the public agreed that it was "sick and tired of hearing people attack patriotism, morality and other traditional American values,"[1] a judgment that helped to defeat McGovern because he was linked in the public mind with the critics.

The erosion of confidence began to quicken at the turn of the decade. As recently as 1968, surveys of the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan showed that 7 out of 10 Americans (73 percent) expressed continuing faith in the federal government—and almost as many (70 percent) felt "business was succeeding in striking a good balance between profit-making and service to the public."[2] Then, with apparent suddenness and before the corrosive effects of Watergate could make themselves felt, the attitude surveys from 1969 on showed a sharp decline of public confidence in institutions and a deepening sense of malaise.

HERE ARE some representative findings:

- Studies conducted by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research show that loss of faith in the federal government almost doubled between 1968 and 1973, jumping from 27 percent to 51 percent.[3]
- Studies by the Harris organization reveal an even broader pattern of erosion. Between 1965 and 1972, the Harris studies show confidence in higher education falling from 61 to 33 percent; in the military, from 62 to 35 percent; in the Supreme Court, from 51 to 28 percent; in the Congress, from 42 to 21 percent.[4]
- National cross-section studies by Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., show confidence in busi-

[1] *Time*/Yankelovich, Inc., Pre-election Survey, October 1972.

[2] Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

[3] Yankelovich, Inc., National Survey, 1973.

[4] Subcommittee of Intergovernmental Relations, U.S. Senate, *Confidence and Concern: A Survey of Public Attitudes* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).

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ness falling from 70 percent in 1968 to 33 percent in 1970—a low state from which business has not recovered.[5] Recent Yankelovich studies show that a 71 percent majority of the public now feels that "things are going badly in the country," a sharp increase from 39 percent in 1972; that "the country is in deep and serious trouble today" (68 percent); and that the problems we face are worse than at any other time in the personal recollection of the people interviewed.[6]

- Surveys also show that just in the last two years, mistrust of "the people in power in the country" has shot up from an uncomfortable 54 percent in 1972 to an overwhelming 88 percent in 1974.[7]

THROUGHOUT the post-World War II period and up to the late 1960s, about two-thirds of all Americans felt unqualified confidence in our national institutions, so much so that the electorate felt it could afford to ignore politics and devote itself to private life. Yet, by the second Nixon election in 1972, this "normal" situation had reversed itself. The two-thirds majority now withdrew confidence from these national institutions, with the mood shifting from optimism to anxious uneasiness.

These changes signal a political situation somewhat comparable to the 1930s, when the American public also experienced a pervasive feeling that something was fundamentally wrong with our institutions. At that time, the trouble—large-scale unemployment—was clear to everyone. Today, what it is that is wrong remains vague and elusive, at least in the public view.

What are we to make of this massive shift in public sentiment? Watergate is not the only answer, since most of the erosion took place before Watergate. It is possible that this shift in public psychology signifies little of enduring consequence: opinion polls often pick up rumblings of discontent that lead to few practical consequences. On the other hand, the change may be heavy with consequence, for in a democracy the withdrawal of confidence in public institutions by large numbers of citizens can presage a period of instability and change. The current situation is so confused and so marked by cross-pressures that a case could be made for either extreme, or for any number of gradations in between. There is some information on what the shift in public attitudes does *not* mean (more on this later), but little that is reliable or definitive on why it has occurred.

What follows is my own effort to analyze from the data a novel and highly volatile social/political drama. It is a drama full of threat—more so, for example, than the troublesome McCarthy era of the 1950s—but also offering some promise.

II

In clarifying what the new public discontent means, the concept of "institutional legitimacy" is probably the most useful one to bring to bear. As S. M. Lipset points out, institutional legitimacy is so strategic a concept because it focuses attention on the sensitive links that connect the political process with the social context.[8] In times of social stability, the link is unobstrusive, even invisible. But when people began to question whether they are being well-served by their central institutions and whether their values are compatible with those pursued by the institutions, then a threat is posed to one of the key structural elements holding us together as a society. Institutional legitimacy is therefore an evaluative concept: it refers to judgments citizens make as to whether their institutions are entitled to the authority they claim. Beginning with Max Weber, the

[5] Yankelovich, Inc., National Surveys, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974.
[6] *Time*/Yankelovich, Inc., Political Indicators, 1974.
[7] *Time*/Yankelovich, Inc., National Survey, 1974.
[8] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960; Anchor, 1963).

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concept has been progressively deepened. But curiously, there is little empirical research on threats to institutional legitimacy. My own research leads me to propose three broad categories of institutional legitimacy, corresponding to three kinds of judgments we find people making about our institutions. Each has different practical consequences.

Ideological Legitimacy

THE FIRST TYPE of legitimacy is ideological; that is, the support people give to the core values and ideas underlying a political/economic system. If an ideological threat exists, it would be, in our society, a questioning or rejecting of the premises of the welfare state. Irving Howe has provided us with a useful if compressed formulation of the essential form taken by the welfare state in the United States today:

> By the welfare state one signifies a capitalist society in which the interplay of private and/or corporate owners in a largely regulated market remain dominant but in which the workings of the economy are so modified that the powers of free disposal by property owners are controlled politically.[9]

The first question we must ask, then, is whether the precipitous decline of confidence in our institutions signifies a rejection of the premises of the welfare state. Fortunately, the evidence yields an unambiguous answer: the public does *not* seriously question the ideological legitimacy of the welfare state or the major institutions of which it consists. On the contrary, at the level of general values there is remarkable congruity between the system in its abstract form and the values espoused by a cross section of Americans. There is widespread support among the public both for the private property/capitalist component of the welfare state and for the political control of these privately owned entities. Thus 72 percent of the public subscribe to the traditional belief that "private property is sacred." A massive 93 percent—just about a consensus—express their willingness to "make personal sacrifices, if necessary, to preserve the free-enterprise system." And by margins greater than 5 to 1 (64 percent to 12 percent), Americans reject the proposition that we would be "better off if big business were taken over by the national government."[10] At the same time, however, there is majority support for stricter government regulation of business,[11] and for the view that the federal government has an obligation to see to it that "the poor are taken care of, and that no one goes hungry."[12]

It could be argued, as Philip Converse has, that the public does not hold a coherent political philosophy and that the majority merely gives lip service to platitudinous norms.[13] But consistency of viewpoint matters less in the present context than conformity with norms. The survey findings reveal that the country does not question the basic premises of the welfare state. If institutions are threatened by a crisis of legitimacy, it is clearly not the result of any serious challenge to the ideological premises of the welfare state.

Functional Legitimacy

A SECOND TYPE of legitimacy relates to the effectiveness with which the public credits institutions. Is local government giving the community adequate police and fire protection, trash collection, school and housing accommodations? Is the federal government doing its job in protecting the national security, regulating the economy, etc.?

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[9] Irving Howe, "Notes on the Welfare State," in *Poverty: Views from the Left,* Irving Howe and Jeremy Larner, eds. (New York: William Morrow, 1968).

[10] *Time*/Yankelovich, Political Indicators, 1974.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Confidence and Concern* (see Note 4).
[13] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent,* David Apter, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1964).

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Lipset distinguishes between effectiveness and legitimacy,[14] partly on the grounds that effectiveness can be gauged by objective criteria while judgments of legitimacy are subjective. By objective standards an institution may be functioning well, even though observers may fault it from lack of knowledge, prejudice, or changed expectations. Conversely, an institution may be failing utterly to perform its essential functions, while its constituency fails to recognize the failure. I would, however, subsume at least the subjective aspect of people's judgments about effectiveness in my definition of institutional legitimacy, on the ground that people make such judgments constantly and that judgments of effectiveness bear directly on their confidence in institutions. (The argument that Mussolini caused the Italian trains to run on time was often cited in favor of the legitimacy of his regime.) Unfortunately, the survey research evidence dealing with this component of legitimacy is more elusive and ambiguous than that on the ideological aspect. The research suggests that the majority of Americans seem to believe their state and local governments are not functioning any worse than they did in the recent past. While confidence in the press, trade unions, educational institutions, and the professions has declined, they are *not* being criticized essentially on the grounds that they have become disorganized and substantially less effective.

This judgment holds even more with regard to big business. The public enthusiastically endorses Ralph Nader and other consumer advocates. But the principal reason for Nader's remarkable public support has little to do with his role as critic of business effectiveness. If anything, people believe that big business is all *too effective*. It is what business does with its economic clout that troubles people.

The exception to these judgments about institutional effectiveness, a critical one, refers to the federal government. A majority of the public believes that the federal government is less effective today than it was in the past. A recent study by the Harris organization shows that a 61 percent majority of the public faults the federal government for its inability to solve the nation's problems, in contrast to a 37 percent minority of the political leadership who criticize the federal establishment on these same grounds.[15]

A word of caution. The significance of these findings can be misleading unless people's expectations are taken into account. On the all-important matter of what the public truly expects from its government we find much confusion. There is little doubt that the public has, until recently, supported what has come to be known as "the imperial presidency." Intuitively, the mass of Americans turn for the solution of the most pressing national problems to the single figure of the president. Even today, at a time when the executive branch is mistrusted as rarely before, people are wildly inconsistent about the power that should reside in the presidency. In answer to one set of questions, they say that the president has too much power and it should be curbed; in answer to another set in the same interview, they say that we need an even stronger presidency.

My interpretation of these incomplete confusing findings is that people believe the federal government should not be the direct and principal agent responsible for the solution of problems, but that its main function should be confined to that of referee, regulator, and protector of the public interest. More than three-quarters of Americans (76 percent) hold the view that "the federal government should not run the life of the country but should regulate major companies, industries and institutions to be sure that they do not take advantage of the public."[16] This expectation holds the key

[14] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Political Sociology," in *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects* (New York: Basic Books, 1959; Harper Torchbooks, 1965).

[15] *Confidence and Concern* (see Note 4).

[16] *Ibid.*

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to the country's support of the welfare state, which hems in private enterprise with politically regulated ground rules.

It may be true, as Nathan Glazer and others emphasize,[17] that there are limits to social policy and that many federal programs have ended up as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. But we are not concerned here with an *objective* appraisal of the government's success or failure but only with the reasons for the remarkable falling-off of public confidence in institutions. And by this standard, although people gripe and grouch about the lack of effectiveness of the federal government, I cannot detect in the research evidence any large-scale sentiment that our institutions are failing to perform their everyday bread-and-butter functions. The chief complaint the public presses against the country's institutions, from the presidency down, is *bad faith*. It is a moral complaint.

Moral Legitimacy

"POLITICAL ACTION normally takes place within a universe of normative regulation and involves the acceptance by all but revolutionary actors of the rules of the political game."[18] The third type of legitimacy—moral legitimacy—can be defined through this observation by Lewis Coser. The moral legitimacy of institutions becomes threatened when people who accept the normative rules of the political/economic system come to believe that the institutions are violating these rules for immoral reasons. The contrast here is with ideological legitimacy, which is threatened when questions are raised about the rules themselves. A widespread desire to change from private to public ownership of property would raise questions of ideological legitimacy, while the conviction that private ownership is right and proper, but that the private owners are cheating on the rules, signifies a violation of moral legitimacy.

The decline of confidence in institutions can be attributed almost wholly to the sharp decline in their moral legitimacy. This is true across the board, encompassing virtually all institutions, but it is truest of all for the strategic core of the system: the relationship of the federal government to business. The significance of the present crisis of legitimacy —and this much overworked term does seem appropriate here—lies in the fact that for the first time since cross section measurements of Americans began, a majority of Americans feel a deep distress about the moral rightness of many of their institutions. In an era marked by a general weakening of social bonds—family, community, church, employer—the bond of national allegiance forms a critical part of the average person's identity. But now the moral intuition of the average citizen tells him that something fundamental is amiss. People feel that the great national institutions command an excess of power, which they abuse for selfish ends. They suspect that moral constraints operating in the past no longer operate today. And all this leaves them frustrated and bewildered.

This discontent has not assumed an activist political form, and that is proof of its nonideological character. There is no huge outcry or demand for reform, revolution, or even far-reaching political change. Watergate has damaged the Republican party, but the Democratic party is not an automatic beneficiary—a fact the more sensitive Democrats understand. Although public mistrust is directed against both major political parties, there is less than massive support for basic change. Not only is ideological fervor lacking, but people also fear that changes in procedures or party structure will not get to the underlying defect. So bleak is the public skepticism that people suspect that even if you throw out the rascals now in office, others

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[17] Nathan Glazer, "The Limits of Social Policy," *Commentary*, September 1971.

[18] See Coser's introductory essay in *Political Sociology: Selected Essays*, Lewis A. Coser, ed. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967).

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will replace them. People fear that those with power and responsibility will somehow find a way around any new procedures or legal provisions to place the narrow interests of institutions ahead of the public well-being.

What lies beneath this spread of discouragement and mistrust? At a superficial level, the diagnosis focuses on money corruption. But this should not be taken literally, because public cynicism about money corruption is skin deep. A large core of faith lies under the thin layer of cynicism, to the effect that the system can work and that honest leadership can be found to make it work if only a climate of moral integrity can be restored. This is why, at the beginning, I referred to the public's "quasi-sophistication." The accusation "crooked politician" wells up from a momentary feeling of disgust, anger, and betrayal, and not from any deep conviction that honest leaders cannot be found. (Note the great enthusiasm and relief in the first days of the Ford administration.)

The crisis of moral legitimacy reflects, I would say, an only partly articulated belief that a silent contract, a kind of implicit bargain between the public and our institutions, has been rudely violated. The bargain works something like this. The public is prepared to accept, as an inherent part of the private enterprise/welfare state system, vast inequities in social benefits—provided that the individual citizen receive in exchange certain rights and privileges. I would single out four key expectations: first, the expectation that the average person will have the opportunity to win modest economic security; second, that he will have a fair opportunity to improve his standard of living; third, that consumer "rights" will be his, such as securing fair value for his money; and fourth, that he will receive rewards in the form of money, respect, and opportunities for advancement, in exchange for hard work and observance of the rules. Many social critics, both Left and Right, deplore this outlook as mundane, lacking heroic qualities. Those concerned with achieving more equality in the society feel this "bargain" lies like a dead weight on their hopes. But approved or not, the stability of our society rests squarely on how well this bargain is preserved.

The historic experience of Americans with the government and the economic system in fulfilling this bargain has led to two guiding principles, which exert a strong political influence, even though they are not codified into law or usually made explicit. One is the view that the government should serve as referee and protector rather than doer. The decline of confidence in government grows directly out of the belief that government has violated this trust. In the 1972 election, the only reservation a majority of the voters held about Nixon was that he appeared to be too close to big business.[19] Subsequently, the illegal campaign contributions from business that surfaced in the Watergate revelations merely confirmed these suspicions. Thus, the principal lesson drawn by the public from Watergate is the view held by 70 percent of the voters that "Watergate shows how big business misuses its influence and controls the country." [20]

The second principle that mediates the bargain underlying our mixed economic/political system is even more deeply buried than the first. Its reality emerges clearly only when it is violated—as people think it has been in the recent crisis. The principle is that the profits of the private sector should be guided not by their size but by how they are made. Even college students, the most severe critics of the system, believe overwhelmingly (80 percent) that business is entitled to a fair profit.[21] It is not profits as such that disturb people but whether they are "deserved" in the moral sense.

What we are witnessing today is, then, a

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[19] *Time*/Yankelovich, Inc., Pre-election Survey, October 1972.
[20] *Time*/Yankelovich, Inc., National Survey, 1973.
[21] Daniel Yankelovich, *Changing Values on Campus* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1972).

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new chapter in the history of American populism. The essential point about populism, especially in its current version, is that despite an antibusiness emphasis, such as we normally associate with the political Left, it has a profoundly conservative thrust. It seeks to restore, not change. It is fueled by a sense of public morality outraged. It is accompanied by a harsh punitive attitude toward criminals, "welfare bums," pornographers. It is an anguished outburst of resentment by those who feel they have worked hard and sacrificed, only to reap exploitation in return. This social resentment is probably the most potent political force in America today.

"Men . . . cannot for long accept a society in which power, privilege and profits are not distributed according to some morally meaningful criteria." [22] The thought expressing that principle is most familiar to thinkers of the Left, but this observation by Irving Kristol is most applicable today to the historic constituency of the Right: the lower-middle-class white-collar worker who feels that his economic status and position of respectability is being threatened by the moral turpitude of institutions to which he would, under ordinary circumstances, give his unstinting allegiance.

III

My final point is to call attention to a peculiar defect in our social institutions, one that Max Weber with remarkable prescience identified many years ago. It now seems clear that the advanced industrial nations have much in common, regardless of whether their economics are capitalist, socialist, or mixed. The care and feeding of an industrialized, highly technological society and the distribution of its benefits require large-scale organization and highly developed managerial skills.

But the tendency of all organizations is to place their own survival and aggrandizement ahead of the interests of those they are supposed to serve. As an institution becomes larger and more powerful, it seeks out for advancement within its own ranks those experts and managers who identify what they believe to be morally correct with the narrow interests of the organization. In the top ranks of the institutions that rule our lives there are men, and increasingly women, who may be personally selfless but are also remorselessly selfish for their organizations. Few of these people are corrupt in the commonplace sense. What we are seeing today, contrary to popular belief, is not a growth in corruption. Today's executives and managers in business and all other giant bureaucracies may well be more personally honest than their predecessors. The flaw lies in the lack of an institutional morality to parallel our social or individual norms.

The essence of the problem is, I suspect, a hidden double standard of moral conduct, one for individuals and the other for institutions. An individual, in fulfilling his own needs, is expected to be mindful of the needs and desires of others. An older man who divorces his wife of many years because a young mistress fills his current needs may be living through an understandable human crisis, but he could hardly delude himself into believing that his conduct is morally justified on the grounds of the greater *efficiency* with which he is now meeting those needs. Yet, the typical official in authority comes to feel that in advancing the interests of his organization—his party, his department, his company—he is serving a moral purpose, however narrowly and selfishly it may be defined. It would not be surprising if the leadership of the Mafia felt a sense of moral self-fulfillment in pursuing the interests of their institution. When it comes to serving one's organization, men put on moral blinders. And when a man comes to feel that he is serving a moral purpose, all restraints can be suspended: men will commit unconscionable crimes in the name of morality.

People in positions of authority in institutions usually have strong superegos. They are

[22] Irving Kristol, "Reflections on Capitalism and the Free Society," *Public Interest*, Winter 1971.

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imbued by their upbringing with a sense of responsibility that many of them carry out faithfully in their private lives. A thousand times a day they can make small judgments, even sacrifices, to subordinate their personal impulses to the need of others. This is the essence of private morality: the ability to subordinate one's personal desires to serve others. A paradox: within our institutions men carry out with a high conviction of moral self-righteousness decisions that may be amoral or clearly immoral. The problem is not with misplaced loyalty or personal corruption, although both exist. It lies with our failure to insist upon an ethic of responsibility for the *objectives* of institutions.

While individuals live by multiple purposes and complex motives, institutions, if they are to be efficient, tend inexorably toward single-mindedness of purpose—to maximize profits, to win elections, to increase budgets, to grow in size and influence. We have laws for restraining institutions, but that is not the same thing as moral standards. The purpose of the law is to codify the minimum morality of the society, not to embody its everyday moral norms. If our culture depended solely on laws, we could not survive as a viable civilization.

Despite its obvious shortcomings, I believe the analogy between individual and institutional moral norms to be fundamentally sound. The purpose of social morality is to mediate between the welfare of the individual and the group. We would not need social morality if each individual automatically enhanced the general welfare by an energetic pursuit of his own desires. But social morality governing individual behavior through complex patterns of expectations and norms is universal because it needs to be; otherwise, organized social life would not be possible. Increasingly, we have become a society of large central institutions. Most social purposes today are carried out through them. We need moral norms to govern their behavior and to reconcile their self-interest with the well-being of the whole society, as badly as we need them for individuals.

The question then arises as to what mechanisms we can invent other than the law to insure that institutions will meet our changing social requirements—analogous to the patterns of moral expectation that contain individual behavior. Suffice it to say that to make headway in solving this problem we can expect a renewal of vitality in the referee function of the central government; changes in the rules governing campaign financing and the appointment of regulatory officials; a more scrupulous insistence on the autonomy of politically sensitive agencies; new codes of ethics governing honorable resignation from office if such autonomy is threatened; and structural changes in the governing institutions, such as corporation boards of directors, so that they reflect a wider range of social interest and a greater democratic responsiveness. None of these mechanisms will suffice, of course, unless there is also a renewal of moral consciousness. □

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Cushing N. Dolbeare

The Housing Stalemate

A Lack of Welfare in the Welfare State

"The welfare state, for all its value, tends to provide benefits in inverse relationship to human need. And not—the point is crucial—because there is a conspiracy of the affluent, but as 'a natural consequence' of the division of society into unequal social classes. Through vigorous and radical reforms it is possible to offset—though not to remove—this inherent tendency within capitalist society to distribute public benefits according to the inequalities of private wealth. Any movement that attempts to carry out such reform will be going against the grain of the system itself."

These words of Michael Harrington, in his pamphlet Socialism in America, *come irresistably to mind upon reading the study Cushing Dolbeare has written for us about the housing problem in America.*—ED.

As this article is being written (early July), the House and Senate each have passed housing bills and a conference committee is about to try to resolve two very different approaches. Crudely stated, the House bill, passed on June 20 by a vote of 351–25, represents a compromise with the Administration in order to achieve some kind of federally subsidized housing production, while the Senate bill, approved in April by a 76–11 vote, embodies a conventional liberal wisdom, continuing, in spruced-up form, the housing programs of the New Deal, Fair Deal, and Great Society, which the Administration has sought to bury.

Presumably, some legislation will emerge and, with a little luck, several 100,000 American households with serious housing problems will get a little help. Last year, Representative Thomas Ashley of Ohio, perhaps the chief architect of this legislation, described three "realities" affecting all housing legislation:

> First, our housing needs are of such a magnitude that they are not likely to be met in a short period of time without a massive commitment of the Nation's resources. Yet in view of other equally pressing social needs—in providing improved health services, quality education, and a cleaner environment—housing simply will not receive a priority claim on the Nation's resources. Consequently, we must face the necessity of striving for and accepting only incremental improvements in housing conditions. To promise more is to raise false hopes among those we most wish to help.
>
> Second, there is no inexpensive way of providing housing assistance to low-income families. . . .
>
> And third, any program that applies limited resources to problems of great magnitude must in some respect appear to be inequitable to some and preferential to others.

Ironically, while as a society we have

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moved from accepting public responsibility for education—accomplished a century ago—to greater acceptance of public responsibility for health and nourishment, we are simultaneously moving away from accepting public responsibility for providing shelter.

At the root of the failure of our housing programs—and they have failed in scope and scale—is a failure of will and commitment. When we decided, for better or worse, to reach the moon during the 1960s, we were not detained by cost or the problems that had to be solved in the process. We succeeded. Similarly, we can decide to solve our housing problems, and we can make the necessary commitments of public responsibility, resources, and energy. But we will do this only by developing a concept of the necessary role and responsibility of government, and an active concern with the rights of all citizens to decent shelter.

The situation is dismal. Millions of American families live in shelter that is unsafe, unsanitary, or lacks basic facilities. A substantial portion of these families are paying more than they can afford for such housing—35, 40, or 50 percent of incomes that are well below the poverty level. Additional millions of households are living in housing that meets minimum standards of physical adequacy but costs far more than they can afford—again, 30, 40, 50 percent of their incomes or more. New housing, with few exceptions, is priced beyond the reach of all but the most affluent 20 percent of Americans. The availability of money to finance new housing, either for builder or consumer, is at the mercy of large financial institutions and federal manipulations of monetary policy to control inflation. There are no effective mechanisms providing for the construction, financing, or maintenance of housing in vast sections of the country: in rural areas, with few exceptions, and in inner-city areas.

The governmental support systems for housing, at federal, state, and local levels, have one thing in common: they are passive rather than active. While there have been mortgage-insurance programs, interest-subsidy programs, loan-and-grant programs, even direct-subsidy programs for housing authorities—none of them operate independently of outside, nonfederal initiative. They have another common element: the initiative comes not from the consumer but from the producer. Thus housing is neither in the hands of government, except negatively—to prevent various "undesirable" things—nor in the hands of consumers. It is in the hands of producers, predominantly speculative builders.

As zoning restrictions, building code, subdivision requirements, and other suburban constraints have artificially forced up the price of housing by requiring builders to construct single-family houses on fairly large lots, builders increasingly support federal-subsidy programs. Most housing consumers have been priced out of the market, and more by local governments and governmental practices than by the builders. This has a variety of causes. Builders operate largely in suburban areas, where there is a presumptive market, available land and financing mechanism. Builders tend not to operate in the inner cities or in rural areas. Yet, suburban communities are no longer expansionist—if they ever were. A longtime truism has it that the last person to move into a suburban community wants to remain just that: the last person to move in. Thus the availability of land zoned for moderate-density housing is the result of interaction between community people who don't want it, and builders, often with strong political influence, who do.

One obvious answer to the problem of rising suburban costs—building either in inner cities or in rural areas—seems beyond the capacity of our present institutions. Much rhetoric has been directed at the need to revitalize our inner cities but little of it at concrete, responsive programs. Rural areas have been spared both the rhetoric and, except for the Farmer's Home drops in the bucket, the programs.

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Has Public Housing Failed?

The words "public housing" almost invariably conjure up a vision of high-rise, high-density, often atrociously designed projects—poorly maintained, strewn with rubble and trash, with hallways and elevators reeking of urine. One enters, if at all, fearing for life or limb. Within the past year, pictures of the dynamiting of one such project in St. Louis have engraved this image dramatically on our minds. Public housing? Clearly a failure—a solution to slums perhaps worse than the original disease. So goes the new wisdom.

Public housing's image has been determined by the large number of projects constructed in big cities during the 1950s and 1960s, mostly on cleared sites. The combination of our laws of eminent domain and federal-subsidy constraints forced public housing authorities into building high-density buildings in order to absorb the inflated site costs of compensating slumlords for the income stream they had been receiving from their former "investments."

The reality, however, is that four-fifths of all public housing units are in low-rise buildings: garden apartments or single-family homes. Many are in small projects, well integrated into the life of their neighborhoods. Less than 30 percent of all public housing is in cities of a half-million people or more; a comparable number of units is in communities with less than 25,000 people. For the past five years, except for housing specifically designed for the elderly, public housing outside of New York City has been almost exclusively low-rise: the days of new monster, high-rise public housing projects are over.

For over three decades, beginning in 1937, the public housing subsidy covered *only* the interest and amortization of 40-year bonds floated on the private market to finance site acquisition for construction; operating costs—and usually part of the amortization, too—were covered by tenant rents. During the depression, war, and immediate postwar years, public housing was occupied primarily by working people and their families. The very poor were largely excluded, rental income was steady, and the subsidy mechanism worked.

A shift in occupancy patterns began in the 1950s, the product of improving economic opportunities, the widespread availability of new FHA housing for white families with steady incomes, and the mandate of public housing to provide shelter for people displaced by slum clearance. Public housing was increasingly occupied by very poor families, often receiving most or all of their income from public assistance. Rental income dropped and this, combined with rising operating costs and the absence of operating subsidies, led to declining quality of management and maintenance. Welfare families were discriminated against in a variety of ways.

During the last decade, public housing development activities have been transformed. Renewal subsidies became available to reduce site costs, permitting sensible development. Housing authorities were enabled to buy or lease existing housing, either in usable condition or for rehabilitation. Small projects of less than 100 units became feasible. Options to permit and encourage home ownership were introduced. Housing authority boards, previously confined to "providers," became open to tenant membership. Many housing authorities became less paternalistic and more genuinely responsive to tenant needs and concerns.

The failures of public housing are real, and should not be minimized. Basically, however, they are failures to reach far enough in the direction of government support and responsibility. Public housing needs to be both expanded and reformed. It should be expanded through legislation guaranteeing both development and operating subsidies and mandating sufficient production, acquisition, or rehabilitation to provide shelter for all low-income families needing it. It should be reformed through provisi for greater tenant rights and participation, and through elimination of local vetoes over project location.

Public housing is critical because, given our present panoply of housing institutions, only public housing authorities are capable, under *public* control, of providing for low- and moderate-income families what private developers and financing institutions provide for the affluent. □

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It is easy to slip into oversimplification—to speak of "the housing problem." But "the housing problem" only means that shelter in this country is inadequate. "The Housing Problem" indeed is an amalgam of many different problems, each problem affecting a particular segment of the population and affecting that segment differently. There is little perceived common ground, say, between the problems of the occupant of a rural shack and those of the tenant in a city tenement.

Low-income housing victims perceive one set of problems. Reformers, often, see another. Owners and builders see a third. Finally, governments, depending on their level and orientation, see a fourth set. There have been, over the years, a number of efforts to unite the perceptions of reformers, builders, and government. *Too often the perceptions of the victims have been left out.* As almost everyone has a personal housing problem, our citizens find it difficult to sympathize with others who have different problems, and to support programs of no immediate personal benefit.

THERE IS a variety of perspectives.

Affluent people see the housing problem in terms of too much growth, rising taxes and, perhaps, if they are living in cities, changing neighborhoods and declining services. With the new awareness of the energy crisis, relationship to community facilities, including public transportation, will be of growing importance.

Middle-income people face all these problems and more: taxes and maintenance-and-repair costs are rising more rapidly than incomes. So is the cost of new housing, which is often unavailable at hoped-for prices or in hoped-for locations.

Moderate-income people find no new housing available and the existing market tight, with little choice of location. Even when suitable housing can be found, financing is difficult. Down payments have to be substantial, and interest costs over the life of the mortgage are at least double the nominal cost of the house.

Landlords increasingly find rental housing an unprofitable investment or, at best, less profitable than other investments. Tenants —in the eyes of most landlords—are troublesome and careless. They are likely to complain, even occasionally to withhold rent. Tenants often do not recognize the cost squeeze that rising prices have put on landlords or the fact that many landlords see themselves locked into unattractive investments. The landlord's solution: condominiums—transfer the ownership and the attendant problems of maintenance to the tenants.

Tenants, on the other hand, are confronted by unfair and often technically illegal leases, under which they waive rights established by law. Maintenance lags behind need. For families with children, little choice is available. Minority families and families on welfare have even less choice. Rents are high for value received.

Old people, too, have their special problems. If they are owners, frequently the houses are an increasing burden: larger than they need, with maintenance costs and property taxes placing a growing burden on their budgets, while income is meager. U.S. owners 65 years old or over spend an average of 8 percent of their income on real estate taxes alone. Those with incomes below $2,000 spend an average of 16 percent of their income for real estate taxes. Yet, very likely, their houses are their major economic assets, with secure alternatives unavailable.

Young people, who are just setting up their households, have another set of problems. If they live in rural areas, neither decent housing nor decent jobs are likely to be available. In suburban communities, housing for sale is beyond their means, and rental housing is often excluded under zoning laws or, if available, is exorbitant. Current rental costs are so high that it is difficult to make the necessary savings for a down payment. There has been much rhetoric on the hous-

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ing problem of low-income and minority people. It will not be elaborated here, except to note that it is often understated rather than exaggerated.

Overarching these components of the broader housing problem is the fact that efforts to confront housing problems seem to bring out the worst characteristics of American politics and economics. The bundle of prejudices commonly know as the Protestant Ethic operates to reduce the role of government and extol the virtues of private enterprise and individual intiative. Housing programs operate in an atmosphere of pervasive racism and prejudice against poor people. In part, this is because efforts to meet housing needs often appear to threaten our citizens' few components of security in this insecure society. Often, the purchase of their home is the largest single investment of their lives. Commonly, this is a debt difficult to pay at the outset and, with rising taxes and repair costs, often growing increasingly onerous. Added to the concern for the safety of this investment, there now is a growing concern for safety, both in the home and in the community. These fears have been translated into effective political power, at both the local and national levels. Locally, they have prevented the introduction of subsidized housing or even of moderate-density zoning. At the federal level, they have made political support of broad-scale housing programs seem hazardous at best and suicidal at worst.

In 1934 the federal government set out to build housing for low-income people, partly to provide shelter, but more to provide jobs. A federal district court ruling that this was beyond the scope of federal authority has never since been appealed or challenged. Instead, federal housing programs have since been designed to work either through or with active consent of local governments. Thus, public housing authorities were created by local governments and authorized to construct housing units—but, in practice if not in law, only in the numbers and locations approved by those governments. We have poorly located, high-density, high-rise public housing in many urban areas, not because planners and administrators were incompetent, but because they were allowed no other choice. Rural and suburban areas, by and large, had no public housing.

But was public housing in fact public? For 30 years, local housing authorities were composed of builders, realtors, and bankers, with an occasional minister or other reformer thrown in—but they never included a low-income person or a tenant. They were authorized to construct and operate housing projects. This they did by contracting with local private architects and builders, financing the projects through bonds bought by private investors. True, there was public subsidy by the federal government and public management by the local housing authority —but *public housing,* in the sense that we have public roads, *has never existed,* and it has been equally resisted by governments, reformers, and private enterprise.

Programs designed to benefit poor people have had little appeal in this country. During the depression, when poverty was a majority fear though not quite a majority problem, there was a brief period of support for low-income programs. But since the end of World War II, in a time of prevailing middle-class prosperity, it has been tacitly assumed that poverty in this country was a social disease, curable by a combination of individual effort and public supportive services. The notion that it is society's responsibility to provide a basic level of income and the necessities of life has by and large been advanced timorously or apologetically, not as a self-evident truth. We have defined "reality" not in terms of the nature and extent of social problems but rather in terms of the constraints that bear upon their solutions.

After a generation of effort to expand the public housing program has resulted, at best, in only nominal progress, reformers have

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shifted their approach from advocacy of additional measures to aid the poor to efforts to create significant vested interests capable of providing an expanded level of support for housing programs. Quantitatively, this new approach was enormously successful. The four years following the Housing Act of 1968 produced more subsidized units for moderate-income families than four decades of public housing efforts have produced for low-income families. Moreover, the most effective lobby for subsidized housing on Capitol Hill is now the National Association of Home Builders. The traditional supporters of public housing, represented most visibly by the National Housing Conference, have been largely reduced to haggling among themselves over whether they should continue to serve very-low-income people, or whether the route to housing salvation is through an economic mix—which translates in practice into eviction of the very poor (and therefore "undesirable") in favor of the less poor and upwardly mobile (or "desirable)" tenants. The voices of consumers and their friends—tenants, rural people, and a scattering of others—are either silent or effectively drowned out.

FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS have evolved along two rather separate axes. The first, and older, is represented by programs with broad standards of eligibility, available as a matter of right to all eligible people. Relationships are established directly between the federal government and the consumer. These programs are designed for predominantly middle-income and affluent people. They include income tax deductions for local property taxes, mortgage interest, and depreciation; the tax-free features of housing authority bonds; FHA and VA mortgage insurance, particularly on new construction; and savings deposits in member institutions of the home-loan banking system. It could be argued that the housing component of public-assistance payments should be included in this category. In contrast to the foregoing programs, however, the constituency is low-income, eligibility is far from an established right, and payments differ from state to state.

The other major axis of housing programs has consisted of the housing subsidies designed for low- or moderate-income families. Here, housing assistance has been regarded as a privilege rather than a right. The programs have operated through intermediary institutions—state and local governments, nonprofit or limited-dividend development corporations or housing authorities, builders, bankers, and investors. While the scope and cost of these programs are far smaller, these are the programs that have generated the discussions, evaluations, freezes, and charges of high costs, waste, inequity, or maladministration.

The true cost of federal housing subsidies, counting everything, is massive. But the major housing subsidies do not appear in the federal budget and are seldom accounted for. They are provided through the tax system: deductibility for home owners of mortgage interest and local property taxes and, for investors, accelerated depreciation on rental housing and tax-free bonds issued by local housing authorities. While only crude estimates are available, it seems clear that *housing subsidies for households with incomes above $20,000 are at least four times as great as housing subsidies for families with incomes below $3,000.* Perhaps only

HOUSING SUBSIDIES — TOTAL — BY INCOME CIRCA 1970

Annual Income	*Est. Subsidy*	*Number of Households, 1970*	*Average Subsidy per Household*
$0–$2,999	$ 641 million	1.493 million	$56
$3,000–$5,999	$1,113 million	10.939 million	$102
$6,000–$9,999	$1,949 million	15.821 million	$123
$10,000 +	$4,510 million	25.192 million	$179

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in agriculture do we have a comparable picture of federal subsidies for the rich while the poor are ignored or systematically deprived of their rights.

If the inequities of our present total housing programs were to be demonstrated, and if there is genuine understanding of the nature and extent of our housing needs and the inadequacy of current public and private institutions to meet them—then we might, conceivably, achieve a successful housing program.

CONSIDER THE ANALOGY OF HEALTH CARE. Until the adoption of medicare and medicaid, government spending for health services, primarily veterans benefits at the federal level and other hospital and medical care at the state and local level, were one-quarter of all health expenditures. Since medicare and medicaid were adopted, not only have total health-care expenditures risen sharply, but the public share has risen to almost 40 percent. The expansion of effective demand, financed through medicare and medicaid, has led to recognition of a crisis in health care. In 1950 total health expenditures were $12 billion, which was 4.6 percent of the gross national product. Public expenditures accounted for 25 percent of this total or roughly $3 billion. In 1970, by contrast, total health expenditures were $68 billion, 7 percent of the gross national product, and the public share was 37 percent, or $25 billion. This increase was prompted by two important decisions: to provide health services to elderly people, regardless of income, and to low-income people, regardless of age. The crisis generated by these programs is not new: there always has been a need for health care. The crisis resulted when those needing health care were given hope of access to it. Existing health delivery systems were not equipped to respond adequately, and are now being reevaluated.

In housing, we may now be at the premedicare stage of health programs. That is, we have a limited number of programs, inadequately serving selected groups of people, and a delivery system that is incapable of responding to a sudden surge of effective demand.

We need a whole new approach to housing: one that deals with all legitimate housing problems—whether of young, old, black, white, rich, poor, urban, surburban, or rural. *We need to see decent housing as a* right *and its provision as a public responsibility.* We need to design new institutions and delivery systems that are genuinely responsive and controlled by their consumers. Finally, we need a commitment of government financial support, initiative, and action to bring all this about.

The policy statement contained in the Housing Act of 1949 set the goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family." Two essentials, at least, need to be added: freedom of housing choice and ability to pay.

The Housing Act of 1968 put some concrete figures on the first half of the 1949 goal: "the decent home." It set a target of 26 million new or rehabilitated units to be added during a decade; 6 million of these—the number of existing substandard units to be replaced—were to be subsidized. This 26-million-unit target ignores the factors of suitable living environment, freedom of choice, and ability to pay. Thus it grossly understates the crudest measurements of housing needs.

For many, control over their housing is at least as important as the adequacy of the shelter itself. Home ownership is as important as a symbol of self-determination as it is as a financial arrangement. Indeed, the distinctions between rented or purchased housing are becoming increasingly blurred. There is not a great deal of difference between a rental unit, a condominium, a cooperative, and a house being bought on a lease-purchase contract or a 40-year mortgage. The type of structure—location and age and whether it

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is a single- or multi-family unit—is probably at least as important as tenure.

Therefore, self-determination and consumer or resident control over housing must be an important part of any major housing program. By now experience has taught us that supportive services are a key component of home ownership programs, at least for marginal-income people. Our housing problems will not be met by half measures, or half-hearted proposals. While public housing, in the words of Anthony Henry of the national tenant movement, is "a roaring success compared to what the private market provides," it has not secured the loyalty of its residents; nor does public housing provide a rallying point for those wishing to deal with housing problems. Our other direct housing programs have even less appeal. While their faults are not as great as current HUD and other criticism implies, they are cumbersome, costly, inadequate in scope, and totally unable to meet our housing needs of low-income people.

Fair play is important to most people. Most people not only resent being pushed around themselves, they are not happy seeing others pushed around. The notion of a total housing subsidy system, framed so that the subsidy rises as income goes up, is so egregiously unjust that it is intolerable. The current indignation over minimum rents in public housing is a tempest in a teapot compared to this inequity. And the cost to the federal government is far higher.

The Housing Act of 1968, which resulted in a five-fold increase in the production of subsidized housing, was not alone the product of an awakened and aggressive lobbying effort by housing producers. It was also the product, in part at least, of two searching examinations—one by the Douglas Commission and the other by the Kaiser Committee—of the nature and extent of our housing problems and, perhaps not least, the dawning recognition that prior to 1968 the federal government was, tax expenditures aside, as likely to make a profit on its housing programs as to spend money on them. Even those most insulated from the realities of American life could recognize that we could not solve our housing problems without spending some money.

No one, yet, has the prescription for adequate housing programs. Interestingly, however, there has been a recent revival of interest in public housing as the mechanism for either major or incremental improvement. Public housing has never really been tried in this country. In order to try it now, it would be appropriate to provide for public financing, production, and operation of housing, at least for those who cannot afford decent private housing. It would be appropriate for the federal government to exercise its powers to override the objections of local governments to providing poor people with access to decent housing. It would be appropriate to spend perhaps 10 percent of our gross national product for providing decent shelter.

Two ingredients seem essential for real progress. We must lay to rest the myth that housing is a private commodity best supplied by the private market. And those with housing problems must stop seeing themselves as being in the grip of unfortunate circumstances; they must come to see that, in reality, they are being deprived of what should be a basic right in an enlightened society. □

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Yuri Brokhin

Fathoming the Free World

Or: Adventures of Soviet Jewish Emigrants

One day last July my wife Tanya and I were discussing our latest everyday problems. I don't know why we chose the lobby of the Associated Press building as the site for our debate, but suddenly a young man in a Moscow-style suit approached us, smiled politely and said:

"How nice it is in the middle of New York to hear such pure Russian swearing. Do you by any chance work for TASS [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union]?"

"No, I replied, "we're from another agency—we're Jews." And, imitating a sportscaster, I added: " 'Afterwards, exchanging looks of contempt, the antagonists went their separate ways.' Or perhaps you'd like to chat for a while?"

"Okay," agreed the man, who turned out to be a Soviet journalist. We had a cursory discussion about Brezhnev's visit to the U.S. and then turned to the Jewish question.

"Well, everything is clear as far as that is concerned," our new acquaintance declared. "The boss [Brezhnev] has said firmly: 'We'll give you Jews and you give us trade.' "

So what is the present exodus of Soviet Jews? A caprice of the political game, a bargaining counter in the hands of the powers, an ideologically based movement or maybe just a desperate, spontaneous rush by a mob?

According to official statistical data, 2,150,707 Jews were living in the Soviet Union in 1970, whereas in 1959 the Jewish population numbered 2,267,814. Of all the 104 nationalities in the U.S.S.R., Jews were the only ones to lose about 120,000 people in 11 years. And this did not occur on war fronts, in gas chambers, in prisons or emigrants' trains.

Certainly the decisive factor in these data is the intensive process of assimilation. In this process the husband or wife tries to adopt the nationality of the non-Jewish spouse and then to record their future children as "non-Jewish."

Today 83 percent of all Soviet Jews declare their native tongue to be Russian; they do not speak Yiddish, let alone Hebrew, do not practice Judaism, do not go to synagogues, and are not interested in the Jewish religion, history, or culture. Most don't consider themselves Jews at all.

On the other hand, the Soviet authorities consider them Jews and, with the aid of a powerful internal-passport system, clearly identify ethnic affiliation. Some people bear this brand silently through life, resigning themselves to a civic inferiority complex, while others take active measures to get rid of their Jewishness.

Besides assimilation through marriage, a great many simply lose their passports and subsequently change their name and nationality. Quite a few people bribe the police, who then issue them new passports with a nice "point No. 5" that says "Russian" or "Ukrainian." When this is done, though, the

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bribed police officers warn: "But remember that if there is a pogrom, it won't be the passport that they beat up, but your nose."

There are people who become active opponents of their own nationality. One acquaintance, a construction engineer, declared at a meeting that was accepting him as a Party member: "Unfortunately, I am a Jew, but I promise to make every effort in the future to get rid of the characteristic traits of that nation." And he said this with complete sincerity.

A good many Jewish technocrats who hold good positions at factories, scientific institutes, and the ministries may not use such phrases, but mentally they regard their Jewishness as an impediment to their future career.

One thing is indisputable: anti-Semitism and tendencies toward assimilation have, to a large extent, a cause-and-effect relationship.

I have met quite a few Jews who are deputy ministers, heads of ministry administrations, directors and chief engineers of plants and mines, managers of industrial trusts, and directors of design and research institutes. It may seem paradoxical but it is a fact that many of them, by dint of their positions, are anti-Semites. They try not to hire Jews, afraid they will be accused of pursuing an improper personnel policy. The result is that for a Jewish office employee, a Jewish boss can be a worse enemy than a non-Jew.

The press conferences with Jewish celebrities that are often held in the Soviet Union are not just a show; they also express the views of a stratum of the Jewish intelligentsia that gravitates toward assimilation and is prepared to spearhead anti-Semitic propaganda. I did not make a slip: I mean anti-Semitic.

Anti-Semitism is manifested in its most overt form in Soviet society when one applies for a job. After graduating from a film institute, I looked for a job for a long time. One day I heard that an editor's position had opened up at one of the studios. I rushed over.

They spoke with me for a long time. Everything seemed to be going well, but in these diplomatic phrases and the close study of my by no means Roman profile, I smelled something foul.

"Your first name?" asked the chief editor.

"Yuri," I replied.

"Patronymic?" The editor's eyes narrowed as though he were preparing to catch a flea.

"Aleksandrovich."

"And your last name?"

"Ivanov," I lied.

"Then please show me your passport," the chief editor concluded, making it clear that you couldn't put one past him that easily.

In the end I didn't get the job, just as thousands of other Jews with diplomas fail to get jobs, especially in the very cities where there is constant need for specialists. The number of Jews in scientific circles is a subject of special attention from the Party leadership. Those who are there can stay, but for a new Jew it is incredibly difficult to squeeze into graduate study. With each year it becomes more complicated for Jews to enter higher educational institutions. But then a figure from the latest official statistics seems all the more astonishing. Of every 1,000 Jews, 825 have a higher education or a specialized secondary education, putting Jews in first place among the 104 nationalities of the U.S.S.R., 50 percent higher than the educational level of the other most developed nationality—the Russians.

Of course, officially in the Soviet Union there is no anti-Semitism, and I don't think there are any secret Party circulars that instruct local bodies to whip it up. That is why anti-Jewish tendencies depend to a large extent on the tastes of local managements. In this regard the category of "verbal anti-Semites" is of interest.

In a ministry where I directed an industrial film, the head of the largest administra-

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tion was a Ukrainian. He began the workday by ordering his secretary, "Tell that Kike woman to come here!" The "Kike woman"—his deputy on financial and economic questions—would come and the boss would discuss routine matters with her.

Then he would give the secretary the next command: "Tell that Kike fellow to come here!" This time the chief engineer of the administration would appear.

In the afternoon the boss would convene a conference of the executive personnel of the administration, half of whom were Jews.

Afterward he would call up his colleagues at the ministry and loudly fume: "I'm suffocating, the Kikes are coming from every direction." Yet he continued to hire mostly Jews.

Eventually his daughter married a Jew. Since then he has complained disconsolately: "Now the Kikes have broken through on the home front. Soon I'll be going to a synagogue."

This type of "verbal anti-Semite," who really doesn't take a step without a Jewish assistant, constitutes a sizable percentage among high-level Soviet officials and serves as a kind of illustration of the ugliness of the phenomenon.

THERE ARE frequent analyses in the Western press of the reasons for the rapid increase in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. They cite Israel's successes in the Six-Day War, the Leningrad hijacking trial, at which not one of the defendants pleaded guilty, anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R., and many other things.

Quite a few people, of course, felt an awakening of national consciousness and a sincere desire to live on the soil of their ancestors. But an even greater number of people, in my opinion, had no ideological reasons whatsoever.

They simply became a particle of a snowball that is now sweeping through the cities of the Soviet Union. Now communications among people have taken on an explosive character. These communications in themselves, on the feedback principle, have become an impetus for the movement. And as a result, people who just yesterday were not even thinking about Israel and were not going anywhere, have suddenly felt themselves drawn into the orbit of the snowball —and people keep going.

If one adds to this phenomenon the eternal Jewish passion for new things, the perpetual longing to seek a happiness that lies somewhere in faraway lands ("where we are not"), then the result will be the 90,000 people who have left in 1970–73 and the 100,000 awaiting their turn to leave.

My case is more or less typical. I was not a Zionist, I have never been a Communist, and I did not belong to the democratic opposition.

Like thousands of other members of the intelligentsia, I was just apathetic toward domestic political problems (a lack of apathy, to my mind, would mean active participation in demonstrations, protests, letters, and not living-room chitchat about the Soviet regime's dirty deeds, chitchat at which we were all great experts but which was good for nothing).

One day I heard they had begun to let people out. Then I found out that several of my acquaintances were leaving. At first I made fun of them. And suddenly I thought about myself. Thirty-seven years old, a tolerable life lying ahead within the regular pattern—no particular ups or downs, generally something in between.

But over *there* was the enticing unknown, frightening and sweet, capable of turning one's life topsy-turvy. Strangely enough, it is precisely such a topsy-turvy turnabout that a person sometimes misses.

The decision was made, three months later a fictitious invitation came from a friend who had left for Israel, and we were in the famous Kolpachny Lane, in front of OVIR [the visa office].

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At first the sense of solidarity took our breath away. I had never expected to see so many Jews at once. There must have been 200 or 300 people. There was, of course, an incredible din. I began to look into the faces. It was all right—they were our simple Soviet Jews. In fact, a squabble had already flared up.

"Let me through, my people are over there" said a man with a Georgian-looking mustache, trying to get ahead of everybody.

"Your people and my people are all between the Sinai and the Golan Heights," an Odessan replied, in an effort to quiet him down.

"I'm going to complain," the Mustache persisted.

"To whom, Brezhnev or Golda Meir?" the Odessan inquired.

In front of us a lady who was pleasant in all respects, whispered confidentially (after all, we were her people): "Tomorrow a correspondent from the French newspaper *Le Monde* is coming to visit me. My son and I have worked like hell the whole day. It was no joke: we hid all our furniture, rugs, piano, refrigerator, and chandeliers with the neighbors. There's nothing left in the apartment but bare mattresses. Let the whole world know how Soviet Jews who want to leave for Israel are living. Now"—the lady lowered her voice even more—"I have a problem: how do I get some crystal, silver, and several works of Fabergé to the West? You don't know any diplomats, do you?"

In a nutshell, as one would expect, for the Jews tragedy and comedy are inseparable.

Finally, we were received by an official, and a little playlet was enacted. We spoke of our fervent desire to be reunited in Tel Aviv with the family of Uncle Isaac. The official listened to us silently, and in her cold police eyes one could read just one thing: "You're lying, you Yid mugs. If it were up to me, I'd send you to Siberia."

Unsnapping her jaws, she said: "You'll get an answer within four months." And she barked toward the door: "Next!"

But events ran ahead of the official's prognosis. We received our visas in two months, and in another 15 days we were on the plane from Moscow to Vienna.

Another 23 persons were flying with us, and a crowd of at least 200, joyous and excited, saw us off at the Sheremetyevo International Airport. Most of those in the send-off party too were to leave soon. They firmly believed, without a single doubt, that in another month or two their turn would come to fly away. They had reason to believe this.

Indeed, 93 percent of Soviet Jews receive exit visas within two or three months without any great obstacles. That leaves 7 percent. These are the people who are subjected to the harshest spiritual torture, lose their jobs and are driven into a desperate situation. Doctors of sciences go to work as janitors, famous dancers starve, screenwriters unload barges to feed their families, and professional engineers lug bricks at construction projects. What is this unlucky group?

A little history. When the first groups of Jews wishing to emigrate appeared in 1969–70, the Soviet government did not yet consider the emigration problem a particularly serious one, and continued to let out people according to the well-known pressure-cooker principle, under which the lid must be opened a little from time to time.

Suddenly, despite the vociferous anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli campaigns in the press, the reverse occurred. Applications for departure to Israel poured onto the desks of OVIR by the thousands. And when cracks appeared in the dependable edifice of the Jewish scientific elite, the Party specialists on Jewish questions became seriously concerned. A frightening threat arose—a Jewish brain drain.

This just could not be allowed. Measures to halt the emigration of the scientific intelligentsia were urgently drawn up. But they were poorly thought out and crude. The introduction of the education tax proved to be a clear tactical error by the Soviet gov-

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ernment. The effort in such an overt form to organize a market for selling Jewish heads stirred indignation throughout the world and failed.

Then a Solomonic solution was found—don't let them out and that's all. No one knows for what reasons the government has been refusing to let out the cameraman Mikhail Suslov, the Sinologist Vitali Rubin, the engineer Vladimir Slepak, and many other people who have nothing to do with "security." It is evident that the fate of these 7 percent serves primarily as a bugaboo for the rest of the Jewish population. It's like Russian roulette. Every Jew applying to leave may unexpectedly fall into the unlucky 7 percent.

It is difficult to convey the state of emotional exhilaration we experienced in leaving Moscow. We realized that perhaps we would never again see this land, which in the course of our lives had firmly become part of our souls, with everything good and bad. At the same time, what could be more desirable than the discovery of a new world? The same mysterious world about which we, children of the cosmopolitan 20th century, had dreamed since childhood, about which we had read books and seen films, but which we had had almost no hope of visiting.

So forget the doubts, and forward to the West!

Five people—my friend's family—went into a butcher shop in Vienna and suddenly, one after the other, burst out laughing. The customers and salesmen looked at them in astonishment. They did not know that the reason for the nervous langhter had been the eight varieties of salami laid out in the counter window. My wife became a "try-on" maniac. She went from one store to another and, with furious tenacity, tried on dresses, coats, suits, and shoes (without any hope of buying anything, since we had no money).

"I'm drunk from the pleasure of touching these things," Tanya said.

This psychological shock that hits a Soviet person upon his seeing the Western cornucopia can be understood only by people who have grown up on sliced ham and clothing from the Moscow Bolshevichka Factory. Later, more profound and more realistic appraisals of the Western world would come, but our first impressions were bound up with the "store-window syndrome."

AT THE VIENNA AIRPORT we were met by a friend from Moscow. He called me aside and, looking around feverishly, asked: "Where are you headed?"

"Naturally for Israel," I answered.

"Don't do that, no matter what. You'll die."

"I think he's lost his mind," my wife whispered. "Look at his restless eyes."

"I barely managed to get out of Israel. Don't get on the bus, they won't let you go then."

"He does seem to have gone batty," I thought, and said, "We'll get in touch tomorrow."

At Schönau Castle there were about 300 people. Of course, the castle did not exactly prove to be the Hilton, but it was quite tolerable for a transit stop.

Toward evening everyone assembled in the hall. The director of the castle began to teach us a song. The gist of it was roughly as follows: "Israel is our sun, Israel is our happiness, Israel is our joy, Israel is our life."

In half an hour a mighty chorus was shaking the old arches of the castle. My wife and I left inconspicuously. We were becoming confused. Spinning in my head was a song that we had sung in school: "Stalin is our banner, Stalin is our happiness, Stalin is our father." So it is going to be the same thing all over again?

Meanwhile, my friend continued to demand that we change our route and promised to give us the address of a Jewish organization that would help us go to any Western country.

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In short, the next day we announced we were not going to Israel. Our explanation was that my wife was non-Jewish. But that was only the official reason. In fact we were totally indifferent about where to go. And besides, from the emotional standpoint we had a new opportunity to prolong that amazing state of the unknown, what I would call that healthy spirit of adventurism when you wonder with palpitating heart: "Suppose something extraordinary happens." Let me say that nothing special did happen, but the anticipation is always wonderful.

Israeli officials spoke with us and the next day they calmly let us go without any obstacle. Does that mean our friend was exaggerating? Unfortunately, I cannot give an objective assessment of the situation in Israel, primarily because I have not been there.

But I have spoken with many Soviet Jews who have left Israel and have read letters from people living there.

Here is what the wife of a well-known screenwriter in Jerusalem writes (she is the daughter of a prominent Soviet movie director and had a very high living standard in the U.S.S.R.): "I suddenly felt that this country, with its combination of Asian mud and old Biblical stones, is my own, that I am rooting for it and will always live here."

An engineer friend of mine sent me a letter. "During this latest war," he write, "the debates about whom to consider a real Jew quieted down, and people stopped demanding allowances and sinecures. We have unexpectedly discovered in ourselves a sense of a unified nation that must be protected."

This is significant, because in the past I heard the following phrases:

"If you want to become an anti-Semite, go to Israel."

"In the Soviet Union we were called Kikes; in Israel they make fun of us while calling us Russians."

"Let the Jews build their socialism without me. That's not what I went to Israel for." And so on.

No matter what the future of Soviet Jews in Israel brings, I think the greatest difficulties in the absorption of newcomers will come now, when the flow of Soviet Jews is not decreasing, and the possibilities of their needs being met by the government of Israel, which was economically exhausted by the latest war, are extremely limited.

MY WIFE AND I defined the summer of 1972 as our "Roman holiday." As we waited in the Italian capital for our American visas, we could already taste our future conquest of the "Klondike." I told my wife of tremendous things to come: (1) she could continue her professional career as an actress in Hollywood; (2) I, as a professional screenwriter, could write scripts for Stanley Kramer or Otto Preminger; (3) meanwhile, we could start some business like a Russian restaurant, a Russian hotel, or a Russian gas station.

So when the Boeing 747 touched on American soil, we sniffed the sweet scent of our forthcoming millions. However, by the next day it was different.

The New York HIAS service evaluated my education and skills and proposed to me a wide range of jobs, which began with watchman in a New Jersey bakery and ended with ice-cream man on Brighton Beach. I agreed (of course, lots of American

dissent

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millionaires began as shoeshine boys), but here a conflict arose with my wife. She complained that the uniform of a watchman or an ice-cream man would transform my intellectual countenance, and if I took either job she would leave me forever.

The situation became critical. Tanya suggested that she might look for a role in an X-rated movie, while I could go into the narcotics business. It seemed to me that a stretch in an American prison would hardly strengthen our marriage. But here I picked up something. I became a professor at the Berlitz school. Because of its high reputation, I discarded my blue jeans and put on the sober suit of a bank clerk. I have also worked as a lecturer at the State University of New York, but I have yet to see the land of milk and honey here.

What I do see is a surprising similarity between people's lives in Moscow and New York. On the streets, in the subway and on the buses are the same crowds of people with tired eyes, tormented by the endless commuting, driven crazy by the noise and filth of a giant city. And that is human nature: the shock from the abundance of goods and food quickly passes, the good things become ordinary, and the bad things become eyesores. People start to criticize. I do, too, and in this way I assimilate an unfamiliar concept, called "freedom of expression."

On Oct. 6, when the war in the Middle East broke out, I was walking along Fifth Avenue and saw enormous crowds of excited people in front of television screens.

"They're very involved," I thought. "It is war, after all." It turned out that they were following the baseball game between the Reds and the Mets.

Now I wonder whether New Yorkers could tear themselves away from the excitement of a sports event if missiles with atomic warheads were launched at the city.

They say that New York is a city that belongs to a completely different country and that we still have to discover the real America. Okay, we agree to take up this noble task. But where do we get the down payment, mortgage, and lawyer to buy a new Santa Maria? □

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Tzvi Lamm

Zionism: From Realism to Autism

The Price of Losing Touch with Reality

Ever since the Yom Kippur War last year, the Israeli press and magazines have been filled with a lively discussion reviewing the political situation of that country. Some of these articles, such as the one that follows, have been severely critical of the policies pursued by Israel over the past two decades. Tzvi Lamm's article is reprinted here, with permission, from Dispersion and Unity *(#21–22), a journal published in Jerusalem by the World Zionist Organization. It seems remarkable that so caustic a criticism of Israeli policy should have appeared in a magazine sponsored by the Zionist movement.*

We shall be glad to print replies and comments on this article, either from Israeli or American readers. A few minor editorial changes have been made, in order to adapt the text to American standards.—ED.

What happened on Yom Kippur 1973, and is happening today, is not the result of a single or frequent mistake but of a process that began a long time before that day. Over the years, Israeli policy—in this term I include the political policies of the Zionist movement and the *yishuv* [Israel's Jewish population]—has undergone some major changes that can be presented as a threefold metamorphosis.

The first stage of this metamorphosis, during which the foundations of Jewish sovereignty were laid, was governed to a large extent by *political realism,* even though at that time the Zionist idea seemed more like a dream than a practical project with a chance of realization. The chief spokesman for Zionist policy in that stage was Chaim Weizmann.

Two qualities characterized that stage: (1) sticking close to the goals toward which the Zionist movement aimed, and (2) a great deal of sobriety in appraising the power of the Jewish people, in whose name the Zionist movement acted, to oppose the hostile forces that threatened to destroy it.

To adhere to long-range goals, which are complex and difficult to achieve, is not like adhering to simple, short-range goals. Every political movement, including Zionism, translates its goals into slogans. However, even the most successful political slogans are merely the translation of the dynamic aspirations of a collective life into static formulations that freeze these aspirations, and hence slogans age quickly. Faithfulness to goals often requires the leadership to act in opposition to slogans which it once had set itself. In certain situations, devotion to these slogans as a result of the tendency to be doctrinaire constitutes, in practice, abandonment of the goals. Two painful turning points in this period teach us that the Zionist leadership in the era of political realism preserved the vitality of Zionist goals by abandoning its slogans.

One such turning point was the proposal of Uganda and Argentina as an alternative to Eretz Yisrael [the land of Israel]. Zionism

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was born out of the troubles of the Jews and it became a national movement when its most sensitive people realized, while there was still time, that utter collapse was approaching, that there was no hope of living among those nations with whom the Jews then lived. The aspiration to return to the land of our fathers was a product of contemporary troubles and of the seismographic signs that foretold a total breakdown. This too is the origin of the movement of cultural and social rebirth of the nation. First came the troubles, then people cultivated the ideology of a Jewish state in which "our days will be renewed as of old," our culture revived, and creative, original ways of life would arise. When, at a certain point, Zionist leaders believed that they would not be able to liberate the Jews from their troubles by settling them in the land of Israel, they were ready to consider the proposal of Uganda and Argentina without seeing any contradiction to the original Zionist idea. Indeed, Zionism as a movement that arose to answer the needs of the Jews, under whose feet the ground had begun to fall away, saw itself obligated to seek an alternative when its first choice, Eretz Yisrael, fell through, or appeared to have fallen through.

The Uganda question is not properly understood in the standard Zionist interpretation. The majority interpretation views Uganda as an abandonment of the basis of the Zionist movement. But Zionism did not arise in order to *return* to the Jewish people its lost homeland. It arose in order to establish sovereignty, and hence a national home, for Jews without a home. It sought a territory in which sovereignty could be established and in which the Jews could *build* themselves a homeland. Zionism was not a movement of national liberation on the model of such movements in 19th-century Europe or 20th-century Africa and Asia. Rather, it was a rescue movement to save a people in a critical situation by concentrating it within one territory, allowing it to take its political fate in its own hands. It was a movement to sever the Jews from the other nations by establishing Jewish sovereignty. The decision for Eretz Yisrael was certainly not a secondary issue for Zionism, but it also was not the point of origin and the decisive factor in its emergence.

Even in critical situations, the human condition is not one-dimensional. Since the beginning of the era of nationalism in the West, the future of the Jewish people has depended on the possibility of concentrating it in a territory in which it could establish national sovereignty or at least partial self-government. However, not every territory could inspire the Jews to auto-emancipation—only Eretz Yisrael could bring that to the Jews. As soon as the decision was made for Eretz Yisrael, the immediate goal was transferred from saving the Jews from their trouble to the ideological slogan of "redeeming the land." There is no need to explain why it is easier to convert a Jew with the slogan of "redeeming the land" than with the truth lying behind it that the ships are sunk and there is no future for him or his children in the land in which his parents and grandparents lived. The political realism that characterized the leadership of the movement in this period protected it from the temptation to accept the simplistic interpretation of the slogan "redeeming the land." It stuck to its task of redeeming the *people* from its troubles and it generally interpreted the redemption of the land as a *means,* hence not a goal, which should determine its actions.

This realism was also marked in the question of partitioning Eretz Yisrael. Under the pressure of political conditions that could not be eluded, the Zionist leadership preferred to accept a part of the land (one that had continually shrunk from the time of the original promise) in order to absorb and save Jews rather than to remain faithful to slogans that it had coined in regard to the historic rights of the people of Israel to the whole of Eretz Yisrael. Such faithfulness in

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that situation would have endangered what little could be *done* in the part of the land that could be had.

From its beginnings, the Zionist movement has known small groups devoted literally to slogans, but who either did not understand the essence of the slogans or preferred to ignore it. On the basis of the trouble of the Jews and the effort to find a solution, Zionism built a whole ideology, and its main component was the justification of the right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. But despite the slogans, the leadership of the Zionist movement knew how to distinguish between the kernel (the historical necessity) and the chaff (the slogans) and hence how to adjust to partition borders that located the new Jewish State in the traditional regions of the Phoenicians, the Philistines, and the Canaanites, and removed from their area all that part of the land with which the historical memories and emotional responses of the Jewish people were connected. All this just goes to show that Zionism was meant from its beginning to establish a "national home" that would sever the Jews, to whatever extent, from the nations in whose midst their conditions in modern times had become a horror.

There are two aspects to the degeneration of ideology. One begins with holding on to petrified slogans and thus losing contact with living reality. The other begins with burdening empty slogans with new contents that contradict the spirit of the original contents. Both tendencies have affected the Zionist ideology since the establishment of the State.

Marginal groupings, which understood Zionism according to its slogans and not according to its essence as a *rescue* movement, began creating the myth of a land waiting for its sons and liberators in imitation of the other national movements in the world. But in reality it was not the land of Israel that needed to be liberated but the people of Israel, whose chances of continued existence had been shrinking to the danger point. The Zionist movement thought that this danger could be circumvented or partially prevented by *settling* Eretz Yisrael.

It would be naive to claim that before the establishment of the State the Zionist leadership followed a perfectly realistic policy, with every section deriving from a rational weighing of possibilities. In that political realm most fatal to our people and its sovereignty in the land, Jewish leadership, since the beginning of the British mandate, has not always made far-sighted and reality-tested decisions. This vital political field is, of course, our relation to the Arabs both within and outside our borders. The presence of a third force in Eretz Yisrael—the British—was a temptation that the Zionist leadership could not always brush aside. It was an enticement to play the game of two against one. But although the Zionist leadership played this dangerous game even before the establishment of the State, it did not neglect the Arab problem as a determining factor in policy-making.

Each period in the history of Zionist politics knew its own battles. The wars of the period of political realism were the riots of 1936–39 and the War of Independence [May 14–June 11, 1948]. In both battles a dual approach to the Arab problem still prevailed in Zionist policy. From the beginning of settlement in Eretz Yisrael, it was clear that our strength was a factor in our security. That was the idea of the "wall" that the settlers and the national institutions took care to construct and to fortify. The arming of *Hashomer* and the *Haganah* [Jewish self-defense organizations] and the placement of new settlements according to strategic considerations were part of the building of the wall. But along with the building of fortifications there was also a recognition that without an agreement, without talks, without finding a *modus vivendi* with the Arabs, our existence in this land and in this region of the world was not assured. This motif of the "bridge" to the Arabs counterbalances the motif of the "wall" of defense against the Arabs. Anyone who seeks proof for the presence of this

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motif in the pioneer period should examine the speeches of members of *Hashomer,* the protocols of the Zionist Congresses, and the words of the leaders of the pioneer movements.

The realism of the policy-making in this period was reflected in the loyalty to these two motifs. Past experience has taught the Jews that without self-defense, not only is their existence insecure, but of necessity their relations with their surroundings are distorted. The very normalization of the situation by advancing their sovereignty required the Jews to be ready to defend themselves. On the other hand, a sophisticated perception of the problems in our region has taught us that by the sword alone we will not be able to stand.

This approach was fully embodied in the idea of *havlaga* (self-restraint), which became the strategy of the first years of the 1936–39 riots. The basis of this strategy was founded on the recognition that ultimately we must live with the Arabs, and that we should do everything in our power to see that an hour's landslide does not turn into a permanent collapse, that the blockage of bridges does not turn into the burning of bridges. This principle was evident even in the beginning of the War of Independence. The *yishuv* [Jewish population of Israel] and its leadership were ready to pay a high price to reach a settlement, even if it was only a modest or partial one. This was a difficult path, which was not always accepted with understanding from within and entailed a real danger from without; yet the recognition that only an agreed settlement acceptable to the Arabs would make it possible for us to hold on to the land, no less than our diligent effort to prepare ourselves for war, gave expression to the realistic basis of Zionist policy in this period.

The political realism of the pioneering period began to disintegrate after the establishment of the State, and it left the way open to the feelings of autism and ethnocentrism that influenced the policy of the State of Israel in the early years of independence. The autism expressed itself in the belief, prevalent among the people and the leadership, that in the very existence of the State most of the problems that had first evoked Zionism were solved. The ethnocentrism was reflected in the expansion of the national ego, the perception of the needs of our people and our state as the sole perspective from which to determine the goals of state policy without regard to the needs of the other side involved in the dispute. The architect of this viewpoint was David Ben-Gurion. There is no doubt that his political intuition was sharp in all matters pertaining to accepting the partition plan and declaring the establishment of the State. In these matters Ben-Gurion was the loyal executor of the original Zionist spirit. Even after independence, the theory of the State which he advocated was derived from the assumptions of classical Zionism, according to which the state is the means and the instrument for releasing the Jews from their straits.

But along with this, since the establishment of the State, Ben-Gurion had begun to divert the Zionist policy from its realistic basis to something messianic, something cut off from reality. He was the one who taught: "It does not matter what the *goyim* (nations) say, it is what the Jews do." This slogan sounds thoroughly Zionist. Even before the first Zionist Congress, Leo Pinsker summarized the essence of Zionism as auto-emancipation, as self-liberation. But the meaning of these slogans has been ripped out of context, out of the climate in which they grew. In Ben-Gurion's era this slogan summarized the ethnocentric orientation. The idea of a bridge, of talks and compromises with the Arabs, became increasingly limited and the idea of the "wall" received a new interpretation: "Offense is the best defense." There is no doubt that in purely strategic terms the principle of offense is the best defense. But strategy without political goals is meaningless. In

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a case like ours where the fact of our existence as a state raises suspicions about our intentions to expand, any offense that strengthens such suspicions jeopardizes the chances for peace and turns tense relations into a full-scale siege. Offense as a means of defense is likely to assure our security in the short run, but it necessarily prevents peace, which is the only means to guarantee Israel's security in the long run. But in a climate of autistic, ethnocentric short-sightedness the question of "a bridge" has been neglected even though it is vital for the peace of the State. National narcissism prevents one from having a sophisticated understanding of the condition of the State relative to the world. Without that kind of understanding, policy-making makes no sense.

This kind of narcissism characterized the foreign policy of Israel during the whole period of Ben-Gurion's leadership, even though Ben-Gurion himself was undoubtedly a realistic statesman. This is because considerations from another field led him to support the messianic atmosphere that prevailed. In the absence of clear orientation, one becomes an opportunist. The Sinai Campaign [Oct. 29–Nov. 5, 1956] and the Six-Day War [June 5–10, 1967] are wars that represent this period and in them the policies of the period are represented. The Sinai Campaign was a political act into which we were drawn by the attraction of a "big opportunity," though it was a dubious proposition from the very beginning. When two "have-been" powers, whose plumes had been plucked and who had been frustrated by the loss of their empires made a final last ditch effort, a final convulsive attack to regain their influence, the State of Israel joined in without any consideration for the future or for the present reality. It is doubtful that any serious statesman in 1957 would have believed that England and France could get back their hold on the Middle East, but the helmsmen of the State of Israel hurried to jump on the sinking ship of these declining empires—although it was obvious that if we are to continue to exist in this region it depends on a reconstruction of our relationship with Egypt. The politics manifest in the Sinai Campaign of being drawn along, of lacking direction, derives from a process begun earlier in Zionist politics. The army and its military power took the place that should have been reserved for political action. The politics of hiring out our sword took the place of the politics of the pursuit of a peace settlement. Since then, Israeli policy has been deteriorating to the point where the present political line barely deserves the term "policy."

Now the feeling has taken root that the army and the state are values in themselves. The status of the *yishuv* and the *Haganah* in their own time was merely instrumental. The first was a base for absorbing immigrants and the second for the defense of that base. They were tools in the hands of a policy designed to facilitate the realization of Zionism. But, since the state now is a value in itself, it has become its own *raison d'être*. This is also the case with the army, and the Sinai Campaign has made that very tangible.

The Sinai Campaign advanced two dangers to our existence, which came to fruition in the Yom Kippur War [October 1973]: (1) the unity of the Arabs against us, and (2) the globalization of the dispute between the Arabs and ourselves. Again, the ethnocentric atmosphere prevented many from understanding that the suspicions of the Arabs, both the masses and the cabal of colonels who along with Nasser established the regime in Egypt, were reinforced and reaffirmed by the conspiracy of the Suez War in which we took such a major part. Of course, no one has the power to assure us that the development of events would have been different if it had not been for the Sinai Campaign. But in the same way, no one can deny that the Sinai Campaign speeded up the process and, much worse, prevented Israel from following an alternative policy to offset the dangers inherent in these developments.

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Again it was a short-sighted enthnocentrism that kept many from understanding the significance of the Soviet and American intervention in the region since the Sinai Campaign. Perhaps they were destined to understand it only when the dispute became a subject for global politics during the Yom Kippur War, which has effectively canceled out most of Israel's room to maneuver. And here we mean room to maneuver in a war for our survival.

The *ex post facto* justification of the Sinai Campaign—i.e., to eliminate the fedayeen activities in Gaza and to open the Straits of Tiran—must be judged in relation to the other results of the war and the possible results of an alternative policy. Terrorism was eliminated for a short period, but it broke out again later, with immeasurably greater force. It turns out that even terrorism, which is nurtured by the suffering of the refugees and supported by powerful political forces, cannot be defeated by force. The same is true for our right to free passage from Eilat. In a region of tens of neighboring Arab states, the only way to guarantee the passage of our vessels is to make a settlement with those states. On the historical plane, there is no point in thinking in terms of "what if." Nevertheless, it is hard to refrain from thinking what our political situation would be today if Israel had announced in those days that it recognizes the right of Egypt to nationalize the canal, that Israel demands the right of free passage through the canal and promises to remain neutral should Egypt be attacked by a power trying to take control over the canal away from Egypt. No one can deny offhand the possibility that, in the situation of 1956, this kind of Israeli stance could have brought terrorism to a halt and opened the Straits, and could have served as a first step in calling for a settlement.

The Six-Day War marks a transition to the present stage in Israeli policy. This war, unlike the Sinai Campaign, was not the product of the political initiative of Israel, but it would be hard to say that Israeli policy since the establishment of the State did much to prevent it. At first sight, it seemed that this war substantiated the assumptions on which Israeli policy was based. The military victory proved to many that the defense of the state depends on its military prowess alone. By looking at the problems a few weeks after the Six-Day War, we discover an enlightening phenomenon: Zionist ideology, which from the very beginning guided Zionist activity, regressed into the language of a power ideology.

In reading the journalism of the Six-Day War period and the speeches of the leaders, one suddenly learns that the destiny of Zionism was the liberation of the homeland and that the conquering of territories was a goal in and of itself. The term "liberated territories," which was coined at that time, symbolizes the prevailing autism, the severance from reality, which overtook Zionist policy. Autism is the rejection of actual reality and its replacement by a reality that is a product of wish-fulfillment. The capture of these lands aroused from slumber a deep, sincere, emotional response to the historical events that had once taken place in them: the graves of our patriarchs and matriarchs, paths along which the prophets once trod, hills for which the kings fought. But feelings cut off from present reality do not serve as a faithful guideline to policy. This break with reality did not necessarily blind men to the fact that the territories were populated by Arabs, but it kept them from understanding that our settlement and taking possession of the territories would turn our existence as a state into a powerful pressure that would unite the Arab world and aggravate our insecure situation, in a way previously unknown in our history. But, in the eyes of an autistic individual, everthing seems to depend only on his own will.

The Israelis argued about demography, about encouraging the emigration of the Arabs from the land, about keeping Israeli

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citizenship from the Arabs who would remain in the "territories," about rebuilding the Temple, about everthing. About peace? Some posed a formulation: in exchange for peace we would grant the Arabs—peace. A policy of positions of strength, which the Zionist movement had rejected and the State had been careful to avoid for most of its existence, became the guideline and won the justification of statesmen, writers, thinkers, and journalists. A heavy autistic fog enwrapped the Israeli public and Israeli policy, and this fog characterized the period between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War. The political step which characterized this period is the establishment of a national coalition.

From the beginning, this was a government of "no policy." The government of Levi Eshkol, which preceded the grand coalition, tried to retain a little of the political realism still present in the period of ethnocentrism, or perhaps it even tried to do more, to reinforce the weakened realistic elements in Israeli policy. The establishment of a government of the grand coalition put an end to that attempt. The national coalition government determined several developments in Israeli policy. The most decisive of them was the transition from an ideological leadership to a business-minded leadership, a trend that had already begun in the period of Ben-Gurion and that flourished in a government of epigones; it was a government of men who carried things out but lacked someone to tell them what to do.

In this situation the coalition government was a convenient solution for all. The nation that lives in a dream world is happy to see the end of public political debate. The Labor party (or the Alignment), lacking an orientation, was happy: in establishing a coalition government it no longer had to worry that its opponents would force a definition of its positions. Most important, Gahal [liberal-right party] could now approach the position of leadership not just as a plain partner in a coalition, but as a real political force whose slogans and goals had been adopted by the elder partner in the coalition, the Labor party.

The breakup of the coalition does not refute this analysis but, rather, clarifies it. The decision to disengage was convenient for both of these major parties in the government. The Labor party considered it a waste to share with Gahal the fruits of prosperity in this rosy period of autism. Gahal thought —apparently mistakenly—that the dream world the people saw testified to a radicalization toward the Right, so that Gahal could take power by itself, or at least could increase its strength. The Labor party, lacking orientation, did not want to deal with Gahal's viewpoint and for the same reason it could not deal with outside causes: neither with the Arab states for peace nor with the United States against political dictation. The acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242 by the Labor party, over which Gahal left the national coalition government, was just as much a reflection of real inertia as was the sitting on the territories without any political initiative during the coalition period. The purchase of armaments became a substitute for foreign policy; concepts like "strategic depth" and "warning time" became political terms and the economic profits of those who became rich after the war and the conquest seemed to guarantee political stability.

In this atmosphere, the Yom Kippur War was a surprise—not a military surprise, as they try to present it now, but a blow to the minds of a public doped with empty slogans, living in a fog, and avoiding reality.

The identifying mark *par excellence* of this period is the almost complete deterioration of the concept of peace. Everyone spoke in the name of peace. Our desire for peace turned into an axiom that no longer needed to be proven. We heard that our Jewish settlement in Hebron was a guaranty for peace, that only with an Israeli regime in the "territories" could there be peace in the region,

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and that in practice we already had achieved peace. To the basic political question of what we were willing to give up in exchange for peace, no one had an answer, neither the government nor public opinion. Somehow, a magical belief prevailed that time was working in our favor, even though for many years we had known that our national movement arrived late and that it awakened, and, unfortunately, sped up the development of the Arab national movement—in short, that time works against us. The short moratorium we enjoyed by virtue of the difference in the level of organization between Israel and the Arab states was wasted during the six years of no policy that was the spirit of the coalition government.

The perception of the Yom Kippur War as a surprise testifies to the severance from reality of those who present it thus. The War of Independence did not surprise anyone, and the Six-Day War did not surprise us. Was there really no sign that the Yom Kippur War was coming? I don't mean intelligence evidence, which is only a function of a prior conception, but political evidence, according to which a basic conception is formed.

In the Six-Day War the borders of Israel spread to territories that had previously belonged to the areas of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In political terms that is the conquest of territory. Since the end of World War II, conquests have lost the legitimacy they had held over a long period in history. The war against Nazi Germany was at least partially a war against the legitimacy of rule by the power of conquest. Many countries in Africa and Asia were liberated from colonial rule without a shot being fired, merely by the power of the principle that military conquest must be negated. Even the Soviet Union, which does not usually detest cynicism in its political actions, had to cover up its conquest of Czechoslovakia by setting up a seemingly independent Czechoslovak government. The friends of Israel, including even the United States, could not, in the present political climate, refrain from attaching to their declarations of support for Israel a statement condemning military conquest. No one needed intelligence information to know that should war break out, even if initiated by the Arab states, its purpose would be to return to the territories that we conquered and that the majority of the nations of the world would call us "aggressors," or, at best, "the cause of the war," and hence unworthy of help.

This and more: for many years we have demanded of the Arab world that it recognize an Israeli entity as an entity historically, emotionally, and actually tied to Eretz Yisrael. We also announced after the Six-Day War that we did not recognize the rights of a Palestinian entity. We never thought that those who stood on our side during and after our struggle to establish the State would consider it improper to ignore the fact that another group of human beings defined itself as a nation and demanded for itself the "natural right" to a state. Did we need an intelligence investigation in order to know that the problem of Arab refugees was a powder keg that would explode one day and leave Israel isolated on the international scene?

Many, many facts have become piercingly obvious since the Six-Day War, but the prevailing autism prevented us from taking notice. The war against terrorism, for example, was very difficult and forced the government to walk a thin tightrope in taking steps acceptable by world public opinion (such as the attack on Beirut airport, the forced landing of the Lebanese plane, the attacks on terrorists in foreign countries). Nevertheless, the achievements in this war were remarkable: terrorism did not gain a foothold in the territories, the Israeli civilian airline suffered less than several other airlines of nations not involved in the dispute. Such achievements, on top of the victory in the Six Day War and the War of Attrition, influenced public opinion and strengthened the prevailing view that power, military initiative, and original army operations were an answer to everything.

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The war with terrorism also revealed certain phenomena that served as "writing on the wall" for the future. The countries in which the Palestinian terrorists worked pretended not to see them; terrorists were caught and quickly freed, even if they had done terrible things. Nations not involved in the dispute, in whose political territory the terrorists were active, preferred to ignore the open support given the terrorists by the Arab states, their fellow-members in the U.N. Should this not have forewarned us about the international political situation in which we have found ourselves since the Yom Kippur War (a situation more serious and more disturbing, relative to our future, than the fact that the Egyptian Second Army and the remains of the Third Army are sitting on the eastern side of the canal)?

In order to see the widespread autism that dominated Israeli public opinion, compare the number of voices of statesmen, party leaders, and commentators who warned us about this kind of political development with the number of voices that quieted us and assured us that we were "sitting on the best possible borders." In order to see how this atmosphere came to dominate this state, one must try to trace what has happened in the field of ideology.

Almost everything in the ideological vocabulary of Zionism has undergone an erosion of meaning and value. That is what has happened to *chalutziut* (pioneer settlement), Hebrew labor, defense, cultural renewal, the idea of the uniqueness of our people, and many other notions. Let us review the transformation of one of these ideas. In the era of pioneering Zionism, a period of political realism, all of Zionist ideology was concentrated in the idea of *settling the land*. The emotional associations of this concept match the aspirations of the settlers to renew the life of the people as of old: as the tribes of Israel in the time of Joshua settled the land, so the scattered of Israel will settle it in the modern period. The political-practical significance of "settling the land" is the conquest (by settlement) of one point after another of the homeland. This conquest was not military and this fact was, in its time, a sign of the uniqueness of Zionism, a source of pride of Zionists. It also corresponded to the limits of the meager power of the Zionist movement. But this settlement of land was considered both by the settlers and the whole Zionist movement not only as the establishment of political facts but as the daring creation of a new social, cultural, and national framework for life—a life that no one could define once and for all. The daring aspect of settling the land was that each group saw itself as realizing now, in the present, the desired future goal. It was a framework designed to renew the culture of the nation, to change its social and employment structure, and even to alter its position as a nation in the world. Self-defense, which was an integral part of settling the land, was not only a reaction to the presence of thieves and bandits, or to the appearance of pogromists supported by political forces in the area, but an expression of the change in values that had occurred in the Jewish people following its decision to seek national sovereignty.

For a long period, settling the land was the essence of Zionism, and Zionism was wholly the settling of the land. There is nothing in one that was not in the other. Anyone who did not approve of settling the land stood outside of Zionism, even if he swore up and down in the name of Zionism. It is difficult to determine whether the political realism of the period derived from the realities of life in those scattered settlements in Israel, which stood face to face with the problem of establishing Jewish sovereignty, or whether the settlers learned from a practical, realistic Zionist ideology to stay away from talk and to concentrate on stubborn, difficult, day-to-day activity, and hence not be tempted by easy answers.

The erosion of the meaning of "settling the land" began with the establishment of

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the State. At that time a barren attempt was made to preserve the outer shell of *chalutziut* without its inner content. They called it "state *chalutziut.*" This *chalutziut* was not like the original, yet to a certain extent it corresponded to the changed reality, even though the idea itself was a manifestation of the prevailing autistic severance from reality.

But however strongly this erosion of values had affected the idea of settling the land in this early period of the State, it was nothing compared to what happened to the idea after the Six-Day War. After the tanks of Tzahal, after the border-guard units and the military administration came the groups and individuals who settled Kiryat Arba (the Jewish enclave in Hebron), Pitchat Rafiach, the Jordan Valley, and the Golan Heights. In line with the best colonial tradition, the settlers inherited, with all the legal sanctions, the land that was taken from the natives, and the settlers needed the protection of soldiers against the expropriated owners and against their neighbors who feared lest their lands also be expropriated when their turn came. These settlers did not come to establish sovereignty for a people without sovereignty, but "to liberate the land of our fathers from foreigners." The concept of homeland was expanded for the purposes of settlement. Even "settling the land" in Sinai was termed as liberating the homeland. This settlement policy cannot be justified even as a "wall" of defense for the interior, because, when the Yom Kippur War broke out, the settlements in the Golan Heights had to be evacuated. Even though this "settling of the land" has nothing in common with the settlement of Hanita or Kfar Yecheskel in old Israel, the associations from the past have crowned this colonization with the title *chalutziut.* The song writer who saw in the settlement in the Sinai a remembrance of the "old Eretz Yisrael" did not sense the distortion. "State *chalutziut*" has been transformed into *chalutziut à la* South Africa and Rhodesia.

Zionism in the period of realism knew that it was a movement of a remnant seeking refuge, of a decimated nation weakened by the Holocaust. It came about as a gathering together of exiles from various cultures whose only common characteristic was the anomaly of their social structure, a bridgehead seeking a place in the sands, in the rocks, and in the swamps of a little land whose political problems were complicated, a community surrounded by states who found it hard to adjust to the existence of a foreign body in its midst. The policy of the six years of fog preferred to ignore these harsh facts.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me state that no policy, no matter how realistic, can guarantee that the aims of the Zionist movement will be realized, that we will achieve a secure existence in this land, that the Arabs will make peace with the fact that we exist. The forces opposing us are seeking to destroy us: the moderates, politically, and the extremists, physically. Anyone who does not admit this and who does not base his view of the required political policy on that assumption is nothing but a dreamer —albeit dreaming a different dream from that which was planted in the mind of the people by the leadership over the last six years of autism. But along with this assumption there is another, which should not be ignored: *the problem of our existence in this region will not be solved by force.* Force is an element in our defense, but our security depends on a settlement and an agreement with those who today are our enemies, that is, it depends on making peace with them. If a settlement like this is impossible, then we have little chance of continuing to exist in this land. In comparison with the forces that we can muster, the potential military, political, and economic forces of our opponents—and this is a truth that no one disputes—are beyond all measure. In the early stages of our settlement in this land there was no alternative but to use force, and perhaps we will need it again in the future. But today, when the strength of our enemies may rise

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above our own, the use of force becomes a nightmare.

The time has come to abandon the deceptive notion that we are a "power" in the region and the overbearing self-righteousness of our "historical rights" to the land, to stop being dragged opportunistically after transitory advantages of circumstance, and to return to realistic political thinking. The historical connection of the Jews to this land is undoubtedly a political factor, but its weight must be judged against other political factors functioning in our region: especially the feelings (no less historical) embodied in Arab nationalism, the competition between the Western and the Communist blocs, the specific weight of the Third World (to which the Arabs belong), the power of oil in the lands of the Arabs, and so on. If we are lucky, we have not yet spoiled the chance to return to the situation of a society living with reality, fighting for its existence, and directed by leaders who dare to stand before it with a political position, which is to say neither a prophetic vision nor a policy of reacting to each event as it comes. □

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Georg Mann

The Real Secrets of Science

Some 55,000 people in the federal government now earn at least part of their pay by practicing intellectual birth control as they stamp "confidential" on stacks of documents. And 3,000 superior civil servants are active abortionists of ideas, stamping "top secret" on papers they so designate.

These figures come from Congressman William S. Moorhead (D–Pa.), who has introduced a bill to make some sense out of the way federal employees make secret mountains out of factual molehills. Moorhead is the last in a series of congressional libertarians who have picked up a lance against the obscurantist windmills of government classifiers.

So far they have won few lasting victories, in spite of President Nixon's order early in 1972 to declassify some vital and many not-so-vital government secrets of World War II. But Moorhead has at least managed to give some clues as to the cost of this federally prescribed ignorance, although the total expenditures for keeping the American public stupid are still not known. At his request, the Government Accounting Office asked the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the State Department how much money they spent safeguarding, transmitting, and classifying documents, as well as investigating personnel. The response from the agencies totaled some $126 million a year and these figures were admittedly inadequate. Defense and the AEC reported no costs on management and policy, and only State gave a figure on administration. The data, as the GAO admitted, were really not indicative of the true total costs of classification. And some cost estimates were impossible to develop. Moreover, these figures do not include the added bills for secret-keeping that come from government contractors. One of these spent $400,000 for the secret-storing of metal scrap from airplanes. The hush-hush alloy absorbed radar waves, and its composition had been publicly known for a number of years.

Among the classified secrets of the federal government have been figures on government purchases of toilet paper, long winter underwear, and paper clips, shark attacks on sailors in New York harbor in 1916, and a special bow and arrow developed for jungle warfare during World War II. And there have been reports that, until stopped, government officials were attempting to classify newspaper clippings —a new bench mark in human folly.

However, the American public can sleep more comfortably, if poorer, knowing that in addition to rubber stamps labeled "confidential," "secret," and "top secret," ingenious officials have invented 63 more terms for secrecy. As Congressmen Moorhead points out, Congress in its 1966 Freedom of Information Law established only nine categories of privileged information that government agencies might withhold from the public, including issues of national security and trade secrets. Among the new terms are the SPECAT of the Defense Department and the revealing CRYPTO of Transportation. And never ask

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what is hidden behind stamped documents marked with LIMDIS, ATOMAL, NODIS and NOFORM. Hundreds of agencies apparently rate themselves internally on their ability to hide knowledge. At one point there was even a debate as to whether the Migratory Bird Commission should be given the right to stamp documents with the three magic words—"confidential," "secret," and "top secret."

How much remains hidden? The people who know don't dare tell. The National Archives alone are estimated to include 470 million pages of classified material, including 160 million pages of World War II secrets, whose contents have lost some of their novelty by now. As long ago as 1960, Congressman John E. Moss (D–Cal.), who preceeded Moorhead in the assault on secrecy, talked of a million cubic feet of classified government documents. Some experts have estimated 100,000 file drawers and 2 million separate classified documents in the Pentagon alone. And one estimate suggests that the Pentagon itself could be filled to overflowing twice over with the documents it has classified. Recently William G. Florence, former deputy assistant for Security in the Air Force, estimated that the Pentagon is sitting on 20 million documents, and 99.5 percent of them could be made public without endangering national security.

BURIED in all these government secrets is material of all kinds, involving politics and international relations as well as science and technology. Some of the former may be essential to keep secret, but the results of science and technology are widely overclassified, mostly by officials, one suspects, whose only qualification was a complete lack of a sense of the ridiculous.

A few years ago David B. Tyler pointed out that among the classified findings of science were such data "as are found in the first edition of *Kirkes' Physiology* (1848) and the *Handbook of Physics and Chemistry* (1914)." Eugene Rabinowitch has recalled the case of a scientist reprimanded in Washington for having published a physical constant in nuclear weapons research that was still classified as secret. The scientist pointed out that this measurement had already appeared in the widely distributed, official Smyth Report on the atomic bomb. "Yes," retorted the security officer, but that was in pounds per square inch, while you give the figures in kilograms per square centimenter. Why make it easier for the Russians?"

Harold Urey testified in the late 1950s that many of the essential classified scientific facts about the H-bomb could be found in any library. And Donald J. Hughes told a government hearing that one secret reaction in producing nuclear fusion—still classified in the United States—had already been published in a British journal by a scientist without any connection with the H-bomb program.

In hiding facts, the security officers look as intelligent as the courtiers of King Canute sweeping back the sea. Even more startling perhaps than the obliterating of known facts are those instances where the classifiers have necromancer-like ability to control human memory. Charles G. Wilber, of Kent State, turned in a research report when he was working for the Chemical Corps. Later, after leaving government service, he asked to see a copy of his report—and was told it would take a special dispensation for him to see a copy of his own research.

Trevor Gardner, former assistant secretary to the Air Force, tells of an unnamed scientist whose security clearances had been lifted. Nevertheless, according to Gardner, this stubborn individual had "such inventive ability that he keeps coming up with 'secret' and 'top secret' ideas," applicable to weaponry. Gardner added, "as soon as he gets some interesting results he no longer has access to them." But supported by an unclassified Air Force contract, the scientist keeps on, and, as Gardner commented, "We can't seem to classify his head."

A more recent attempt at amputating the mind, only partially successful, took place in 1968, when the AEC set up regulations providing that if a scientist working outside the AEC and without access to classified information developed something of interest to the classified program, his findings would be permanently classified and removed beyond his use. A compromise resulted, but with the decision still up to the AEC.

A different approach toward embargoing the intellect turned up in 1969, with the discovery of a blacklist that prevented more than 100 scientists from serving on advisory panels

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of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The blacklists began some 17 years before, during the McCarthy period, and apparently were compiled by lower-echelon bureaucrats without the knowledge of the Secretary. Thus the government was deprived of the abilities of many distinguished scientists (one was a Nobelist), and the scientists, in turn, were deprived of the interchange of knowledge to further their own research—one of the main benefits to serving on a panel. What secrets were preserved by creating a blacklist in HEW has not yet been determined.

Although the blacklisting presumably has ended, there is no public indication that those responsible for creating these lists were ever punished or reprimanded. In fact, all the governmental specialists in the termination of intellectual pregnancy are supremely safe. During the past five years there have been some 2,500 cases in which federal employees have been punished for security leaks—and not one where such an employee has been penalized for overclassifying material, no matter how silly his activities made the entire federal security program look.

The government classifiers have not only worked overtime in keeping scientific secrets and warding off the intrusion of "security risks," they have been even more indefatigable in trying to keep the American public ignorant of these aspects of science and technology that have directly affected the public welfare. During the early days of A-bomb testing, while the twinkling Geiger counters signaled the increase in radiation hazards in every laboratory across the country, the government insisted there was no danger from the stepped-up radiation levels. When considerable crop damage occurred near the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, government officials for five years blithely sat on the reasons for the injury to plants, before getting around to telling the public what had happened. As Congressman Moss said at the time, "The Army had again been caught in one of the Pentagon's favorite pastimes—marking 'secret' or 'confidential' or even 'top secret' some bits of information that would be embarrassing or bothersome or merely untimely if disseminated to the public."

A few years later there were reports of mysterious ailments and even deaths affecting some 6,000 sheep near the Dugway Proving Ground near Salt Lake City. While federal agencies remained stubbornly silent, Philip M. Boffey pieced together reports from several sources adding up to conclusive proof that nerve gases emanating from Dugway were affecting the sheep. The Pentagon promptly denied that escaping nerve gases were responsible, paid one rancher almost $400,000 for damage to his animals, and then tightened regulations for the testing of lethal chemicals.

For sheer hysteria aimed at walling off the American public from the discussion of a relevant scientific issue, nothing—one hopes—will ever equal the efforts of government agencies to squelch any reference to the possibility of an H-bomb during the early 1950s. Complete documentation of all these efforts would require compiling a small book and a low level of risibility. Let one example suffice. There was the solemn destruction of 3,000 copies of an issue of *Scientific American* by a special officer of the AEC who also supervised the destruction of the plates. At issue was an article by Hans Bethe on the H-bomb, which, according to reports, largely consisted of well-known statements of scientific fact, expressions of Bethe's opinions already reported in the media, and other data in the public domain.

THE PROCESS of removing knowledge from the free civilian world to the files behind the barriers of classified knowledge continues. In 1965, a NASA advisory committee presented plans for a space-mapping aerial camera designed to improve the base maps of the U.S. Almost as soon as it was proposed, the design of the camera vanished behind the walls of classification, and shortly thereafter, the entire field of mapping from space became classified. In the meantime, in spite of the secrecy, the Soviets are orbiting their own cameras, apparently succeeding reasonably well in their mapping.

If the blacklist in HEW demonstrates that serious national security is not really the motivation for government secrecy in science, the recent fuss over the application of the Freedom of Information Act is added proof. The Act itself was passed by Congress several years ago, after a gestation period of 11 years. It was a mild enough document, specifying that except for nine different categories of information, government agencies should willingly respond to requests from citizens. Most agencies—

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with the notable exception of the Environmental Protection Agency—have become masters of avoiding direct answers. They neglect to answer inquiries for months, then tell the unfortunate inquirer that his question is too general, would he please be more specific. Or they will plead the cost of looking up the information, which apparently is disposed of in the most inaccessible manner possible. One typical example came from the Food and Drug Administration (one of the most industrious proponents of secrecy) in response to an inquiry concerning the safety of various food additives. After sitting on the letter for a year, FDA asked the writer to be more specific in his request. The writer then asked about the safety of sodium nitrite, widely used in preserving meat and fish. This time the reply said the possibly poisonous effect of sodium nitrite was a "trade secret," and there the matter rested. Recent testimony before hearings on the safety of food additives, incidentally, have incriminated sodium nitrite as a potential cause of cancer.

The costs of looking up information are also used as a roadblock to disseminating knowledge. A housewife who asked for data about birth-control pills was told that it would cost her more than $12,000 just to find the material, plus a copying charge of 25¢ a page. With a filing system so cumbersome, it would seem that any system of stamping "top secret" on documents would be superfluous.

The information can be pried out, but not in time for a newspaper or newscast deadline. As an aide to Congressman Moorhead told *Science*, "If an applicant appeals to the director of the agency and shows willingness to go to court, he will generally get his information." It can take as much as two years before such a case is heard in court, to make the FDA or an equally close-mouthed Department of Agriculture disgorge information to taxpayers. Fortunately, both interested corporations and consumer groups have won some major victories. The latter forced the disgorging of the Garwin report on the impact of the SST, and data concerning the environment impact of the Cannikin nuclear bomb tests in Alaska.

The EPA, on the other hand, has shown a praiseworthy effort to respond to inquiries of a scientific and technological nature, particularly on the hazards of various pesticides. Part of this cooperative attitude can be attributed to the growing strength of both the conservationist and the consumer movements. The conservationists are increasingly vocal. The consumerists are perfectly aware that the federal government has perhaps the largest serious collection of data on the performance of thousands of products, ranging from hearing aids to gasoline. And the government is coy about releasing these figures, no matter how beneficial the facts would be to the taxpayers who have paid for the results. Industry knows the facts, the consumers don't.

Not only is keeping secrets expensive for the government, abolishing them is almost equally so. How many secrets are being kept because setting up the bureaucratic structure to review them is too expensive for current budgets? Nobody knows. □

Paul M. Fitz Simmons and
Kenneth Manley

Is It Worth It, Really?

No one ever looks at the enforced return of an escaped convict from the economic point of view. No, it is always the usual outburst of fear, indignation, thirst for vengeance.

An individual may have spent five, ten, even fifteen years in a prison with an exceptional institutional record of good behavior, may be a hard worker, an amiable person, respected by his fellow prisoners and the administration. He may have been considered trustworthy, even have achieved "minimum security" status. Then he escapes! And his past institutional record of good conduct is wiped out in an instant. His past life and crime is

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paraded anew before the public, and the model inmate is transformed into a dangerous animal, to be hunted down and captured at all costs. Stalk him with stealth and caution; shoot him, cage him like a wild beast—*but bring him back!*

If prison served any purpose at all, this man ought to have been on the way to rehabilitation; for isn't it the supposed basic tenet of imprisonment to return the man to society with a better mental outlook?

Immediately upon the prisoner's escape the prison authorities negate their whole philosophy, denying all they have allegedly done for the man, bent blindly on recapturing him.

The greatest loss to any man is the loss of his freedom and of the opportunity to make the meaningful decisions concerning his future. Since time immemorial man yearns to be free. Any imprisoned animal, which supposedly cannot even rationalize, will leave the sty, the pasture, or the corral if the bars are left down. Why then is it so amazing and frightening to people that a thinking human being will grasp freedom if given the opportunity?

Though it cannot be freely talked about in the informer-infested society of prisons, escape is uppermost in most of the men's minds. There isn't a man in any prison who hasn't hoped, wished, yes, prayed to be free.

There are the dreamers who use the many avenues of mental escape, aside from the thought of "going over the wall." There are the men who reminisce about the past, the good times—and there is the dreamer who lays plans for the future, mapping out each step until it is implanted in his mind and he foresees each future move and response down to the last detail. And there is the "escapist" who is constantly reading all types of literature; or the man who drowns himself in work or a hobby, or plays all sorts of sports—in short, the man who concentrates his energy on a particular thing to the degree that makes him forget where he actually is. After a time this man can no longer grasp reality and becomes submerged in what he is doing—something other than "doing time." The dream has taken over the dreamer, and for all purposes this man has escaped from his prison environment—even though his physical self is still surrounded by the same old cold and impersonal steel and concrete.

Then there is the "doer," who can no longer gain satisfaction and sublimation from dreams; he must physically escape the confining boundaries of the prison. He must escape! The urgency to be free becomes so strong that it hurts. He plans to go over the wall in daring, life-risking, hair-brained schemes; he spends long laborious hours tunneling under the wall—or hiding out within the walls hoping not to be missed at a count and so to have a chance at the wall. The ingenuous plans boggle the imagination; unfortunately they usually fail through chance or misfortune. A guard will look through a peephole that is rarely used; voices will be heard where none are expected; a pole that is to be used to get over the wall will not have been wiped carefully enough and proves too greasy to climb hand over hand—and so the scheme collapses.

Escapes from inside the wall are rare, though attempts will always be made. As long as men are locked away, some will try to be free. To beat prison security is very difficult, for it is carefully planned, leaving few loopholes.

MOST ESCAPES are made by men with minimum security status. So, really, these are not escapes but merely breaches of trust. For the man with minimum security status, it is simple to leave prison, and it is hard to understand why so many of these men are staying, not running. Perhaps to those who are serving long sentences, freedom is no longer that valuable, or obeying rules has become so ingrained that they have become automatons.

Most of those who "go over the wall" or "walk away" from a minimum security assignment do so on the spur of the moment and are quickly apprehended. But there is one kind of escapee who plans all of his moves, and who is fully prepared. He has accepted the fact that he must sever all ties with the past if he is to be successful. No more family, no old friends! Everything must be new—a fresh start, desperately hung onto. The harshness of such a "fresh start" is one of the main reasons why so few prisoners try to split.

So the man who runs must be willing to give up all of his past—just to be free. His well-planned escape will endanger no one, for he has made provisions for a car, for money and clothes. This escapee rarely uses violence—

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committing another crime is the farthest thing from his mind. If all goes well and he can last for that first hour, he is free. (I.D. photos are but caricatures of a man, useless as a means of identification.)

If the escapee is successful, the new life begins. After the butterflies settle down, his sole object is to put miles between himself and the prison and the state the prison is in. A new town must be found to live in. (The man who runs right home is usually caught.) Now the escapee becomes a member of his new community—accepted as much as any newcomer. The need for all the usual necessities now faces him—he needs a job, an apartment, clothes, credit—and new friends. Time is a factor, because his fund of money, so hard to come by in prison, is fast running out. A new identity must be manufactured, and if this new set of papers is successful there isn't any problem, for our society runs by paper. Job and credit pose the crucial problem: once the job materializes, credit and all the other things fall into place.

The escapee now becomes a productive member of society. He pays taxes. He produces and consumes goods and services. Instead of costing his state the usual $8,000–$10,000 to keep him incarcerated and another $3,000–$5,000 for the welfare of his family—he is earning money. He now is a man who puts as much into the community as he takes out, a law-abiding individual who is no longer a threat to society. This escapee, of course, avoids involvement with the police. He knows he must stay out of trouble, for one fingerprint may bring down his new facade. So: never have too much to drink; stay out of lower-class bars; stay out of fights or too-public places and rallies, protests, and parades. The model inmate now becomes—and must become—the model citizen.

The escapee has suffered the severance with his past, family, and friends—and even with this new well-arranged life, there still is always the tug of emotions, the longing to be in touch with one's family. And when he is in touch—how demeaning it is for his wife and children to have to sneak letters to nonexistent addresses, to receive clandestine phone calls at friends' homes! Such conditions are not conducive to keeping a family unit together. But this is not nearly as reprehensible as the attitude of the police when they search for the escapee. To every person whose name is on his old visiting and mailing list they troop, letting each of these people feel their lack of respect and a loss of honor. Does anyone really believe that a man's wife would inform on him to a cop? Or that, if her husband should call, she would immediately contact the FBI? The wife is told she is a fool to stick to the man: he is no good, he showed no consideration for her nor the children, and he is probably out shacking up right now with another woman. So they pry and demean, they probe, they push and bother—often without a warrant or legal right. They are masters at brow-beating women and children.

The family may relocate on the sly, after a long wait is over and the man has made it. If that family is reunited, all is well and good. This will make the man doubly conscious of his precarious position in society, and he will be even more careful, an even better citizen. But if the bust comes, as it usually must—because of a set of unforeseen circumstances, perhaps a chance encounter and recognition—who is economically responsible for the family then? The state of arrest or the state of origin? And what is to be done for the family now? Is that family also to be punished for harboring a fugitive?

The discovered escapee is arrested; he is finger-printed, and his old identity is revealed. And now, back to a county jail to await extradition. If escape is such a serious crime, no matter what the original charge, why are the bails set for it usually so low? Now, once again, the costs to the public purse start to multiply: there are costs for courts, clothing, food, housing in jail; officers and wardens have to be paid to watch the man. And so the annual bills to the public start anew.

Is it worth it?

No matter what the crime, eventually, most likely, the man will have to be released. Is another year or two or three riveted to the original sentence any sort of answer? No way! If the man can be in the free world, working, an accepted and useful addition to the community, what purpose is served by starting again the imprisonment cycle with its huge attendant financial drain and obvious failure?

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Only vengeance is served—not understanding.

More and more states now are refusing to extradite escapees who have become useful members of their community. And if enough community leaders and social groups spoke out for this new method, there would be even more. There is the case of the escapee from South Carolina whom the governor of New Jersey refused to extradite, and another case in which a New Jersey prisoner wasn't returned by New York. The two judges' decisions in these cases, contrary to usual court procedure, are a heartening sign.

But when the escapee is back behind the prison wall, society suffers a loss of production and the tax burden is increased in the state of origin. If the citizens of a state would take the time to inquire exactly how much of their tax dollar goes to support their prisons—a multi-million dollar expenditure for each year—they certainly would be up in arms over this waste of money.

WHY NOT use community-based corrections methods in these cases? Probation is a tool of the court. Since the man was a credit to his new community, law-abiding and hard-working while he was out, isn't it sensible to expect he will be the same again in his own state? And isn't it the purpose of prison to make him over into a law-abiding man? Well, he has made himself over into just that. Probation should be applied here with stringent parameters if the court deems it necessary. Or if the court is really interested in rehabilitation, leave the man where he is found, under the supervision of the state wherein he has made good under the Interstate Act.

The norm of prisoners on release is a rapid return to crime within two or three months when the going gets the toughest. Imagine for a minute the pressure on an escapee—he is out illegally, while the parolee is not and can find help. Yet, the crime rate for escapees nationwide is far below the average of 84 percent recidivism prevailing among parolees or men who have served their maximum sentences.

If for no other reason than economic expediency alone, leave the man free, where he is. If it has to be different to serve the ends of justice, law or society, the *amorphous they*, then arrange for supervision, where he is. This man does not want to hurt people. He only wants to stay out, to keep hold of the most precious and at times most costly of man's possessions—freedom. □

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David Bromwich

Killers of the Dream

In Hemingway's story "The Killers," two anonymous gray men walked into a lunchroom and said they were going to murder a prize fighter named Ole Andreson. Just what Andreson had done to deserve his fate was not clear. But he had betrayed someone, most likely someone worth betraying. All of the circumstances were flat and nondescript like those men. Something to do with a racket, and the racket was getting even, and there was nothing to do but watch. "I can't stand to think about him waiting in the room and knowing he's going to get it," says Nick Adams. "Well," says his friend, "you better not think about it." It is the imagination of a small but wholly irrevocable disaster. Because it will be absolute and arbitrary, it is absolutely arbitrary. We are waiting for an end. That it looks manageable, plain, and narrowly limited helps only for a moment, for afterward, in the very air, will lurk the sense of an evil that is pervasive and casual.

Recent American movies have been helpless in explaining the doom of their heroes. Like "The Killers," they draw on the odd tic of a feeling for conspiracy. Where Hemingway left one subdued, however—where the effect of his story was humbling and truly frightful—the audience of these films leaves the theater weary, bitter, ill at ease, and no wiser than when it came. Evil for Hemingway, though inscrutable, did not paralyze. It was a matter of accepted landscape, like knowing the inside track, and, accordingly, Nick Adams's experience in the lunchroom is treated merely as one item on the agenda of his *rite de passage.* But in these films the evil is altogether more specific, being for the most part a dry social phenomenon, and yet the spell it casts is somehow more complete. It has an ideological tone that can be alluded to but never revealed. To make a suitable impression evil must go under a whispered alias: inevitability.

CHINATOWN WILL DO for a start. The film is a detective genre story and also a period piece, set in Los Angeles in the 1940s. It was directed by Roman Polansky, who did *Rosemary's Baby* and *Knife in the Water,* and who, given the cold hauteur of his genius for trash, has seemed for a long while to be the proper heir to Hitchcock. My own immediate reaction to his latest venture was simply that it did not feel much like a Polansky film. Yet the fact is that his trademark, an alertness to vague menace in an atmosphere of subliminal and all-extensive violence, has become very nearly standard in the short time since his last piece of work. Jack Nicholson plays the Bogart role here; actually, his character is more straightforwardly a snoop than the old movies let us believe; near the beginning of the film, willy-nilly, courage fills him because his life is in danger; and what he discovers thereafter is a city power structure that has been corrupted in widening circles of decay. The gang is the government. No questions asked. When Nicholson is set upon by a couple of low-level thugs, it is as if they came from nowhere. Only nowhere is everywhere. The film does not pause to ask whether this may not be an extreme view of things, but continues, blithely, with Nicholson's hopeless effort at pursuit and prosecution.

Some of the confusion derives from an unhappy cross-breeding of two modes of detective

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writing from the California school. Since it takes place 30 years ago the film must pay homage to Raymond Chandler. However, since it was made in the 1970s and with later conventions jostling to be employed, it adopts a good deal of the current stock in trade from Ross Macdonald. The result is certainly curious. One has the usual Chandler-cum-Bogart interest in getting a problem solved, with a finish that will be tidily satisfactory and perhaps grim but at all events not depressing, and beyond all that an interest in displaying the rude necessary wit of the detective. "Down these mean streets a man must go who is not himself mean." Yet at last the pretense of solving anything is given over. We are stranded with Macdonald's focus on the bizarre and ineluctable force of a villain who is probably a psychopath. *Chinatown* has to switch abruptly in mid-course since it hovers between mutually exclusive sets of assumptions.

John Huston takes the part of the villain in a performance which is not easily forgotten. Genteel, silver, and *echt*-Pasadena, he wants to control the water supply of Los Angeles and grow rich forever. He looks as if he might have an infinite capacity for absorbing liquor and still not fail to notice any first scent of opportunity for a merger. "Incorporation!" he beams, utterly enthralled. "Incorporation!" His name, for those who will enjoy it, is Noah Cross. *Chinatown* is loaded down with half-hearted mythy clues like that: the city suffering from drought, one man setting out to find the cause, and, as it turns out, an answer not unrelated to incest. Thebes, anyone? Despite the facile literariness, I am glad to report that Southern California composes the scene in *Chinatown* whole-heartedly. Crickets with their nervous beat are heard throughout the movie as the sun burns without motive over Los Angeles. Not since *The Big Sleep* has a movie known with this authority the tense and weirdly tentative look and feel of things there. But the conspiracy of wealth, power, and violence that finally stops the detective in his tracks is something untoward, a riddle which, in the detective story format, strikes one as a broadly unassimilable cheat. Certain assumptions within a genre are moral as well as generational. In Polansky's defense it ought to be said that detective movies, as a rule, are not more or less cynical than the general film culture they abide in from year to year, and in this case they are following a well-defined lead.

BADLANDS DEPICTS a social malaise that prevails everywhere and without end. It is directed in a style that would be called "spare" if it were prose: by portraying acts of extraordinary violence in a very low key, it subtly compels an admission that they are the norm. The film is rather clever and totally unscrupulous, and it has earned high marks among all those critics who wish, at any cost, to give encouragement to a promising youthful director. Terrence Malick, who made the film, is an anomaly in the industry, for he is the first American director to come over to movies from an academic discipline, and his involvement in the craft apparently does not partake of idolatry. All of which on the face of it makes him a desirable character, but he has brought the public a conceited and rotten film.

A chain of pointless murders is the subject of *Badlands,* and the killer and his girlfriend are the heroes. That is a fairly impartial summary of the plot. It remains only to document the film's various "outs" and to speculate as to why they should have pleased anyone. There is, first of all, the reflex sarcasm that goes on being inherited from Salinger. The entire film is narrated by the girl, who is scarcely in her teens, and she is naturally full of wide-eyed romance, which the picture contradicts in every frame. The counterpoint, which I found tedious and often offensive, possibly represents the point of view of her boyfriend, who is slightly older. But sarcasm, whether it is coming from the boy, the girl, the director, or all or none of the above—a mystery in this kind of wit is how it can be appealing when the dramatic stance it implies is by definition nonexistent—surely tends in the main to remove the gravity from any situation.

After this first blow we are given a trial by lighting. Those badlands of the Northwest look pretty forbidding, or at least pretty dull. Maybe they hold a reason for senseless deeds. Then there is justification by realism: every murder happens in a middle-range shot, to emphasize how little such a film could ever flinch from its own horrors, let alone dwell

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on them. In the last scenes and most importantly, the hero becomes a cult item with the officers who capture him, and why not, since he is a Nietzschean who strikingly resembles James Dean? This is the grand finale, the cleanup that deflates everything. But what we see is mostly the killer, with his pretensions being recognized as accomplishments. As an illustration of the have-it-both-ways method of directorial trickery, it ranks together with the most spectacular feats of Hollywood.

My conclusion is that Malick, having decided to make a film, opted for the murder story, which is based on a real occurrence, as a scenario with possibilities but then drew an imaginative blank. He could not see how to manage the thing. So he emptied it of affect and put in style. He is, I think, fearfully influenced by Godard, particularly *Band of Outsiders,* with its queer high spirits about a ramble that liberates no one, and *Pierrot le fou,* which spoke of an isolation from the world that gained its whole character from random, discovered fragments of popular culture. Such pleasure as may be taken from *Badlands* resides in the fidelity of its imitation. Especially if one admires Godard, as I do, the spirit of Malick's film will appear pure in spite of the film itself. *But he happens to be showing a mass murderer and his victims.* Malick is responding to a mood in the popular culture at large and he is quite as innocent, absurd, and essentially hysterical as his characters. Hysteria should by no means be thought incompatible with a low-keyed voice or a spare technique: it entails nothing more than a systematically unreasoning attitude toward life and the complexity of life. Evil that was everywhere and nowhere at once would obviously make for a cipher. (In those fields yonder? In the killer? In us?) For me, such a power is difficult even to imagine, and I am sure that it has not been unveiled in any work of art. What *Badlands* and other films have done on the sly is to introduce the notion of an intangibly potent evil without having tried to digest it.

SET THE PACING of a detective movie against a quickly recognized opportunity for social criticism and the result will be the single most surprising film of its year. It was directed by Francis Ford Coppola, stars Gene Hackman in the role of a bugging expert, and is called *The Conversation.* Harry Caul, who is the hero, finds himself with a taped conversation that has taken a wicked turn. What seemed an innocuous talk between lovers can be heard in undertones to express fear of murder. Later, the corporation president who ordered the tape is indeed murdered, while the lovers who could be heard to feel threatened are still alive. The girl will succeed to high office in the corporation, so that now the conversation is like an optical illusion. At first: "He'd *kill* us if he knew." With full knowledge: "He'd kill *us* if he knew." Appearances, appearances. Even a bugging expert has much to learn. But who will guard the guardians? Harry was thoroughly bugged, all along, by a corporate assistant who collaborated with the young couple. "We'll be watching you," he is told, and, as the film comes to an end, his life disintegrates before our eyes.

Much excitement in *The Conversation* attaches to the gradual metamorphosis of the tape. The source for this sequence is *Blow-Up,* and ultimately Hitchcock's *Rear Window.* The true subject of Coppola's story, however, is the corporate mentality in all its ramifications, which subsume those who bug and those who commission bugging. Lovers are irrelevant. In the last analysis they are just buggers too. Yet Harry's furtiveness, his pride, his neurotic ability to concentrate, his peculiarly Catholic obsession with conscience, which he manages to keep entirely separate from a case of professional jitters; the corporate assistant, with his seriousness, speed, deadly assurance about deadly matters; the president, ostensibly guilty, and the young couple, ostensibly his victims—all of them caught in a cycle of watching and waiting and calculating for gain: these the film makes vivid and unforgettable.

Tapes have been an issue of some concern lately, and *The Conversation,* shot in the spring of 1973, has been called prophetic. Its acumen strikes considerably deeper than such a compliment might imply. The plotting young assistant is a ringer for John Dean in every way, and that he has become a daily figure in our lives, almost a type, says something about our state. Harry one must pry further into for an analogue, but he will surely remind many people of a dense and paradoxical character, also from our recent past, who shared with the

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plotter-type an irremediable wish to look the part of the hero. I mean Daniel Ellsberg. The original sin of being a square, the incredible specialization, the constant worry over strategy, the new and flashing recognition that wreaks havoc on an established way of life, and the righteous swerve out of control in which the old personality is very much visible, are all there in full strength with Harry Caul. Though in some measure reminiscent of Graham Greene's heroes, his doom remains that of an American trapped by unexamined customs who must suddenly guide himself he knows not whither.

Coppola is the most versatile American director as well as the finest in his touch. He brings off a lengthy scene in a garage that is Harry's studio, the *ad hoc* party struck up by a few bug-men after their convention, and puts it in a class with the marriage sequence he photographed for *The Godfather*. He can be, visually and imaginatively, the most generous of directors, even as he holds to the decorum of portraying men who are bugs. Admirers of *The Conversation*, not, I trust, immune to their own irony, have dubbed the movie "Kafkaesque," but to me it seems a fair original. It disturbs perhaps chiefly because it shows nothing of what the matter at hand is about: the corporation is a large building—a business is a business—and the president is a well-off aging man. But somewhere in all that there is going to be one less of us walking the streets. The film works quietly with a version of ideological determinism as it indicates that everyone is ignorant, everyone is trapped: the metaphor, which sounds like a pun, is to be tapped. Unlike *Badlands* and *Chinatown* this film is playing legitimately with its given set of rules. It should not be obliged to give political or financial or even personal details, and within its kind it is entirely consistent. I suppose my only reservation has to do with the kind as such and the manner in which it has become enticingly available.

ANY AGE REVEALS ITSELF most unambiguously in what it does to the classics of a previous age. Dryden's songs for *The Tempest* and Shaw's refinishing of *Cymbeline* are familiar examples: the revision and not the thing revised always looks the more mannered, and the whole process, which is comforting, really spoils nothing. This year, literate Americans were appalled by what Hollywood had done to their *Great Gatsby*, and their reasons were twofold. Gatsby and Daisy had been sentimentalized, with lots of gamboling in the sun, and the marvelously jagged style of the book had been polished over. The first of these objections I find largely bogus, since those romps were in the publicity but absent from the final product, for those who cared to see it. The second is well-taken, but the film, respectably tedious and yet not without individual virtues, in any case sustains its alternative style throughout.

Robert Redford plays Gatsby and as usual cannot act. He is a dull earnest nice young man who contrived to impress viewers in movies where he only had to shut up. But there are remarkable performances here by Karen Black as Myrtle Wilson, Sam Waterston as Nick, and Mia Farrow as Daisy. This last is admittedly problematic. People from a generation closer to Fitzgerald's than my own have, so far as I could tell, despised the role without exception. Those who grew up in the 1950s or 1960s have found it astonishingly right. It would appear that sometime in the past few decades, our received idea of the neurotically destructive woman, whom Daisy represents, imperceptibly took on a dim coloring. Where the character used to be loud, openly a creature of dominance, she has become frightened and neurasthenic. The film of *The Great Gatsby* reflects this change quite faithfully.

The parties are Gatsby parties, lights are on forever, and one lady dances an indefatigable Charleston. At a gathering in the apartment Tom has set aside for Myrtle Wilson, one gets a delicate use of soliloquy on camera: the only such experiment attempted in movies so far, apart from an awkward cadenza at the close of *Sunday Bloody Sunday*. Unfortunately, the film runs slow, grows altogether leaden in its middle hour, and is filled with birds. I offer a surmise. Someone on the set told someone else that Fitzgerald was a great reader of Keats who liked birds. No one has given a more convincing explanation for the dead seagull that washes ashore once, to be examined by a mystified Nick, or for a host of lesser twittering specimens. All the same it is a tasteful film,

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well worth seeing, and the laws by which it is judged bereft of merit have nowhere been made explicit. The direction of this enormous project was supervised by Jack Clayton, who in the past has been an elegant craftsman, but one rule for the making of large-scale adaptations is that even vestigial signs of personality must disappear.

What has been saliently preserved through adaptation is the picture of a dying god. No irony there; death is fated. Yet Mr. Wilson is an unlikely instrument of destiny, and in the novel his act of shooting the hero was chancy, like Gatsby's reunion with Daisy. This film is urgently contemporary about the social malaise of which Gatsby is a symptom, and depressing, much in the fashion of the others discussed. It will not stand for nonsense. We are caught and do not know why, exactly. Something bad in the air. What license there is for this brings back Fitzgerald's ease in the midst of unhealthy lives, a trait that stands in sharp contrast to Hemingway.

Those two killers in Henry's lunchroom murdered one man but made another ready for life. Our sophisticated recent killers, among whom the film-makers may count themselves, educate no one and leave only a blank annihilation in their wake. The offense is not pessimism but rather a certain facility with which it is indulged. Bleak insouciance lies behind many of these films, a lazy hopelessness that has never been pondered, and we will go on suffering as we depart from the theater unless the reigning mood changes. For the time being, the security of that mood is driven home by its unquestioned predominance in a widely marketable feature like *Chinatown*. "The smartest thing you can do," a compromised policeman tells Nicholson's buddy, when the hunt has disclosed a quarry who cannot be stopped, "is just to take your friend home." There is no significant difference between that remark and the old "I guess this wraps it up," except the time and place in which they could have been uttered. All is changed, and nothing. Bleakness has become a convention. □

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Henry Pachter

Bukharin—History and Legend

BUKHARIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, 1888–1938, by Stephen F. Cohen. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 495 pp. $15.

Among the fathers of the Great October Revolution, the brilliant and incisive L. D. Trotsky has long held the attention of the Western world. But more recently, interest in his works and in his person has been waning, while the amiable Nikolai I. Bukharin is now being studied as both a companion of Lenin and an ancestor of revisionism. An excellent biography by A. G. Löwy appeared in Vienna five years ago, and now a young Princeton professor comes forward with an ingenious thesis, thoroughly researched and gracefully written, which challenges the conventional view that Trotsky was the great rival of Stalin. Cohen instead designates Bukharin as the significant historical alternative. He is seconded by a senior expert in the field, Professor Leonard Schapiro, who writes in the *New York Review of Books* that Bukharin stood for "socialism with a human face" and that he presided over a "golden age of Marxian scholarship."[1] The arts also flourished under Bukharin's leadership, the biographers claim, or had not yet been totally brought into line, and they also quote the many visitors who have described Bukharin's humaneness, his help in easing Mensheviks out of the country, his easy-going ways, his overall "lovable" nature—which also is attested to in Lenin's "Testament." All this should make it possible to reconcile communism with the present temper of radical feeling. Now with dogmatism out of fashion, we see, 40 years after "permanent revolution" was opposed to "socialism in one country," a new battle between the images of the two protagonists of these ideas.

Yet there is a more profound reason to study Bukharin. In its sixth decade, the Russian revolution no longer appears to us as the ignition spark of a worldwide proletarian October, as it did to Lenin and Trotsky, but as the first in a series of national, anticolonial wars of liberation, of revolutions not so much against capitalism as against Western domination, with Russia leading the "Asian" countercrusade. This view had come to Bukharin from Slavophile traditions; he developed it in his writings and political actions; it is expressed in works of art he sponsored, such as the movie *Storm over Asia*. In the study *Imperialism and World Economy* (which appeared before Lenin's better known *Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism*), Bukharin announced that capitalism would break up, not in the most advanced countries but "where the link of its chain is weakest": in the colonies. And 45 years before Lin Piao launched his famous manifesto calling the rural masses of the world to rise against the industrial citadel, Bukharin had written that "the city of the world" is surrounded by the vast majority of the rural masses, its providers of food and hewers of wood, who now are uniting to rebel against this domination. Later, as chairman of the Communist International, Bukharin wrote in its program:

[1] Professor Schapiro knows, of course, in this glorious age of Marxist scholarship the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow was sitting on the now famous "Early Manuscripts." But a few facts should not be allowed to stand in the way when a new hero is needed.

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> Between the capitalist and the socialist society there lies . . . a period of national wars and colonial uprisings, which, though in themselves not proletarian, are nonetheless constituent parts of the world proletarian movement. . . . The ties between the Soviet Union and the colonial peoples become ever closer.

This is contrary to the notion that the Bolsheviks were banking on revolution in Europe. Like all other Marxists, Lenin and Trotsky were "Westernizers"; they considered the colonial revolutions as an auxiliary but not the vanguard of the proletarian revolution. Bukharin spoke the Marxist language with a Slavophile accent; he struck foreign delegates as "the most Russian among the Bolsheviks." This also appears in his attitude to the peasants. He believed in their creativity; he recognized—again, earlier than Lenin—that the revolution would have to find its main support in the countryside. During the civil war, which at the same time was a war against the interventionists, he was able to identify the Soviet cause with the defense of national territory. I believe that in the later stages, after the retreat of the revolution, Bukharin's political evolution from Left communism to Right can best be explained by his attachment to the Russian peasant and by his patriotism, which we shall discuss *infra*. It was he, not Stalin, who coined the slogan "socialism in one country."

A third legacy of the Slavophiles was Bukharin's attitude to the state. Older Marxists considered the state an instrument of the ruling class, which one can conquer and then turn around like a gun. Bukharin wanted to "smash" the state because he saw it as an integral part of an economic-social-political complex of domination. When Lenin first heard of this, he called Bukharin an "anarchist," but in 1917 he changed his own position and incorporated Bukharin's conception in his *State and Revolution*, the classic of Leninism. But while Lenin did not draw the radical conclusion, Bukharin anticipated the theory of totalitarian government; he saw the New Leviathan as the mobilization of all national forces under the leadership of the state. Under capitalist-fascist conditions such a system would be poised for imperialist conquest; but the national leadership of a colonial nation or the Communist party of the Soviet Union would also be able to use such an instrument for their purposes. Bukharin was to develop these consequences of his theory ten years later, when he needed to justify the failure of the Bolshevik state to wither away. As late as in 1921 he still angered Lenin by insisting that it should, and we shall see that the abandonment of his antistatism was a major crisis in his life: after that he became defenseless against Stalin's realization of his own conceptions.

THESE THEORIES are impressive adaptations of the Marxian system to the conditions of an underdeveloped country; they need not have split the European labor movement. However, they became a major "revision" in the light of one tenet that was rarely mentioned before 1917 but that placed Bukharin beyond the pale: his utter indifference to democracy. He was, with Lenin, for the overthrow of the Provisional government, for the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, for the erection of one-party rule, for the ban on factions within the Party, for the establishment of the secret police (Cheka). He disregarded Trotsky's warnings about the bureaucratic degeneracy of the Party and voted against publication of Lenin's last articles, which expressed concern about arbitrary government. When Trotsky demanded intraparty democracy, he reminded him that "we Bolsheviks never believed in democracy, which is dear to Menshevism."

Bukharin's views on the transition to socialism were ultraradical. He did not consider "war communism" a calamity but found positive justification for its wholesale expropriation of small business, its abolition of the market economy, its forcible requisitioning of food and brutal suppression of all opposition. In a book that frightened Lenin, *The Economics of Transformation*, Bukharin then explained that capitalism had organized its production in undesirable ways; crisis, war, and revolution brought on a period of negative accumulation, with famine and undersupply of goods temporarily "demanding sacrifice on an unprecedented scale." Socialist reconstruction, Bukharin felt, had to start on premises that had not been prepared by capitalism. The theory was tested in China 30 years later. But when Lenin was able to consolidate his power as revolution in the West did not materialize, he wisely called a halt to war communism, restored the market for small businesses and farms, and invited for-

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eign investment; he also beat down the Workers' Opposition and the Kronstadt sailors, nationalized the trade unions, and candidly announced that this was a "retreat."

Surprisingly, Bukharin accepted the NEP and came to be its outstanding theoretician. Perhaps the failure of revolution in the West caused him to accept a half-revolution in one country. Up till then, he had often sided with Trotsky in intraparty debates; but after Lenin's death, in 1924, the two men developed distinct "lines," one somewhat to the Right, the other to the Left. Bukharin was convinced that the NEP had to be carried out seriously and honestly; peasants were encouraged to "get rich" while industrial development was to proceed at a slow pace. Trotsky wanted to industrialize fast in order to overcome the NEP, to avoid the ossification of the Party, and to carry the revolution abroad as soon as possible. Some Party leaders saw this program as a cloak for Trotsky's personal ambitions; as Marxists they knew that revolutions that fall short of their social goal end in the personal dictatorship of a Caesar, a Cromwell, a Napoleon. The imperious Trotsky, commander of the army, seemed to be the most likely candidate for such a role, while the insignificant Stalin still seemed to be mired in the insignificant post of secretary general.

Although Bukharin knew that Stalin was vicious, he preferred the dictatorship of the Secretariat to that of Trotsky—a judgment one must understand from the vantage point of the year 1924. But to "explain" does not mean to excuse. Bukharin supported Stalin because he believed that Stalin would support Bukharin's policies, which he believed to be Lenin's. For four years the two ruled the Soviet Union, with the one doing the dirty work and the other providing the lofty theories. The New Economic Policy, which demanded the cooperation of other classes and gave the peasants a measure of economic independence, did not bring greater political freedom to any class, not even to the Communists themselves. On the contrary: opposition groups were purged and harassed; the Party was harnessed into the rigid ideology of "Leninism" as defined in Bukharin's simplistic *ABC of Communism*, then the most popular exposition of Soviet theory; the European parties were "bolshevized"; discussion within the Party was stifled; the Cheka was transformed into the GPU. In brief, the dictatorship became a Frankenstein monster, which Bukharin could no longer tame when it was ready to devour him too. If tragedy (as most people understand it) is undeserved misfortune, Bukharin was no tragic hero. He had made the power that unmade him.

On one level of analysis, Bukharin fell from power because his policies had failed both at home and abroad. The peasants refused to "get rich" and did not voluntarily deliver their grain; the workers were restive. To save the country from ruin, Stalin put it on a war footing by proclaiming the Five-Year Plan and forcing the peasants into collectives. This turnabout also appeared reasonable to those who looked with anxiety upon Russia's international isolation. Soviet foreign policies—based on Bukharin's theories of imperialism and colonialism—had suffered defeats both in Europe and in Asia. In Germany he had gambled on an alliance with the anti-Western nationalists and the army; but by 1927 he had to admit that Germany, too, was "imperialist." In China, Stalin and Bukharin had ordered the Communists to support Chiang Kai-shek, and his Kuomintang—which duly booted them out in 1927.

On another level, Stalin used these emergency measures to push Bukharin and his friends to the wall. As all other opposition had been destroyed, there was no balancing force; the Secretary General by then dominated the structure of the Party and the opposition did not dare to submit its platform to the country. Having instituted the ritual of recantation for others who had lost power, Bukharin now had to recant in order to survive. He was allowed to be Stalin's spokesman as editor of *Izvestia;* he was allowed to write the program of the Communist International—and later even the "Stalin Constitution," complete with a bill of rights and voting rights even for concentration camp inmates. He had become a living lie, and when the final sacrifice was demanded of him he confessed heinous crimes, which, in his own words, he could not have committed.

PIOUS BIOGRAPHERS interpret Bukharin's trial as the last stand of democracy under Stalin; they also cite earlier episodes to prove that he always had tried to mitigate the cruelties of the dictatorship. True: he had obtained a fair trial for the Social Revolutionaries accused of high

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crimes against the state—but that had been demanded by representatives of the Second International, with whom he was conducting negotiations about a possible merger. He did prevent special cruelties that later on, under Stalin's personal dictatorship, became standard practice. But the measure of Bukharin's fairness is not the evil that came after him but the one he brought into being and emblazoned with the ideology of Leninism. Even in that last letter, which he asked his wife to memorize and transmit to posterity, he began by praising the Cheka, and only then proceeded to accuse its successor, the renamed NKVD.

Bukharin's ultimate martyrdom, therefore, does not earn him a place among the protagonists of democracy and humanism. His place in history must be determined by his contributions to theory.

It is perhaps for this reason that Professor Cohen concentrates on ideas. For his book is neither a biography, in the sense of a personal life story, nor a political book as that term is usually understood. We never watch Bukharin in action, in the rough and tumble of committee meetings, etc., though we always get a faithful record of their ideological sediments. Nor is there much about the life of this man, who lived so intensely. Birth and education are gotten over with in two hurried pages, and what there was of friends, loves, family we must guess from accidential intelligence. Thus, on p. 352 (when that information helps to explain what kind of pressure was brought to bear on Bukharin to make him confess) we finally learn that there was a Mrs. Bukharin.

I do not believe in psychoanalyzing a subject dead 35 years, or in spreading out a statesman's youthful poems before his embarrassed admirers. But I wonder why Professor Cohen refrains from commenting on a story he cites from Bukharin's autobiography: Bukharin began to doubt God at an early age and was frightened by the thought, "Am I by any chance the Anti-Christ?" Now it is written that the mother of the Anti-Christ is a whore, and so young Nikolai anxiously asked his mother whether she had sinned. Charming! While doubting God, he continued to believe in theology; while thinking heresy, he recognized the Church's right to call him a heretic. Isn't that exactly the attitude he later on had toward the Party? When Gramsci read Bukharin's *Historical Materialism,* he exclaimed that the author must be religious.

Bukharin needed spiritual support; he was unable to be or stand alone. Although Professor Cohen tries to reduce the characterization to one angry outburst of Lenin's, everyone who knew Bukharin has described him as "soft," "impressionable," "weak." At the time he was arrested, in 1937, his close friend, admirer, and one-time secretary Fanny Jeserskaya told me: "He is going to confess to whatever they want; he is such a weakling." Löwy agrees with this evaluation, and Boris Nikolaevsky, the Menshevik writer, whom Bukharin met in 1936 when he was in Paris on business, provides another clue. Allegedly Bukharin told Nikolaevsky:

> One is saved by the faith that development is going forward . . . like a stream running to the sea. . . . *If you try to stand up in midstream it will throw you out altogether.* [This sentence is omitted by Cohen.] The stream goes through the most difficult places, but it still goes forward. And the people grow, becoming stronger, building a new society.

If this quotation is correct, it goes a long way to explain why Bukharin could not say No to Stalin and the Party, why he interpreted discipline as submission, and unity as the obligation to abandon criticism. Had he not told the Trotskyists, in the best Stalin-and-Torquemada style: "You must come to the Party and say: 'We have sinned, forgive us.' "

This self-denying attitude has still another aspect. Again without psychologizing, one cannot ignore the father-son relationship between Lenin and Bukharin, which is well attested by direct and indirect evidence on both sides. There is an interesting parallel. Just as Engels, who had anticipated several "Marxian" themes, nevertheless agreed to play second fiddle and later became the popularizer of a somewhat diluted "Marxism," so Bukharin subordinated his own bold visions to the sober authority of Lenin and then erected "Leninism" as an authority for others.

Professor Cohen's exasperating austerity does not permit us ever to see Lenin and Bukharin together except on official business; but even in the narrow framework of intellectual history, the private conversations of the two men ought to be interesting, if only to determine how certain ideas originated in bolshevism and came to be accepted. Bukharin had dinner with Lenin and his wife before an attempt was made on Lenin's life, and Bukharin had begged him not to go out that night. In his trial, Bukharin was

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accused of having planned Lenin's murder, and much was made of the fact that during the trade union debate Lenin had been exasperated by Bukharin's "deviation." Nevertheless, the bond between the two men was indissoluble, and in Lenin's last days Bukharin was closer to him than any other Bolshevik.

Nor does Professor Cohen inform us what the personal relations were between Bukharin and Stalin. Did Bukharin ever have tea with the Djugashvilis? Why did he name his daughter Svetlana? Professor Cohen wonders how "two characters so dissimilar in temperament, values, gifts and ambition" could form an alliance, but he makes no effort to show us the relationship. Did they joke together in the crude fashion Stalin liked? When asked why there was only one party in the Soviet Union, Bukharin quipped: "The other would be in jail." Not very funny, but this is the only example Professor Cohen cites of Bukharin's famous sense of humor. Is the reason perhaps that Bukharin's other jokes were rarely printable?

Jokes apart, I wonder whether an admiring biographer must suppress information that is of a very personal nature but may help others to understand better what happened in a political crisis. It is well known that Bukharin suffered from frequent depressions, especially when things went wrong for his cause. I have been told that after the civil war he developed a phobia that prevented him from crossing Red Square unaided. This was at the time of Kronstadt and the first purge of the Party; it was at a time when Bolsheviks had their first inkling that the world revolution would not come and that indeed they were alone. But there was more to it: Bukharin told both Denicke in 1923 and Nikolaevsky in 1936 that the Bolsheviks had not expected to win the civil war; they had instituted the most radical measures of war communism because they wished to show to posterity, the way the Paris Commune had shown to its own generation, what a Communist government would have to do; they expected to survive only "enshrined in the great heart of the world's working class," as Marx had written about the Paris Communards.

Now suddenly the Bolsheviks found that they had survived and had to continue surviving their greatest moment, their heroic vision. They found themselves at the head of a backward state and isolated. One of Bukharin's bitterest jokes (reported by Löwy) was: "We have made many mistakes, but the fatal one was our failure to foresee that we could win." Unable to assure the country's reconstruction under the socialist system, they had to resort to dictatorship. Bukharin called the NEP "the twilight of our illusions." It was a crisis not only of bolshevism but for each Bolshevik. Professor Cohen has no inkling that he is talking of a man who had come back from the dead (I think it was Lenin who referred to the Bolsheviks as "dead men on furlough"). Bukharin's crackup is not only understandable, it also helps us understand what happened and, moreover, it may explain what was to follow. After this ordeal it was natural for the Bolsheviks to seek shelter in the Party and to endow it with that transcendence each of them individually was lacking: no man can abandon principle, but the Party can survive tactical retreats.

Considering this human dimension of the story, I find Professor Cohen's chapter on "Rethinking Bolshevism" deeply unsatisfactory. I cannot believe that Bukharin coolly sat down to think the situation over and decide, perhaps with Lenin's help, that the country needed the NEP. This was a moment that changed the Party, a moment that demanded a choice of comrades: the moment, probably, when "Leninism" and the legend of the "iron cohort" were created. With no fear of being paradoxical one might say that "What Is to Be Done?" had never been taken quite seriously and had been forgotten during the exciting years of the Soviet experience. The umbilical cord to the European labor movement had not been cut completely. Now the theory of the Bolshevik state was projected back onto that of the Party. Up to that time, the Bolsheviks had always reached their decisions in lively debates. It was precisely when the Party adopted a more liberal economic policy that deviations came to be considered attacks on its substance. This was also the birth of "Bolshevism" as the organized, disciplined form of Leninist ideology.

Bukharin had no home but the Party. He could not live in any other environment than the one he had helped create, even though he came to hate and fear it. To maintain himself near the seat of power, he recanted in 1929, in 1930, and again in 1933; he suffered the humiliation of his friends and he cooperated with

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the ruthless subjugation of the Communist International to the Kremlin power game. His smiling face became a mask for Stalin's sneer; his "bill of rights" was more useless than a fig leaf for the enormous crimes it was supposed to cover. Much as one would like to sympathize with many of the causes he stood for, one cannot but agree with his last self-evaluation, in his final speech at the Moscow Trial: "My life has become an absolute vacuity."

BUKHARIN'S DEFENDERS have searched the minutes of the Trial to prove that he did not capitulate but defended himself, admitting only as much as was absolutely necessary to save his family, but fighting over points that in comparison seem to be minor. He denied the supreme crime of having plotted to depose Stalin, but he "admitted" so many contradictory facts, like meetings in impossible places with people who demonstrably could not have been there (e.g., because they were in jail) that a well-informed and watchful listener could receive all the clues to exonerate him from other crimes, too. If such an intelligent reader of the minutes was assumed, however, that reader should have been able to decipher a much more important cryptogram: did that floating bottle which was Bukharin's last speech carry a secret "shipwreck's message"?

A man of Bukharin's stature who knew that he was marked to be shot must have fought for his image in the eyes of posterity; he would not be worth writing about if all he intended to say was: "I did not plan to kill Stalin." On the contrary, if there is one crime of which posterity could accuse Bukharin it is precisely that his plot was too timid and that the opposition failed. We cannot imagine that the leaders whose lives were in constant danger did not think day and night: "How can I get rid of Stalin before he gets rid of me?" They knew as well as Stalin that other leaders had been dissembling when they submitted to him. It is almost unbelievable that they should not have conspired against him; there is ample evidence that they did, and Bukharin himself told his Swiss partisan Humbert-Droz: "The opposition is planning individual terror against Stalin." Yet as Marxists and Bolsheviks they believed that, since Stalin had won, he was historically "right," as Napoleon had been in the French revolution.

I AM CONVINCED that a not-so-secret message, easy to decipher for those in the know, was plainly spelled out in the record, not only of Bukharin's but also of other defendants' interrogations. I shall quote a few lines from Bukharin's interrogation (spring 1938):

> PROSECUTOR: So you say Tomsky [a codefendant, former head of the trade unions and a close friend of Bukharin's] intended to open the front to the Fascist invasion? [This term, "open the front," refers to the defensive tactics that were actually used when Hilter attacked in 1941; it was the strategy of the war of 1812.]
>
> BUKHARIN: He did not say that.
>
> PROSECUTOR: Why was the military organization to open the front?
>
> BUKHARIN: From my point of view it was not to open the front.
>
> PROSECUTOR: Was it to open the front from the point of view of [Marshal] Tukhachevsky?
>
> BUKHARIN: He did not object.
>
> PROSECUTOR: Did Tomsky agree that the military organization was to open the front to the Germans?
>
> BUKHARIN: I used the word *dolzhen* [which may mean either "must" or "ought to" in Russian] with the meaning of the German word *müssen* [being forced to] and not in the sense of *sollen* [ought to].
>
> PROSECUTOR: In Russian *dolzhen* means *dolzhen*.
>
> BUKHARIN: In Russian it means two different things.
>
> PROSECUTOR: But we want one meaning here.
>
> BUKHARIN: That's what you want, but I take the liberty not to agree with you.

Bukharin is trying to deny that he planned to cooperate with the Fascist invaders. He admits having envisaged a war situation in which it would become necessary to "open the front," possibly even to give up the Ukraine (as had happened in 1919 and was to happen again in 1941). Marshal Tukhachevsky apparently had given the leaders such a pessimistic forecast; from this information Stalin had concluded that it was necessary to seek an alliance with Hitler. The Right Opposition had held to the opinion that it was necessary to prepare for war with Hitler, even if that meant to "open the front," i.e., to take a defeat, lose territory. What was to follow the defeat can easily be surmised when we realize that all the conspirators had been actors in the 1917 revolution: Defeat meant the overthrow of the government. This was to be the longed-for opportunity to get rid

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of Stalin. But of course they did not wish to return to pre-1917 conditions. So Rykov told the prosecutor: "Bukharin expressed the idea that in case the front was opened, it might become necessary to take measures forestalling the take-over by a military group." Hitler had already announced that he would negotiate only with a military dictator in Russia. The conspirators therefore had to discuss the question whether they would negotiate with Hitler. This came out in the trial of another conspirator:

> SOKOLNIKOV: We had to reason as politicans. We understood that this was a question not to be decided upon on the basis of feelings but by reason of state. We had to decide whether we ought to pay such a painful price, which meant committing a number of abominable, shameful crimes against the Soviet state. We had to decide whether we would be able to use the Fascists.
>
> PROSECUTOR: Or the Fascists would use you . . . and did you expect anything but to be used and discarded by the Fascists?
>
> SOKOLNIKOV: Obviously; had that not been the case, we would have dissolved the bloc [of oppositionists].
>
> PROSECUTOR: You believed that you would be able to preserve your independence?
>
> SOKOLNIKOV: We believed that we had a chance. . . . We figured that the Fascists would not be able to conquer the Soviet Union and that they would arouse the jealousy of their imperialist rivals. We believed that there were international forces that were not interested in letting Fascism grow.

The message of the Trials therefore is clear and loud: Do not conclude a pact with Hitler. Bukharin and his friends had "conspired" to resist Hitler, to provoke or at least to risk war with a much better armed Fascist Germany, to gamble on the opportunity Bukharin lost in 1918—the people's war against the invader and against the ineffective, powerless Stalin dictatorship, until other forces in the West would come to the rescue.

This conception is a strange mixture of realism and illusion. On the one hand, it is an almost prophetic vision of what actually was to happen. On the other hand, it is a return to the "illusions" of 1918–19, the "permanent revolution," war communism, anti-imperialism. In this respect, Professor Cohen's question whether a Bukharinite Soviet Union would have been better equipped to meet the Fascist threat than Stalin's Russia is beside the point. Bukharin was able to give his party that "last service," [2] precisely because he was no longer a "Bukharinist." He was looking beyond the NEP, Stalin, and Trotsky, to a different Russia and a new revolution. "The people are marching ahead" —this was the hope that comforted his last moments.

"THE PEOPLE ALWAYS MARCH FORWARD" may be the summary of Bukharin's philosophy of history, embodied in his most ambitious work, *Historical Materialism*, which he wrote in 1921 at the same time as *Economics of Transformation*. Commentators have wondered how it was possible for the same man to write these two works, which seemingly are so different in spirit, and at the same time at that. And yet, perhaps this coincidence explains the complexity of Bukharin: his sudden passing from the Communist ultra-Left to the Communist Right, his opposition to Stalin at the same time as his support of Stalinism, and his ultimate capitulation. The book itself, *Historical Materialism*, is weak and disappointing; it can hardly be called a philosophical work and is a rather "popular" (in the worst sense) continuation of the *ABC of Communism*. Lenin, Lukács, and Gramsci agreed that Bukharin did not understand much about philosophy.

Nor was Bukharin as well-read as Professor Cohen asserts. The quotations in *Historical Materialism* are mostly from 18th-century materialists—and may even have been gleaned from Plekhanov. Bukharin's epistemology is a naive realism; to his familiarity with modern science Professor Cohen pays the left-handed compliment: "Whether or not Bukharin fully understood modern physics is less important than his belief that the most advanced tendencies accept [his] point of view." The attempt to give historical materialism a naturalistic foundation is characteristic of Comintern philosophy. Its determinism relieved the Communist leaders of all responsibility: since in the end the "objective conditions" were bringing about socialism anyway, one did not need to be bothered by Stalin's crimes. After quoting Michels, Pareto, and Trotsky on the dangers of bureaucratization, Bukharin rejects the idea that "socialists can

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[2] Professor Cohen correctly rejects Arthur Koestler's conception of a "last service to the Party." But in a historical sense, Bukharin's last speech was meant as a service.

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win while socialism loses" on the ground that "a new era has begun": since all industry belongs to the workers' state, there is no economic foundation for a new class. This crude use of an undialectical materialism explains both Bukharin's acceptance of the NEP in 1921 and his collaboration with Stalin, his fight against Trotsky in the later '20s, and his ultimate confession in 1938. There is not much here for either the Old or the New Left to build up a new hero. Even Professor Cohen does not assert that Bukharin's policies would have been more successful in the framework of the Soviet State. Almost certainly, a policy economically oriented toward the peasants would also have resulted in political concessions. Bukharin's mechanical materialism necessarily blocked his understanding of the basic issue of totalitarianism. He could not see that Stalin's crimes were in the nature of the beast; for him, there was a personal difference between Stalin and Dzershinski, the first head of the GPU. His quarrel with Stalin was over policy, not over the system. At some point before 1921, in the turmoil of the civil war, Bukharin lost the libertarian instincts of his youth. His ultimate rehabilitation in the Soviet Union may be prevented by those "early writings" which in that case could be studied by Soviet students. They may be as dangerous now as Marx's "early writings" were in Bukharin's own time. □

Nicolaus Mills

Politics of Schools

THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CITY, 1805–1973, by Diane Ravitch. New York: Basic Books. 449 pp. $12.95.

The importance of Diane Ravitch's *The Great School Wars* is, I think, best illustrated by turning for a moment to Christopher Jencks's assessment of the 1968 teachers' strike and community-control struggle in New York. Jencks wrote:

> The public school system of New York City is on the brink of collapse. Until the basic political framework of public education in New York City is altered, strikes and boycotts—or both—are likely to occur on an annual basis. Nor is New York unique. It is simply first. All the forces which have brought New York City to its present condition are at work elsewhere, and the New York story will certainly be repeated in dozens of other major cities around the country during the next decade.

With this book, Ravitch has made possible a historical grasp of the forces to which Jencks refers. Prior to *The Great School Wars,* no modern or comprehensive account of the New York City public schools existed. Their history had to be gleaned from a patchwork of single-issue monographs or a few dated narrative essays.

Although the emphasis of *The Great School Wars* is on the years following the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown decision, Ravitch has not skimped on the early history of the New York public schools in order to capitalize on the present school crisis. In her analysis of the first half of the 19th century, she begins with the formation in 1805 of the Free School Society, the first nonsectarian organization in the city to assume responsibility for educating the poor; then she moves on to 1826, when the Free School Society became the Public School Society and was designated by the New York City Common Council as the only agency to receive state funds for the education of all children in the city; she then follows the Public School Society to its demise in 1842, when it was superseded by an elected Central Board of Education, and control of the public schools now was vested in trustees elected in each ward of the city.

Ravitch is just as thorough in treating the second half of the 19th century, focusing on the structural changes in the school system, which by the end of that period once more led to greater centralization. She traces the way the ward system brought about scandals in the public schools, especially when the Tweed Ring was in control of New York, and how discon-

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tent with the politicalization of the schools resulted in a series of new laws:

- An 1864 law dividing the school system into seven districts rather than 44 wards and increasing the authority and independence of the Central Board;
- An 1873 law providing for the appointment of the Central School Board by the mayor and for the appointment of the trustees (who still retained such powers as the right to hire teachers and select school sites) by the Central Board;
- An 1896 law abolishing the ward system and dividing control of the schools among a 21-member Central Board appointed by the mayor and the Board of Superintendents, whose members the Central Board appointed and who, as professional educators, were expected to do the hiring of teachers and set educational policy within the schools.

The remainder of *The Great School Wars* explores in detail the two main problems of the New York public schools in the 20th century: the immigrant challenge, which dominated the attention of the schools during the first quarter of the century, and the black and Puerto Rican challenge, which took center stage after 1954. In the final part of her narrative, Ravitch moves directly into the present with an analysis of the 1969 Decentralization Act through which locally elected community school boards were given new authority over curriculum, the right to choose superintendents, and, in certain cases, leeway to select teachers who were not on the competitive eligibility list.

What makes Ravitch's account so telling is not just its sheer detail, but her way of avoiding recourse to a conventional narrative. It is the political struggle for control of the New York City schools that most concerns her, and her book revolves around four wars for control of the schools. In the first war (1840–42), the opponents are the city's Irish Catholics and the Protestant establishment running the Public School Society, with the primary issue the control of the religious and cultural direction of the schools. In the second war (1892–96), the main antagonists are Tammany Hall and the Progressive reformers, with the central issue the depoliticalization of the schools and their return to the authority of an appointed Central School Board. In the third war (1913–20), the sides are almost the same as in the second, with Tammany and the old school bureaucracy opposing the efforts of the Progressives and other reformers to streamline the schools and make them more responsive to social conditions. In the fourth war (1966–69), the principal foes are the teachers' union and black and Puerto Rican community-control advocates, with the key issue to whom the city's educational system should be accountable.

HOW ARE WE TO JUDGE such an ambitious and complex undertaking? The temptation is to accept the overview Ravitch presents and to quarrel with her, if at all, on specific issues or the relative importance she assigns one school war in comparison to another. Indeed, this approach is made all the more appealing by Ravitch's attack on the educational historians she labels "extreme revisionists" whose "angry reinterpretation of American educational history is to a large extent a reaction to the one-sided, over-idealized histories which viewed the development of American education as an unfolding series of triumphs." Yet the middle ground Ravitch takes between the "extreme revisionists" and the "eulogists" is hardly neutral territory, and it is important to note the costs of occupying it.

With regard to the motives of those in control of the schoo's, Ravitch is, for example, so concerned with avoiding conspiratorial theories that often she sacrifices the obvious for the subtle. Thus, in her treatment of the integration struggles of the 1960s, Ravitch presents a detailed analysis of the demographic problems faced by school officials, showing how shifts in population plus a rise in parochial and private schools left the city without an adequate supply of white students for integration. The result is a picture in which school administrators are seen without the means of meeting the political demands made upon them. Yet this analysis ignores the role these authorities played in denying *any* hope for integration and in sabotaging such experimental efforts as open enrollment and pairing. Ravitch virtually does not discuss how school officials made it difficult for black and Puerto Rican parents to find out about transfer plans, how they delayed sending home notices about these plans until the last weeks of school—and how, when pairings did take place, they undermined these by such

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tactics as using tracking to keep classes in the paired schools homogeneous.

When it comes to community control, on the other hand, Ravitch is often more loyal to her pendulum theory of the way New York schools have shifted between local and centralized control than to the underlying facts of the case. She speaks, for example, of the New York public schools in the period from 1842 to 1896 as being "directly controlled by the people." Yet no such evaluation is possible. Although ward trustees had enormous power during this period, for much of the time they failed to represent either the community or the principle of decentralization. In 1871 a Tweed Bill gave the right to appoint the trustees to the mayor, and in 1873 the Central Board of Education, which the mayor appointed, acquired the power to designate trustees. Indeed, by the end of the century the position of the trustees was that of a third force. Particularly during the 1890s, when the trustees formed a citywide organization and began to lobby in Albany, they managed to cut themselves off from both the parents they served and the Central School Board.

Finally, what is missing from Ravitch's account is a serious concern for the way students viewed the New York public schools. She has made little effort to deal with how children saw their teachers and classes or with the political implications of their acceptance of an order they often found inimical. The photographs in *The Great School Wars* include a striking picture by Jacob Riis of a class in the Essex Market School, and from the picture we get a strong sense of the constraint and rigidity felt by the students in that class. But more than a picture is needed. Admittedly, the further back in time we go, the more difficult it becomes to get the recorded views of children. Yet in such books as Michael Gold's *Jews Without Money* and Leonard Covello's *The Heart is the Teacher,* there are at least adult recollections of being a child in the New York public schools, and at present there is a wealth of writing by children about the city's public schools—with much of it, like the materials in Herbert Kohl's *36 Children,* invaluable reading.

I cite these examples because I think that what they mute (the hostility of school officials to genuine change, the sham of local or decentralized control, the thinking of those the schools are supposed to benefit) goes far toward explaining why Ravitch is comfortable in the middle ground she occupies. Fortunately *The Great School Wars* is so accomplished and important a narrative that even these shortcomings are not fatal. Only enough to make one hope that those who build on Ravitch's work will feel the need for something more than her kind of "balanced" perspective. □

Cynthia Fuchs Epstein

Guineas and Locks

THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR, by Alice *S. Rossi.* New York: Columbia University Press. 716 pp. $12.95.

Guineas and locks, wrote Virginia Woolf, were two essential ingredients for creativity, and conditions virtually unobtainable for women. Alice Rossi's anthology of *The Feminist Papers* informs me that a number of major feminists from Mary Wollstonecraft to Frederick Engels and Simone de Beauvoir have made that observation as well, each in their own way.

I have been making that observation, too, for as long as I can remember (in published research and private life, in prose and in hysterics). My female colleagues always nod and affirm, like a Greek chorus at the revelations and outbursts on the subject.

We contemplate our male friends, teachers, and colleagues who sit wondering and writing behind the doors of their studies, coming out occasionally to have a meeting, have a drink, to hold court or hands with an admiring friend. Some men, we admit, suffer behind those doors, assessing their intellectual posterity, trying to capture visions in words or formulae. Those of us who were once seduced by its grandeur see now that this particular form of suffering is a luxury enjoyed by a protected class.

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Admittedly, not all men are protected, but there is a kind of privacy they are permitted, across class and culture, to ponder and experiment.

I have gone to the country to write this comment on Rossi's book, hoping to recapture my experience last year at the MacDowell Colony, the New Hampshire retreat where writers, painters, and composers are given private studios, food, fireplaces, and easy chairs. There, for the first time in my adult life, I was able to be truly private; to write and think and build rather excellent fires. But as most women cannot solve the problems of their condition independently in any way, but must strive for structural and institutional solutions, I have not been able to duplicate that utopia on Long Island.

School is out and I need not meet with a hundred-odd students three times a week for classes, or attend conferences, or spend hours weekly in departmental committee meetings. I have said "no" to participation in any conference on research, political or social action. But the constraints of condition follow me.

The writings of the feminists describe current events. It has rained for three days. My son, taken recently to organic gardening, reads choice passages aloud every few minutes, noting the ways in which I have poisoned the family by cooking with refined sugar and processed salt. It is hard to concentrate and I wonder if I have the right to try. I try to assuage my guilt and former wrongs by baking whole-wheat brown-sugar cookies. It seems more essentially female to be baking than writing reviews.

I not only need locks on my study door but in my mind.

It strikes me that a full account of my working retreat in the country sounds like a Phyllis McGinley joke. If I weren't a sociologist, I would be convinced that any woman dedicated to a task would surmount trivial obstacles. But as a student of the "woman problem" I see them all, the mounting accumulation of the trivial interlocking with the larger social obstacles that hold women in their places and explain why they haven't painted or written or created.

It seems ludicrous that in spite of the children, the distractions, the small uncumulative pieces of time women can carve out in the schedule of their days, men in power still regard them as threats to their monopoly of the creative spheres and centers of power, and contrive and collude to keep them down.

The pattern for most women who have managed careers has always been chance, a somewhat supportive network together with persistent pressures produced by economic need—not plan, design, or systematic training.

ORDINARILY WOMEN TODAY seem to be more aware of both the formal and informal obstacles to autonomy in private and occupational spheres than women did in the 228-year period Rossi covers in her book: from Adams to de Beauvoir. But the women writers then were as aware as anyone writing today.

There are two stories to be found in Rossi's book. One is the writings of the feminists whose works provide not just threads that intertwine but a kind of system analysis of society. The other is the story told by Rossi in her "sociographic" and biographic accounts of the people whose work she includes.

As for the content of the feminists, Rossi provides full excerpts; whole chapters to savor. I had been introduced to a similar array of feminist writings in the anthology published earlier by Miriam Schneir [1] and the Rossi book took me deeper into study. Schneir's volume first made me aware of the pleas of Abigail Adams and the black suffragette, Sojourner Truth, and of others whose words reappear at greater length in Rossi's book. The excerpt approach is useful. One tends to read Virginia Woolf, but turns aside from the works of Charlotte Perkins Gilmore or Suzanne LaFollette, believing they must be antiquated. But excerpts catch the eye and capture attention, and one is advised of one's bad judgment. Schneir's book, with its perceptive introductions, was intentionally brief. Rossi's book has longer comments and selections: it is analytic and penetrating; it is different.

Rossi's analysis is directed not only to biography but to the integrated context in which these few social philosophers and commentators wrote, spoke, and organized feminist sentiment. There are insights into the sociology of creativity to be found in this book.

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[1] Miriam Schneir, *Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings* (New York: Random House-Vintage, 1972).

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Personal history and social structure—Rossi makes clear how they interact. The feminist writers are participant observers. Although there were male feminists who wrote brilliantly and insightfully on the condition of women, the greater passionate interest was to be found among the women. Unknowingly, the sum of their observations are as reliable as an independent sociological study: looking at similar events and common social patterns, they drew the same conclusions. In situation after situation; era after era; as per scientific method.

If we were to plot patterns of women's oppression, using as indicators the writings of feminists from the beginning of the 20th century to the present, the emerging themes would be of no surprise to any woman sitting at a typewriter today, whether she is writing scholarly papers or transcribing the letters of a meat-packing executive. Had Freud read some of the writings assembled in this book, he would have had his answer to the question, "What Do Women Want?"

What women want, and indeed their analysis of what they need, has not changed much through the years; nor have the conditions that create those needs. What these women wanted was freedom and dignity, economic independence—in short, what the woman's movement is about today. What has changed is society's responses to these demands, anyway, some of the responses.

In 1776 Abigail Adams wrote to John Adams, asking that

> In the new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they could. [P. 11.]

John Adams responded:

> As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh. We have been told that our Struggle has loosened the bonds of Government everywhere. That Children and Apprentices were disobedient—that schools and Colleges were grown turbulent—that Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes grew insolent to their Masters. But your Letter was the first Intimation that another Tribe more numerous and powerful than all the rest were grown discontented.—This is rather too coarse a Compliment but you are so saucy. . . .

Some people are still laughing at all this but not very many. That's not to say they have been won over. Rationalizations differ as to why women ought not be paid as much as men (they have less of a commitment to work) or given the same political rights (they are too erratic to make crucial decisions). A recent Carnegie Commission report [2] suggests that universities and colleges have lowered their standards by hiring women to fulfill affirmative action programs. The Commission's members apparently haven't read the formal and informal studies I've seen recently, all indicating that women tend to be overqualified for the positions they have won in academia. Perhaps affirmative action has permitted some women to enjoy privileges long monopolized by men; some few get more than they deserve, but I would guess that the balance is far from having been upset.

It doesn't really say much for our progress to admit that our writing today is old wine in new bottles. What is different today is that there is a larger effort to market the stuff and a somewhat more receptive audience for it.

THERE ARE INSIGHTS in Rossi's volume that go beyond the rediscovery of problems we associate with the feminist cause. The early feminists dug deep into the social fabric.

We find Emma Goldman arguing that the great problems of equality lay not just in the formal structure of laws and their practice but in the relations between the sexes. That is something social science should have picked up long ago, yet today only a few social scientists' eyes are turned toward the study of those micro-interactions between men and women who live together or who encounter each other. How much more would we know of how the institutionalized modes of "proper behavior" and "fair play" and the like act to unbalance the relationship most typically in favor of the man. How much more we would know about the dynamics of power in society.

Some insights predate modern "discoverers." Margaret Sanger, for example, not only orga-

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[2] Richard A. Lester, "Anti-bias Regulation of Universities: Faculty Problems and Their Solutions," 1974.

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nized the movement to provide birth control information (and to encourage research on birth control techniques) but insisted that women also had a right and a need for sexual satisfaction. Charlotte Gilman Perkins's discussion of the economic productivity of women in the economy is not unlike one recently observed in Washington among Department of Labor specialists and critics of the Social Security system (which provides unequal benefits to men and women).

Is this only playing intellectual games? There is more to it than that. We ought to learn that revelation does not insure revolution. But it *is* a revelation to discover how universal these social problems have been.

The other ores to mine in this book are the analytic biographies. The people, like their ideas, seem contemporary. One senses that Rossi liked them. I had the feeling while reading Eleanor Flexner's biography of Mary Wollstonecraft [3] that she didn't like or approve of her central character. Thus, Rossi's short analysis of her life is more penetrating than the entire Flexner biography. This is because Rossi's empathy comes through in sensing the web of relationships among the feminists. They were not alike in personal style or life-style. Some were married and had children, others not. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, writer and theorist, bore several children and applauded motherhood, yet she was the radical of a duo who organized the first women's rights association, and coedited the first history of women's suffrage. Her collaborator, Susan B. Anthony, was the political strategist, the better orator. Brought up in a supportive family, Anthony never married. Her father approved of her activities and helped her. Stanton, on the other hand, met resistance from her father who threatened her with disinheritance. Stanton admired her father's intellect but suffered from his evaluation of her. Writing to a cousin about "scourgings" from her father, she commented,

> I cannot tell you how deep the iron entered my soul. I never felt more keenly the degradation of my sex. To think that all in me of which my father would have felt a proper pride had I been a man, is deeply mortifying to him because I am a woman. . . .

Some time ago Gideon Sjoberg and Leonard Cain discussed the merit of using negative values and countersystem models in our analytic thinking about how society works.[4] Much current work in sociology rests on a model that assumes the primary importance of early influences and the impact of role models on aspiration, motivation and commitment to work. Rossi's work suggests a countermodel—that of the importance of *later* and *ongoing* socialization, and that of *negative* role models —may also explain women's work commitment. This has been my suspicion for some time.

It was probably of equal importance as any of the childhood experiences of these women that in later life they found supportive networks in which to work and from which to derive emotional sustenance. Although Susan Anthony's father wanted his daughters as well as his sons trained to be self-supporting, and encouraged her views on social reforms, one wonders if that would have sustained her effort if she had not had an intimate intellectual and political association with Elizabeth Cady Stanton for over 50 years.

Considering that Stanton did not grow up with such supports, nor received them from her husband or father, it is clear that Susan Anthony provided her with a supportive friendship and a partner who continuously spurred her to writing and activity. Through the years, Anthony turned to Stanton for help in drafting speeches, testimony, and letters for presentation to conventions on temperance, education, and women's rights. Stanton always responded to the call, notes Rossi. But it is the power of the call, which I suspect has been underplayed in analyses of women's inactivity in the intellectual and political realm. Stanton wrote back at one point:

> Your servant is not dead but liveth. Imagine me, day in and day out, watching, bathing, dressing, nursing, and promenading the precious contents of a little crib in the corner of the room. . . . Is your speech to be exclusively on the point of educating the sexes together, or as to the best manner of educating women?

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[3] Eleanor Flexner, *Mary Wollstonecraft: a Bibliography* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1972).

[4] "Negative Values, Countersystem Models, and the Analysis of Social Systems," in Herman Turk and Richard L. Simpson, eds., *Institutions and Social Exchange* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).

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> I will do what I can to help you with your lecture. [P. 380.]

What would be analogous today? A call to give academic papers, to participate in symposia; to perform to one's highest abilities in business and in the professions.

Let us focus for a moment on the structures of the mind that affected the feminists as opposed to the structures of life. Henry Stanton did not help his wife. Yet he traveled a great deal. I agreed earlier that what a woman needs to work creatively is an income and a room of one's own. Many of the authors in the book argue for these or their functional equivalent. In Elizabeth Cady Stanton's case the equivalent was the room in her life provided by a husband who was often away and thus (though there is no comment to this effect) didn't get in her way; some money from her disapproving father (when he wasn't cutting her off from it); and a worthy housekeeper. The Stanton family's solution supports a view that feminists, as well as the effective personnel of the EEOC, and other minority rights activists have advocated for some time: that attitudes may follow behavior; that it is unnecessary to persuade people to reform as long as they are compelled to *act* differently. Even if their attitudes don't immediately follow their behavior, life can be made easier for the victim.

What sociologists designate as alternate social structures are popularly seen as "alternate life-styles." Rossi's analytic biographies show that alternate life-styles—specially relating to new ways for men and women to live together and have children—existed a long time ago. And they were attempted by many of these feminists for the same reasons as today: in the hope of freeing the partners in a marriage from the oppression of either one.

Virginia Woolf, Vanessa Bell, Vita Sackville-West, members of the Bloomsbury Group at various times, managed through their very alternate life-styles to maintain strong work commitments and personal identities, even in a circle of strong-minded, egocentric, and creative men. This was also true of Mary Wollstonecraft (with William Godwin) and Fanny Wright (with Lafayette and later Robert Owen and her husband Phiquepal D'Arusmont) and a number of other women whose writings are included in this book.

The problem of relationships between strong women and strong men, both of whom demand attention and support, seems insoluble. Typically, even strong women bow before strong men. It is no secret that men of intellectual and artistic distinction tend to overpower most of the women in their world as well as some of the men. The chosen women, following convention and the internalized mandates of the social control system, stimulate and serve these men, ministering to their physical and psychic needs.

But the feminist writers were often able to circumvent this style. In the Bloomsbury Group this was perhaps because their relationships with the men in their lives (for any number of idiosyncratic reasons) were not intensive or absorbing. For Virginia Woolf, her precarious mental health (as she, and others in her circle defined it) made others attentive to *her* needs and moods rather than ordering her to be attentive to theirs. This definition also precluded motherhood. Of course within the Bloomsbury Group was an ethos of permissiveness with regard to sexual attachments and sexual proclivities. These Edwardians were far more contemporary in spirit and life-style than present-day radicals who insist on consistency, condemning many choices, and refuse to see that it is probably quite human to want both the security of traditional marriage and the options of independent choice. Nigel Nicolson's new book describing the marriage of his parents, Harold Nicolson and Vita Sackville-West, indicates that each felt the other was "there," yet they often were together only on weekends and each had intimate attachments to others at various points in their lives.[5] Most significant to our interest here is that each left the other to do their own work.

When Mary Wollstonecraft married Godwin, they decided to maintain separate residences so as to be able to work. Fanny Wright also saw the importance of autonomy. She married D'Arusmont only after she became pregnant. Rossi reports that the family was often separated and, reversing the usual pattern, the father remained with their daughter while Fanny Wright traveled to earn money by lecturing and supervising her publications. And

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[5] Nigel Nicolson, *Portrait of a Marriage* (New York: Atheneum, 1973).

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while it was probably true that none of these women had idyllic private lives, their lives were probably more complete and fulfilling than the lives of most women around them, and probably no worse emotionally.

Rossi observes that financial need prodded many of these women toward the path to a writing career. Mary Wollstonecraft's first published work was a collection of essays entitled "Thoughts on the Education of Daughters," written in 1786 to meet the rent on a building in which she ran a school.

Of course no single factor explains everything. Economic incentive is a thin reed on which to base work motivation because only a tiny percentage of the population of any society, female as well as male, does not "need" to work. Feminists stress today, as Charlotte Perkins Gilmore and others stressed earlier in our history, that even women's work in the home is of economic value; that some service workers get paid for it but others—the wives—do not get paid.

The enormous problem of just distribution of rewards for work becomes clear when it is examined from the perspective of the "woman problem." The writers anthologized by Rossi were aware of the radical consequences of changing the position of women in society. Suzanne LaFollette, writing in 1926, observed:

> Those anxious critics who protest that women have got more freedom than is good for Society make the mistake of supposing that Society can exist only if its organization remains unchanged. The same conservatism has opposed all the revolutionary adaptations which have fitted the social order to the breakdown of old forms and their replacement by new ones.

Too many themes presented in this volume are contemporary, both in the writings and in the biographies. Would that they pass into history! □

To Our Contributors

- When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy.
- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope. —THE EDITORS

Cages—at Home

FORT DIX STOCKADE: OUR PRISON CAMP NEXT DOOR, by Joan Crowell. New York: Links Books. 250 pp. $9.95 cloth, $3.95 paper.

Joan Crowell reports in conscientious detail on the history of the June 1969 uprising in the Fort Dix stockade. She writes of the cruel conditions that led to the uprising—of degradation, starvation diet, beatings, and torture. She tells of the sufferings of the five young soldiers accused of having led the uprising, of their trials and their long, hard road to justice and rehabilitation.

To this day, Crowell reports, American soldiers suffer these torments in our Army-camp stockades—a condition in desperate need of reform. E. T. □

David Bromwich

Ragged Dick

DIRTY TRICKS OR, NICK NOXIN'S NATURAL NOBILITY, by John Seelye. New York: Liveright. 152 pp. $5.95.

Of all American myths "rags to riches" has been the most stubbornly enduring. Time may be right for a parting glimpse of our cherished national fiction. Apart from John Seelye's *Dirty Tricks or, Nick Noxin's Natural Nobility*, another, older book is relevant: Horatio Alger's *Ragged Dick* (Macmillan, 1962; paper, 1966), a novel prophetically apt in more than its title. Seelye's new book is a latter-day imitation of the Alger story, written under conditions that allow parody to run into satire. Mr. Seelye is a gifted writer and, in many ways, he has accomplished what Philip Roth set out to do some

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years ago. Where Mr. Roth, at best an unsteady realist, spoiled the broth by throwing in a dose of his own venom, Mr. Seelye is grandly accommodating and lets the subject condemn itself without visible aid. A deadpan account of lunacy is the only satire worth having. Further, to have seen our ruler, in his early days, as a rotten-hearted kid on the make was a stroke of genius. The difficulty is just this: Mr. Seelye is exceeded in genius by Alger himself, who, like America, can be surrealistic without knowing it, and is able to instruct even as he delights.

The Alger child is pure in heart. Shrewd, easygoing, like Tom Sawyer "no better than he should be," he has somehow an instinct that takes him in the right direction, which is up. The whole process of election narrows into gaining recognition from a series of patrons. Grace, yes, but grace only that can be certified by works: never too much too soon. The child in his turn patronizes those of his bottom-dog friends who may be expected to stay down longer than he himself. To his superiors he is likely to appear submissive but not obsequious; to his friends, i.e., inferiors, self-conscious but not condescending. The landscape in which he moves is the modern city, with its magnificence, squalor, and deranging shock-tempo. What he sees and hears is often startling, and the weird undertone comes of an impossible blend of the innocuous and the terrible.

"Glass puddin' " cries a street vendor, who turns out to be an ordinary glazier saying: "Glass put in." There is no background in the world of Alger, so that characters are always having to step onto the midway for introduction. How many of them, like that vendor, are subtle grotesques. Again, what are we to make of a hero who thinks in the following manner: "I guess I'll go to Barnum's tonight, and see the bearded lady, the eight-foot dwarf, and the other curiosities, too numerous to mention." The mind too has only a foreground, when it can speak in a language of *things too numerous to mention*. We are in the presence of a human being comprised utterly of his own superego. Perhaps that is the concealed horror of the story.

Nevertheless there is humor in Alger's fiction, also of the Tom Sawyer variety. Questioned on one occasion about the reason his grooming has seemed to go from bad to better, Ragged Dick deflects his interrogator neatly: "I was dressed up for a party, then, but the clo'es was too well ventilated to be comfortable in cold weather." It is the ragging of an earnest boy who understands very well how to go just far enough.

Unhappily, Mr. Seelye has not preserved the humor. Given a character, however, who must be entirely impure of heart, this is the necessary sacrifice, in return for which we have the spectacle of an ascent that looks breathtaking after the fashion of every rogue's progress. Once, having expounded to his father the philanthropic value of selling rat cheese to customers as if it were Swiss cheese—thus insuring that the unmoneyed shall get ostensible and hence virtual Swiss cheese at bargain prices—young Noxin is rewarded with a morsel of said rat cheese to eat and praise. Equally memorable is the chronicle of days spent by the young worthy at a nearby beach, practicing his oratory and lodging pebbles in his mouth to increase jowl size. (Incidentially, Mr. Seelye is good at names: the home town of Poco Lobo, little wolf; Noxin as Nixon, noxious and perhaps toxic; though it is hard to penetrate the obscurity of dialectical wit that prompted him to call the sire Norman O. Noxin.)

The conclusion of *Dirty Tricks* is borrowed from Dryden's "Mac Flecknoe," and features the hero plunging through the bowels of the earth after a quake—here is a fine and possibly unconscious pun—until he connects with the local sewer system, is tossed out to sea with the town garbage, and floats back to shore and long life. This fellow is BOUND TO RISE, we are informed: just like the sewage. Once again the parodist has been outdone by the more rigorous deadpan of his original, for BOUND TO RISE was the motto Alger wanted as his own epitaph. The implications of that particular double-play are too dense for any commentator. At all events, Mr. Seelye's defeat is an honorable one since it is shared by Nathanael West, who also took Alger for his model in writing the remarkable fantasy entitled *A Cool Million*.

How we are transported from ostensible to virtual acceptance of any lie is the proper concern of the illusionist. Like the Alger hero our own Noxin is a soul utterly composed: for him

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In the Magazines

Jon Wiener

Footnote—Or Perish

A footnote appears, at first sight a trivial thing, and easily understood. But in the pages of the new *Social Sciences Citation Index,* these scholarly creations step forth as independent beings, endowed with a life of their own. The *Citation Index* is the most recent, and most titanic, achievement of the burgeoning information storage and retrieval industry. It is dedicated to the proposition that the best way to find out what an article is about is not to look at its title, but at its footnotes. As the publicity brochure explains, "no human indexer has to decide what is the subject of an article. The author of a new article indexes his own work through his references." The *Citation Index* thus "breaks the subject index barrier." An author who footnotes sources you consider to be important ought to be consulted, and an article that fails to footnote the important sources probably is not worth reading. With this notion in mind, the *Citation Index* has taken on the herculean task of indexing the footnotes in 3,000 social science journals in 26 languages. You look up an author, and the *Index* refers you to all the articles, published in a given period, which have cited various works of his.

The *Index* lists something like 175,000 citations of 125,000 articles by 100,000 social scientists, and it does this every four months. In a year, it indexes around half a million footnotes from 80,000 articles. Of the 3,000 journals whose footnotes are indexed, 1,000 receive "full coverage"—every footnote to a different source is punched into an IBM card, fed into the computer, and published in the next issue of the *Index.* The other 2,000 journals receive "selective coverage" of the appropriately social-scientific articles they publish. In a four-month period, the average social scientist (of the 100,000 who are footnoted) has 1.2 articles cited, and he is cited on the average 1.7 times. In fact, a small number of scholars are cited hundreds of times a year, while the majority are cited once per issue.

The purpose of the *Citation Index,* according to its advocates, is not only to serve as a reference tool, but also to "identify" the scholars "who have had a major impact on their fields," those "who have truly influenced the course of science." [1] "True influence" and "impact" are measured by frequency of citation; the more often you are footnoted, the greater your intellectual contribution, the more valuable your scholarly work. To the extent that the *Citation Index* becomes an accepted measure of scholarly importance, it will play a role in promotion and tenure of college and university staff, alongside the more traditional methods of evaluation. As one citation authority has written, "it was a logical step" to use the *Citation Index* to "measure current performance of scholars." If a young social scientist is footnoted often, his work will be judged important and valuable by his superiors, and he will be promoted; if no one footnotes somebody's work, that will be an argument for firing him. To paraphrase Thomas Hobbes: to be cited regularly, is felicity; to be cited most, bliss; and not to be cited at all, death.

ALL THIS may seem fanciful; it is not. The prestigious journal *Science* has run a series of articles arguing that the "quality of scientific output" of an author can be accurately measured by the numer of citations he receives,

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[1] Eugene Garfield, "Citation Indexing for Studying Science," *Nature* 227 (1970): 669–71.

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that the number of citations provides the best available measure of the "value" of an author's work, that the "best" contributions are among those cited most, and the "least important" attract few, if any, citations, and that an author's "outstanding" work is the one that is cited most often.[2] An article in the British journal *Nature* claims that "valid correlations can be obtained between individual performance and citation counts"; ominously, this finding was reported in the *IEEE Transactions on Military Electronics*.[3] Such a claim may send a chill down the spines of assistant professors; what is this "performance" that military electronics experts have tied to our footnotes?

The potential of citation indexing for measuring academic status can be seen in a pre-*Citation Index* study of the *American Sociological Review*, comparing individuals' citation frequencies for 1958–62 with those for 1967–68 in the same journal.[4] The five most often cited sociologists between 1958 and 1962 were, in order, Durkheim, Parsons, Shils, Sorokin, and Lazarsfeld; in 1967–68, the top five were Lipset, Parsons, Merton, Etzioni, and Goode. Of the ten most often cited sociologists in 1958–62, only four remained in the top ten six years later.

The fastest rising sociologist for this period was Seymour Martin Lipset, who rose from 11th to first. Among those who dropped off the list of the top 22 were not only Shils and Sorokin, but Max Weber himself. Durkheim also took a big fall, from first to 15th. Predictably, Parsons was the only one to remain at the top of the list for both periods. Fully 15 of the 22 most often cited sociologists in 1967–68 were not on the list for 1958–62.

The name Karl Marx does not appear among the 22 most frequently cited scholars for either period; one would have to conclude that his work had little "impact" on sociology, that it lacked "quality," and that it is not among the "best contributions" to the field.

The frequency of publication of the *Citation Index*—three times a year— offers the potential of regularly updated measures of intellectual status. The computer could easily list authors in order of the number of their citations every four months; the sister publication *Science Citation Index* already lists the top 50 scientists each year in order of citation frequency. It is possible to rank-order all 100,000 social scientists three times a year. For an individual to move from, say, the 85,274th most often cited social scientist in May, to the 67,319th in December, would be an indication of intellectual growth and increasing status, a reason to go out to dinner, if not to ask for a promotion.

Of course almost everyone is cited once or twice, so it is only at the top that real distinctions could be made. This makes often cited social scientists something like professional athletes—citations are like home runs, citation rates like batting averages. Presumably there is a Babe Ruth of lifetime citations (Talcott Parsons?), and the academic world is waiting for the Hank Aaron who will challenge him (Seymour Martin Lipset?). The *Citation Index* can be used to identify fast-rising rookies, players at the peak of their careers, and over-the-hill performers, along with those who peaked too soon. The year-by-year pattern of citations provides a concrete quantitative measure of an individual's intellectual development: Professor X started his rise in '63, hit his peak in '70 with his most often cited work, and has been resting on his laurels ever since, having the same old articles cited, and slowly sliding downhill in the rankings. Intellectual styles are reflected in the patterns of citations: some authors are cited at a slow and steady pace, while others alternate flashy peaks with long troughs of inactivity (teaching? administration? mental depression?).

The *Citation Index*'s computer data bank is updated weekly. Dissemination of weekly changes in citation frequency rates and rankings could provide an extremely sensitive measure of intellectual status. One imagines the eventual establishment of a social science tickler tape, which would spread citation rates to the offices of deans and department chairmen instantaneously. (A burst of noise from the ticker; the dean rushes over and reads off the sputtering tape, 'Dan Bell up 6.")

The *Citation Index* can be used not only to see who has the most footnotes of all, but to

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[2] Jonathan R. Cole and Stephen Cole, "The Ortega Hypothesis," *Science* 178 (1972): 369–70; J. Margolis, "Citation Indexing and Evaluation of Scientific Papers," *Science* 156 (1967): 1213.

[3] Garfield, *Nature*.

[4] M. J. Oromaner, "Contemporary American and British Sociology," *British Journal of Sociology* (1970): 329.

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compare the citation rates of authors of related works to see who has had the greater "impact," whose "contribution" to a particular area has been more "significant." For instance, if we consider theorists of comparative modernization, we find that Samuel P. Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* was cited in 16 different articles in four months of 1973, Barrington Moore, Jr.'s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* got ten, and Cyril Black's *Dynamics of Modernization* got only four. (Black need not despair; he might demand that his publisher advertise more, or bring out a cheaper paperback edition, to get more books in the hands of potential footnoters; simply insisting that his own graduate students footnote him more often could raise his citation rate considerably.)

Publishers of the *Citation Index* have suggested a further use for their product: citation frequencies should be the basis of awarding prizes, grants, and fellowships. The *Citation Index* will be useful for "efficient management" of "increasingly scarce intellectual and financial resources." [5] To further such use in the sciences, the *Science Citation Index* plans to rank the 20,000 most cited papers each year, and has listed the 50 most often cited authors in rank order each year.

IF CITATION INDEXING becomes a basis for promotion and tenure, for grants and fellowships, the implications for one's own footnotes are clear. In the marketplace of ideas, the footnote is the unit of currency; to footnote an author is to cast a vote for his tenure or grant. One should therefore be judicious in his footnoting: footnote friends and don't footnote enemies. The most likely consequence will be an inflation of citations; as the importance of being footnoted becomes increasingly clear, each author will footnote more people—to gain their friendship and their footnotes in return. The average number of citations per author will creep up, and the standards will have to be revised to reflect the new footnoting practices.

One must remember that the median citation rate is around one footnote per scholar every four months. If one friend cites you in an indexed journal, you are listed in the *Citation Index*, and you avoid falling into that terrible class of the never-cited. Thus one should definitely footnote his friends (once in an article is all that counts), and do what is possible to see that they footnote you in return (send them offprints, suggest relevant references to your work, etc.).

The easiest way to avoid the dustbin of the uncited is to cite oneself. From the viewpoint of the citation indexers, this is perfectly kosher; for all the computer knows, another person with your name is citing you. (Indeed, if there is another social scientist among the listed 100,000 with your last name and initials, the *Citation Index* considers the two of you to be a single person, and intermingles your footnotes indiscriminately.) Every article of yours ought to cite your other published works—once is enough for each. However, it is undesirable if the only citations to your work come from yourself. This is not a substitute for friends' citations, it is merely a way of boosting your rate. To paraphrase Rabbi Hillel: if I do not cite myself, who will? If I cite myself alone, what am I? And if not in this article, when? (To the question, "If I cite myself alone, what am I?" a sociologist of science has answered, "parochial, eccentric, mediocre.")

ALL of these procedures have been practiced with a vengeance by Eugene Garfield, founder and president of the *Citation Index*'s parent firm [and also its publisher: the Institute for Scientific Information, in Philadelphia].

The *Index* lists 21 articles written by Garfield, which were referred to a total of 19 times in the indexed journals in four months of 1973. This puts Garfield high in the citation frequency rankings—higher than Robert Merton or Daniel Bell, for instance. Close inspection of his citations reveals the following: of Garfield's 21 articles, 13 are cited only by himself; of the 19 references to Garfield's *corpus*, 15 come from himself. That's a self-citation rate of 79 percent. And, of his 21 articles, nine were published in *Current Contents*, of which Garfield himself is founder, publisher, and editor. Perhaps, as president of the firm that publishes the *Index*, Garfield is entitled to take these liberties.

The *Citation Index* is intended not only to provide a quantitative basis for firing or promoting you, but also to refer people to your work. This has further implications for the

[5] Garfield, *Nature*.

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structure of one's own footnotes. Potential readers, using the *Citation Index,* are led to your published work by your footnotes; thus the more footnotes you have, the more people using the *Citation Index* are likely to come up with a reference to your article. The key is not just adding more footnotes to your articles, but adding wide-ranging footnotes that may be only tenuously related to your topic. Even if a footnote is not altogether appropriate, someone may still be led to read your article as a result of finding its footnotes in the *Citation Index.*

These implications for altering one's own footnoting practices have further implications for journal editors and referees. Increasingly they will become the arbiters of what is a legitimate footnote and what is simply an attempt to advance a friend's work, improve one's own citation rate, or draw the attention of users of the *Citation Index.* It will be up to journal editors to permit, or to eliminate, such footnotes. (Those submitting articles might seek to avoid criticism of their footnotes with a few judicious citations of works by the editors of the journal in question.)

Citation indexing has more far-reaching implications for journal editors. The five-year cumulation of the sister publication *Science Citation Index* listed not just authors, but also journals in order of frequency of citation. Not surprisingly, one percent of the scientific journals received 24 percent of all the references, and six percent of the journals received half the citations. Half of all articles footnoted at least one of the 25 most frequently cited journals at least once.[6]

The same conclusion has been drawn about journals as about individual scholars: in the words of the leading advocate of citation indexing, "citation frequency reflects a journal's value."[7] He suggests that frequency of citation should be the basis of library subscriptions; citation frequency "provides a solid basis for cost-benefit analysis in the management of subscription budgets." To assist librarians in this task, the creators of the *Citation Index* also publish *Journal Citation Reports,* listing citations by journal instead of author. If a journal isn't footnoted often, it's not "useful to the scientific community"; it's not worth reading, and thus not worth a library subscription—which will make certain that even fewer read the more obscure journals.

Editors thus need to be concerned about the citation rate of their own journals, and ought to seek to avoid the downward spiral of a decreasing citation rate bringing about a decline among library subscriptions. The simplest method by which editors can keep their journal's citation rates high is to make sure each article in their journal footnotes other articles in earlier issues of the same journal. Editors would thus want to suggest the addition of appropriate footnotes in articles accepted for publication, or perhaps reject articles whose footnotes do not contribute to the citation rate, and thus survival, of the journal.

The *Citation Index*'s creators also believe the *Index* can help editors select articles for publication by providing standards to determine what constitutes up-to-date footnotes. Sociologists of science who study citation patterns have concluded that it is more scientific to footnote recent works than older ones. It is a characteristic of science, we are told, that "new contributions will supersede old ones," and this "should be observable in the distribution of footnote citations." We can tell that physics is more scientific than sociology because 50 percent of cited physics articles in a recent journal-year were less that three years old, while 50 percent of sociology footnotes were more than six years old. What is true of fields is also true of individual articles.[8] The *Citation Index* can provide averages to suggest what the acceptable "half-life" of references ought to be in a genuinely "scientific" work; presumably, editors of social science journals should look suspiciously on articles submitted for publication whose footnotes are primarily to works more than seven or eight years old.

The publishers of the *Citation Index* believe it can indicate "how each brick in the edifice of science is linked to all the others"; it will rewrite the intellectual history of social science, and the rewriting will be done by a computer.

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[6] Eugene Garfield, "Citation Analysis as a Tool in Journal Evaluation," *Science* 178 (1972): 474–75.
[7] Garfield, *Science.*

[8] Duncan McRae, Jr., "Growth and Decay Curves in Scientific Citations," *American Sociological Review* 34 (1969): 631, 634.

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> In the near future a historian or sociometrist will be able to sit before a computer console and specify some starting point—a person, a word, a citation. . . . The computer will respond by drawing or displaying a historical road map which will show . . . a graphical approximation of the history of that subject.[9]

The computer will do this by tracing citations back into the past. Talcott Parsons footnotes Durkheim and Weber; therefore he was influenced by Durkheim and Weber. Parsons does not footnote Marx; therefore Marx's work did not influence Parsons. The computer console thus will dispense with such arguments as Alvin Gouldner's, that Parsons can only be understood as an attempt to come up with a conservative alternative to Marxism during a time of capitalist crisis.

The publishers of the *Citation Index* offer a wide range of other "information services." The "Automatic Subject Citation Alert" is an "individualized, computer-produced, weekly alerting service" which will send you the latest footnotes every week from 3,200 journals on a topic of your choice. You could, for instance, receive weekly listings of all articles in the 3,200 indexed journals which footnoted you. For those scholars at the low end of the citation frequency lists, this experience could be depressing: to be informed every week, month after month, that no one cited you this week.

Current Contents is in some ways the boldest of all the related publications; it is a weekly journal which consists solely of reproductions of the tables of contents of "the important journals." For this intellectual breakthrough, it received the first "Information Hall of Fame Award."

But there is one group of social science writers and editors that need not concern themselves with any of the foregoing: those whose published work appears beyond the pale of the indexed journals. No one punches their footnotes into IBM cards; no computer data bank contains the references in their work. In fact, the editors of the *Citation Index* made some curious choices about which journals to index and which to exclude. Among the 3,200 indexed journals, selective coverage is given to such unlikely titles as *Mosquito News, Soap/Cosmetics, Digestion,* and the *Tasmanian Journal of Agriculture,* but there is no coverage at all of journals like the *Review of Radical Political Economy, Radical America, Socialist Revolution, Telos, Insurgent Sociologist, Working Papers for a New Society,* or *Monthly Review,* to name a few. If a footnote to your work appears in *Commentary* or the *Public Interest,* you get counted; if it appears in *New Politics,* or *Social Policy,* or *Dissent,* you don't. Could it be that there is some logic behind these choices of the editors? Those who want their work to be indexed ought to ponder this question with particular care.

JON WIENER □

[9] Garfield, *Nature*. See also N. C. Janke, Kenneth O. May, "Abuses of Citation Indexing," *Science* 156 (1967): 890–92.

BOOKS *(continued from page 587)*

superego equals ego equals id. Conscience on the other hand is foreign. Wisest to turn such things away at the border or at least refuse their naturalization papers. At birth, the hero must have been impoverished in ways he could hardly suspect. The train ride from Poco Lobo to Long Beach carried him through fields of asphalt and sand, the rubble of *ad hoc* civilization. In that blank scene, with little to fill the mind or crowd the fancy, the Alger fiction merged with his own life. Fiction on this exaggerated scale could be an excuse but also a justification: by resorting to myth, the President-to-be acquired a most fertile imaginative prospect as well as a protocol to which he might forever defer in his peculiar serial rite of expiation. It is tempting to play the patron and hold out aid and comfort: he will do the same, will he not, for boy scouts and returned veterans? Unfortunately, to resist the hopeful gaze of this Caliban has become a necessity in our own rise out of the streets. □

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